{"title":"Fit Between Regulatory Focus and Goal Pursuit Strategies on Auditors’ Professional Skepticism","authors":"Prabashi Dharmasiri, Soon‐Yeow Phang","doi":"10.1080/09638180.2022.2162945","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2022.2162945","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":11764,"journal":{"name":"European Accounting Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77421144","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Ahmet C. Kurt, Mary J. Becker, Rani Hoitash, Udi Hoitash
{"title":"Financial Constraints, Auditing, and External Financing","authors":"Ahmet C. Kurt, Mary J. Becker, Rani Hoitash, Udi Hoitash","doi":"10.1080/09638180.2022.2159471","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2022.2159471","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines the role of costly audit signals in future external financing activity of financially constrained firms. We document that when facing higher financial constraints, firms pay higher audit fees and have their audit reports completed sooner. Equally important, we find that costlier and timelier audits are associated with a greater amount of future financing raised by equity-seeking, but not debt-seeking, constrained firms. Our results are robust to controlling for various audit characteristics and risk factors. Additional analyses show that equity-seeking constrained firms that underwent costlier audits exhibit more favorable outcomes with respect to long-run stock performance and investment efficiency following seasoned equity offerings. Our findings suggest that while financially constrained firms are pressured to make cuts across various expenditure categories, negotiating lower audit fees in the face of higher financial constraints may not be a wise strategy.","PeriodicalId":11764,"journal":{"name":"European Accounting Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135604417","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Reputable Inside Directors and Internal Control Effectiveness","authors":"Zhijun Lin, Byron Y. Song, Zhimin Tian","doi":"10.1080/09638180.2022.2156573","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2022.2156573","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Internal control effectiveness is an important indicator of financial reporting quality. This study investigates whether reputable inside directors impact a firm’s internal control over financial reporting. Using a large sample of Standard & Poor’s 1500 firms from 2004 to 2012, we find that firms with reputable inside directors are less likely to have reported and likely internal control weaknesses and the association is more pronounced when (1) firms have higher needs for monitoring; (2) firms have higher costs of misreporting; (3) the reputable inside directors have higher reputational concerns; and (4) the reputable inside directors have no connections with the chief executive officers. We also find that the likelihood of remediating internal control weaknesses is significantly increased when new reputable inside directors join a firm. These findings enrich prior empirical studies examining the determinants of internal control weaknesses and have corporate governance policy implications for regulators by supporting the desirable role of inside directors.</p>","PeriodicalId":11764,"journal":{"name":"European Accounting Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2022-12-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138503167","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"What is Blockchain Accounting? A Critical Examination in Relation to Organizing, Governance, and Trust","authors":"D. Pflueger, M. Kornberger, J. Mouritsen","doi":"10.1080/09638180.2022.2147973","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2022.2147973","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":11764,"journal":{"name":"European Accounting Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2022-12-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84811499","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Passive Investors and Audit Quality: Evidence from the U.S.","authors":"Ting Dong, Florian Eugster, Antonio B. Vazquez","doi":"10.1080/09638180.2022.2136227","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2022.2136227","url":null,"abstract":"<p><b>ABSTRACT</b></p><p>The rise of index funds, or passive investing, in recent decades has caused heated debates over the efficacy of passive investors’ stewardship role in corporate governance. Our study adds to this emerging line of literature by examining whether passive investors enhance the quality of financial statement audits, a key aspect of corporate governance mechanisms. We follow [Appel, I. R., Gormley, T. A., & Keim, D. B. (2016). Passive investors, not passive owners. <i>Journal of Financial Economics</i>, <i>121</i>(1), 111–141. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2016.03.003] we exploit the yearly Russell index reassignment, which provides us with an ideal setting to study the causal relation between passive institutional investors (i.e., index trackers) and firms’ audit quality. Examining firms closely surrounding the Russell 1000/2000 cutoff line, we find that higher passive ownership leads to higher audit quality proxied by audit fees. To investigate the channel through which passive investors influence audit-related governance issues, our evidence from auditor ratification voting records suggests that passive investors do ‘voice’ their opinion on low-quality audits. Such effort also leads to a higher likelihood of auditor turnover in the following year. In the cross-sectional analysis, we also find that the positive effect of passive investors on audit quality is more pronounced in firms with higher agency costs. Thus, our study supports the view that passive investors play an active role in improving corporate governance.</p>","PeriodicalId":11764,"journal":{"name":"European Accounting Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2022-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138503166","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Advice Utilization From Predictive Analytics Tools: The Trend is Your Friend","authors":"Dennis D. Fehrenbacher, A. Ghio, M. Weisner","doi":"10.1080/09638180.2022.2138934","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2022.2138934","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Management decision-making is increasingly supported by new data types and advanced predictive analytics tools. Prior research suggests that the inclusion of new data types – such as social media data – in forecasting models can improve forecasting. We explore whether managers’ operational decisions differ depending on the data type used by a predictive analytics tool and the consistency of the trend with prior developments. Experimental results show that the extent to which managers use predictions from analytics tools is a joint function of the data type utilized and trend consistency. If a trend predicted by an analytics tool reveals a downward break from prior positive developments (i.e., an unexpected negative trend), managers utilize predictions less if they are mainly based on social media data rather than on traditional accounting data. If a trend predicted by an analytics tool continues a prior positive trend, we do not find such a difference. In supplemental analyses, we explore managers’ comfort level and related attitude concerning the data types and find that only in the trend-breaking condition mediation effects are observed. Together, our findings have important implications for the management accounting function that needs to embed knowledge about managers’ information utilization to facilitate decision-making.","PeriodicalId":11764,"journal":{"name":"European Accounting Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2022-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79221254","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Saverio Bozzolan, Claudia Imperatore, Marco Mattei
{"title":"Family Ownership and Impression Management: An Integrated Approach","authors":"Saverio Bozzolan, Claudia Imperatore, Marco Mattei","doi":"10.1080/09638180.2022.2141287","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2022.2141287","url":null,"abstract":"<p><b>ABSTRACT</b></p><p>According to agency theory, impression management is lower in family-owned firms because of reduced agency I conflicts. However, when family owners are present, agency I conflicts are superseded by agency II conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders, leading to a positive association between impression management and family ownership. Moreover, family owners have distinct goals related to the preservation of socioemotional wealth (SEW) that may influence agency conflicts. We formalize these countervailing forces by developing an integrated theoretical framework that considers both agency I and agency II conflicts and how they interact with SEW-related motives. We hypothesize that the coexistence of agency I and agency II conflicts in family-owned firms leads to a U-shaped association between family ownership and impression management. We also expect that this U-shaped association is flatter when family influence on the board is stronger and SEW motives shape more corporate choices. We test our predictions by analyzing the letters to shareholders of 77 Italian-listed firms from 2008 to 2015. The results confirm our expectations and hold when we use instrumental variable estimation, alternative proxies to capture SEW motives, and impression management measures.</p>","PeriodicalId":11764,"journal":{"name":"European Accounting Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2022-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138503165","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Accruals Quality, Shocks to Macro-uncertainty, and Investor Response to Earnings News","authors":"Carlo D’Augusta, A. Prencipe","doi":"10.1080/09638180.2022.2141288","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2022.2141288","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":11764,"journal":{"name":"European Accounting Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2022-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88783233","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}