European Accounting Review最新文献

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Product Recalls and Audit Production 产品召回和审核生产
IF 3.3 3区 管理学
European Accounting Review Pub Date : 2022-10-20 DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2022.2130953
Kevin H. Kim, Jonathan Nash, Jongha Park
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引用次数: 0
Does Disaster Risk Relate to Banks’ Loan Loss Provisions? 灾害风险与银行贷款损失拨备有关吗?
IF 3.3 3区 管理学
European Accounting Review Pub Date : 2022-10-14 DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2022.2120513
Lorenzo Dal Maso, K. Kanagaretnam, Gerald J. Lobo, Francesco Mazzi
{"title":"Does Disaster Risk Relate to Banks’ Loan Loss Provisions?","authors":"Lorenzo Dal Maso, K. Kanagaretnam, Gerald J. Lobo, Francesco Mazzi","doi":"10.1080/09638180.2022.2120513","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2022.2120513","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":11764,"journal":{"name":"European Accounting Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2022-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81463849","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Optimal Revision Rules of Cost-Based Transfer Prices in a Multi-Period Production Setting 多周期生产环境下基于成本的转移价格最优修正规则
IF 3.3 3区 管理学
European Accounting Review Pub Date : 2022-09-28 DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2022.2125420
M. Brunner, Peter Schäfer
{"title":"Optimal Revision Rules of Cost-Based Transfer Prices in a Multi-Period Production Setting","authors":"M. Brunner, Peter Schäfer","doi":"10.1080/09638180.2022.2125420","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2022.2125420","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":11764,"journal":{"name":"European Accounting Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2022-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77969356","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
When Investors Can Talk to Firms, Is It a Meaningful Conversation? Evidence from Investor Postings on Interactive Platforms 当投资者可以与公司对话时,这是一次有意义的对话吗?来自投资者在互动平台上发帖的证据
IF 3.3 3区 管理学
European Accounting Review Pub Date : 2022-09-28 DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2022.2118147
Shijun Guo, Xin Yu, Robert Faff
{"title":"When Investors Can Talk to Firms, Is It a Meaningful Conversation? Evidence from Investor Postings on Interactive Platforms","authors":"Shijun Guo, Xin Yu, Robert Faff","doi":"10.1080/09638180.2022.2118147","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2022.2118147","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":11764,"journal":{"name":"European Accounting Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2022-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82655882","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Cost Stickiness and Stock Price Delay 成本粘性与股价延迟
IF 3.3 3区 管理学
European Accounting Review Pub Date : 2022-09-28 DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2022.2121739
Nishant Agarwal
{"title":"Cost Stickiness and Stock Price Delay","authors":"Nishant Agarwal","doi":"10.1080/09638180.2022.2121739","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2022.2121739","url":null,"abstract":"<p><b>ABSTRACT</b></p><p>This study examines the effect of cost stickiness on stock price delay. Using a sample of U.S. firms in the period of 1984–2019, I find that the stickiness of Selling, General, and Administrative (SG&amp;A) costs is positively associated with stock price delay. This finding is consistent with the notion that cost stickiness reduces the quality of information available to investors and causes stock price delay (the direct channel). Using a mediation test, I document that cost stickiness reduces the analyst following of the firm, thus increasing stock price delay (the indirect channel). Cross-sectional analyses reveal that the effect of cost stickiness on stock price delay is prominent in firms characterized <i>ex-ante</i> by a relatively poor information environment. Meanwhile, the effect is weak for firms with managers who use less uncertain and more positive words in Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&amp;A) disclosures within 10-K filings. This study contributes to the growing literature on cost behavior by documenting the adverse consequences of managers’ cost decisions on the capital market and the role of the information environment in mitigating these negative implications.</p>","PeriodicalId":11764,"journal":{"name":"European Accounting Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2022-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138503164","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
When do Governments ‘Go Dark'? Evidence on Governments’ Disclosure Choices in Periods of Uncertainty 政府什么时候“黑暗”?不确定时期政府信息披露选择的实证研究
IF 3.3 3区 管理学
European Accounting Review Pub Date : 2022-09-14 DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2022.2118146
C. Columbano, Marco Trombetta
