LSN: Compensation Law (Topic)最新文献

{"title":"Is a Minimum Wage an Appropriate Instrument for Redistribution?","authors":"Aart Gerritsen, B. Jacobs","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2871278","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2871278","url":null,"abstract":"textabstractWe analyze the redistributional (dis)advantages of a minimum wage over income taxation in competitive labor markets, without imposing assumptions on the (in)efficiency of labor rationing. Compared to a distributionally equivalent tax change, a minimum-wage increase raises involuntary unemployment, but also raises skill formation as some individuals avoid unemployment. A minimum wage is an appropriate instrument for redistribution if and only if the public revenue gains from additional skill formation outweigh both the public revenue losses from additional unemployment and the utility losses of inefficient labor rationing. We show that this critically depends on how labor rationing is distributed among workers. A necessary condition for the desirability of a minimum-wage increase is that the public revenue gains from higher skill formation outweigh the revenue losses from higher unemployment. We write this condition in terms of measurable sufficient statistics. Our empirical analysis suggests that a minimum-wage increase is undesirable in nearly all OECD countries. A reduction in the minimum wage, along with tax adjustments that keep net incomes constant, would yield a Pareto improvement.","PeriodicalId":115265,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Compensation Law (Topic)","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116286590","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Scheduling Shortfalls: Hours Parity as the New Pay Equity","authors":"Nantiya Ruan, Nancy Reichman","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2337245","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2337245","url":null,"abstract":"At the dawning of the fifty-year anniversary of the Equal Pay Act of 1963, and as the same anniversary of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 draws near, it is time to change the way we think about pay equity. Workplace fairness between women and men should no longer be framed merely by total disparities in pay, but also by disparities in hours given to women seeking as much work as their male counterparts. Doing so recognizes the realities of many female workers in today’s workplace and addresses the shortfalls thus far absent from the civil rights conversation about pay equity. Today’s workforce is filled with female contingent workers who are at the mercy of their supervisors as to the number of hours they work. The number of part-time workers has steadily increased over the last decade, with involuntary part-time workers (those forced to downgrade from full-time to part-time because of economic conditions or the employer’s needs) numbering 8.2 million and the total number of part-time workers exceeding 27 million. Two-thirds of part-time workers are women, and as the Congressional Joint Economic Committee has recognized, the gender pay gap is partly driven by the earning penalty for part-time work, which pays less per hour than the same or equivalent work done by full-timers. One under-examined factor in this pay inequity is the power of scheduling that employer supervisors have over their part-time work force. From the outside, supervisors seemingly make capricious decisions on whom to schedule, when, and for how many hours. When individual supervisors make these unilateral decisions without regard to employment standards or criteria, they appear to do so with little oversight and guidance, which can lead to discriminatory bias based on gender. This gender bias can be motivated (consciously or unconsciously) by societal stereotypes casting women as less than “ideal workers” with weak commitment to the workplace because of outside caregiving responsibilities. From a doctrinal standpoint, however, the current statutory regimes seem ill suited to address these disparities. The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of 1938 merely mandates minimum and overtime wages, the Equal Pay Act of 1963 does not cover hours equity, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964’s anti-discrimination mandate rarely (if ever) reaches the issue of scheduling and is therefore sorely underdeveloped. Moreover, due to recent Supreme Court decisions dramatically restricting employment discrimination class actions, bringing aggregate litigation for low-wage workers will be an uphill battle, one attorneys are likely loathe to take on for relatively low damages. This Article makes the case for changing the way we think about pay equity. Because our workforce is filled with part-time workers, advocates for low-wage workers should focus not only on pay inequities and living wages, but also on hours equity. Hours equity would provide much-needed stability to scheduling th","PeriodicalId":115265,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Compensation Law (Topic)","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"130020293","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Review of the Meetings of the Government of the RF in July 2013","authors":"M. Goldin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2330937","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2330937","url":null,"abstract":"At the meetings of the Government of the Russian Federation in July 2013, the following issues among other things were discussed: the draft law which upgrades protection of workers’ right to receive a pay in case of a bankruptcy of the employer; the draft law aimed at unification of procedures for collection of insignificant amounts of arrears on insurance contributions, penalties and fines.","PeriodicalId":115265,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Compensation Law (Topic)","volume":"108 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-09-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122513941","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Labor Unemployment Risk and Corporate Financing Decisions","authors":"Ashwini Agrawal, David A. Matsa","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1667035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1667035","url":null,"abstract":"This paper presents evidence that firms choose conservative financial policies partly to mitigate workers' exposure to unemployment risk. We exploit changes in state unemployment insurance laws as a source of variation in the costs