家族所有权与印象管理:一种综合方法

IF 2.5 3区 管理学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Saverio Bozzolan, Claudia Imperatore, Marco Mattei
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引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要根据代理理论,家族企业的印象管理水平较低是因为代理冲突较少。然而,当家族所有者在场时,代理I冲突被控股股东和小股东之间的代理II冲突所取代,从而导致印象管理与家族所有权之间的正相关。此外,家族所有者在保存社会情感财富(SEW)方面有不同的目标,这可能会影响代理冲突。我们通过开发一个综合的理论框架来形式化这些抵消力量,该框架考虑了代理I和代理II的冲突以及它们如何与sew相关动机相互作用。我们假设家族企业中代理一和代理二冲突的共存导致家族所有权与印象管理之间呈u型关系。我们还预计,当家族对董事会的影响更大,SEW动机影响更多的公司选择时,这种u形关联更平坦。我们通过分析2008年至2015年77家意大利上市公司致股东的信件来检验我们的预测。当我们使用工具变量估计、替代代理来捕捉SEW动机和印象管理措施时,结果证实了我们的期望。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Family Ownership and Impression Management: An Integrated Approach

ABSTRACT

According to agency theory, impression management is lower in family-owned firms because of reduced agency I conflicts. However, when family owners are present, agency I conflicts are superseded by agency II conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders, leading to a positive association between impression management and family ownership. Moreover, family owners have distinct goals related to the preservation of socioemotional wealth (SEW) that may influence agency conflicts. We formalize these countervailing forces by developing an integrated theoretical framework that considers both agency I and agency II conflicts and how they interact with SEW-related motives. We hypothesize that the coexistence of agency I and agency II conflicts in family-owned firms leads to a U-shaped association between family ownership and impression management. We also expect that this U-shaped association is flatter when family influence on the board is stronger and SEW motives shape more corporate choices. We test our predictions by analyzing the letters to shareholders of 77 Italian-listed firms from 2008 to 2015. The results confirm our expectations and hold when we use instrumental variable estimation, alternative proxies to capture SEW motives, and impression management measures.

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来源期刊
European Accounting Review
European Accounting Review BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
7.00
自引率
6.10%
发文量
58
期刊介绍: Devoted to the advancement of accounting knowledge, it provides a forum for the publication of high quality accounting research manuscripts. The journal acknowledges its European origins and the distinctive variety of the European accounting research community. Conscious of these origins, European Accounting Review emphasises openness and flexibility, not only regarding the substantive issues of accounting research, but also with respect to paradigms, methodologies and styles of conducting that research. Though European Accounting Review is a truly international journal, it also holds a unique position as it is the only accounting journal to provide a European forum for the reporting of accounting research.
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