{"title":"When do Governments ‘Go Dark'? Evidence on Governments’ Disclosure Choices in Periods of Uncertainty","authors":"C. Columbano, Marco Trombetta","doi":"10.1080/09638180.2022.2118146","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2022.2118146","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT We examine the effect of uncertainty shocks on the level of fiscal guidance – the guidance issued by governments on the expected evolution of the fiscal and economic outlook. Because uncertainty makes governments’ expectations less precise but potentially more valuable to users, we hypothesize that a disclosure dilemma leads governments to balance a higher demand for guidance with a higher probability of issuing inaccurate forecasts. Using natural disasters to randomize uncertainty shocks in our sample, we find that on average, governments issue less guidance in periods of uncertainty. The effect is driven by a reduction in the number of forecasts on the future evolution of balance sheet items, but only when governments have low refinancing needs and face a relatively quiet bond market. Instead, governments that maintain a stable level of guidance in periods of uncertainty appear to cater to coercive isomorphic pressures stemming from creditors. We further document that the relative ‘transparency’ of governments in periods of uncertainty is negatively related to indicators of fiscal reporting quality. Collectively, the evidence indicates that in the public sector, uncertainty leads to a trade-off between disclosure quantity and quality.","PeriodicalId":11764,"journal":{"name":"European Accounting Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2022-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88420753","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Firm Strategy and CEO−VP Pay Differentials in Equity Compensation 公司战略与股权薪酬中的CEO - VP薪酬差异
IF 3.3 3区 管理学
European Accounting Review Pub Date : 2022-09-14 DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2022.2119153
Margaret A. Abernethy, Yunhe Dong, Yu Flora Kuang, Bo Qin, Xing Yang
{"title":"Firm Strategy and CEO−VP Pay Differentials in Equity Compensation","authors":"Margaret A. Abernethy, Yunhe Dong, Yu Flora Kuang, Bo Qin, Xing Yang","doi":"10.1080/09638180.2022.2119153","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2022.2119153","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We examine whether pay differentials between the chief executive officer (CEO) and vice presidents (VPs) can be explained by firms’ strategic priorities. We find that firms that pursue prospector-type strategies have a larger CEO−VP difference in equity compensation. We argue that such a pay differential relates to the relative authority that CEOs have in strategic decision-making, and we find that authority allocation based on a firm’s strategic priorities is consistent with the relative ability of the CEO vis-à-vis the VPs. Our results remain consistent after considering alternative explanations including CEO power, risk-taking incentives, and tournament incentives among VPs. Further analyses reveal that a large CEO−VP equity pay differential enhances firm value for prospector-type firms, and that shareholders and proxy advisors tend to incorporate firm strategy in their say-on-pay votes and proxy recommendations.</p>","PeriodicalId":11764,"journal":{"name":"European Accounting Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2022-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138503163","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Do women mind the non-GAAP? Board gender diversity and non-GAAP disclosure quality 女性在意非公认会计准则吗?董事会性别多样性和非公认会计准则披露质量
IF 3.3 3区 管理学
European Accounting Review Pub Date : 2022-09-10 DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2022.2116065
D. Ranasinghe, Luisa A. Unda, S. Wright
{"title":"Do women mind the non-GAAP? Board gender diversity and non-GAAP disclosure quality","authors":"D. Ranasinghe, Luisa A. Unda, S. Wright","doi":"10.1080/09638180.2022.2116065","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2022.2116065","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":11764,"journal":{"name":"European Accounting Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2022-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88147237","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Language Similarity and M&A Transactions 语言相似性与并购交易
IF 3.3 3区 管理学
European Accounting Review Pub Date : 2022-09-10 DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2022.2117221
Xiaofei Pan, Jin Zhang
{"title":"Language Similarity and M&A Transactions","authors":"Xiaofei Pan, Jin Zhang","doi":"10.1080/09638180.2022.2117221","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2022.2117221","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":11764,"journal":{"name":"European Accounting Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2022-09-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88829595","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Takeover Vulnerability and Pre-Emptive Earnings Management 收购脆弱性与先发制人的盈余管理
IF 3.3 3区 管理学
European Accounting Review Pub Date : 2022-09-05 DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2022.2116064
Abongeh A. Tunyi, Junhong Yang, Henry Agyei‐Boapeah, Michael Machokoto
{"title":"Takeover Vulnerability and Pre-Emptive Earnings Management","authors":"Abongeh A. Tunyi, Junhong Yang, Henry Agyei‐Boapeah, Michael Machokoto","doi":"10.1080/09638180.2022.2116064","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2022.2116064","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":11764,"journal":{"name":"European Accounting Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.3,"publicationDate":"2022-09-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77355200","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
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