borne by workers during layoff spells. We find that higher unemployment benefits lead to increased corporate leverage, particularly for labor-intensive and financially constrained firms. We estimate the ex ante, indirect costs of financial distress due to unemployment risk to be about 60 basis points of firm value for a typical BBB-rated firm. The findings suggest that labor market frictions have a significant impact on corporate financing decisions.","PeriodicalId":115265,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Compensation Law (Topic)","volume":"58 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126237883","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Strengthening Unemployment Insurance for the 21st Century: A Roundtable Report","authors":"Stephen A. Woodbury, M. Simms","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1760130","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1760130","url":null,"abstract":"This report summarizes the proceedings of a national roundtable on \"Strengthening Unemployment Insurance for the 21st Century,\" convened by the National Academy of Social Insurance (NASI) in Washington, DC, on July 13, 2010. The roundtable was prompted by the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Social Security Act, which established Unemployment Insurance (UI) as a state-federal program in 1935, and by the Great Recession, which has placed unusual demands and stress on the UI program.The roundtable brought together about 70 government officials, legislative staff, researchers from think tanks and academia, representatives of employers and workers, and other interested parties. The day was organized into six panels, each on a specific aspect of the UI program, plus a final session during which attendees suggested UI program reforms. The first six panels started with brief presentations by at least two UI experts, then moved on to a discussion period and comments from others attendees.","PeriodicalId":115265,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Compensation Law (Topic)","volume":"48 4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126123283","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Raising the Dead? The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act","authors":"","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1418101","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1418101","url":null,"abstract":"If applied literally, the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act has the potential to radically change the landscape for litigating claims under Title VII and other antidiscrimination laws. While limited to discrimination in compensation, as opposed to discrimination in other terms and conditions of employment, the FPA removes the statute of limitations not only for compensation decisions per se but for any “other practice” affecting compensation. Further, the new law is explicitly retroactive. Thus, a failure to promote plaintiff twenty years ago would seem to be actionable today, so long as the nonpromotion has an effect on current compensation. While the statute has a liability- limiting provision, capping backpay at two years before the filing of an EEOC charge, the potentially enormous financial costs of the new law are sure to trigger a variety of responses from employers, ranging from interpretation disputes about the sweep of the new law, to constitutional challenges, to the FPA’s retroactive application, to raising the defense of laches, which has been barely developed in this context. This Article analyzes the new statute, generally concluding that its most radical implications are, in fact, the correct interpretation of the law and that, so read, Congress acted well within its constitutional powers in making the Fair Pay Act retroactive. Ironically, the justices who read Title VII as it was originally enacted to impose a strict limitations period, an interpretation that triggered the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act override, will be compelled by their own approach to statutory interpretation to read the Act as it is written. The Article does recognize, however, that laches may limit the impact of the new statute – most obviously where the plaintiff was aware both of the adverse employment action at the time it was taken and of the probability that that action was discriminatory.","PeriodicalId":115265,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Compensation Law (Topic)","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-06-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115456715","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Requirement to Expense Options: A Reactionary and Deleterious Response to Outrage","authors":"Thomas P. Ferguson","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1081472","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1081472","url":null,"abstract":"In 2004 the Financial Accounting Standards Board issued Financial Accounting Statement 123R which, among other things, mandates that firms report the estimated \"fair value\" of employee stock option grants and other forms of equity compensation and apply the expense to their reported earnings. This paper argues that the reasons FASB provides for the necessity of this change - accurate accounting for a value given, comparability among other domestic companies, and comparability internationally - are not only goals that are not met by the change, but that the implementation of FAS 123R is actually a reactionary measure to public outcry and outrage over excessive executive compensation and is designed to reduce executive compensation. Further, even if this surreptitious purpose - which is outside of FASB's scope - is met, it is met in a way that fails to further investors' information needs and fails to offer new comparability efficiencies. While the focus of my inquiry and analysis regarding FAS 123R is on employee stock options, primarily to executives, because options are often granted as just a part of a compensation package they must be addressed in the context of an entire employee compensation package, particularly an equity compensation component. Thus Parts I and II of this paper discuss executive compensation and equity compensation generally. Part I very briefly introduces equity compensation. Part II focuses on the general social and economic issues surrounding executive compensation, particularly equity compensation. Equity compensation is presented in the context of contemporary discourse, discussing bargaining issues, equity effects on manager behavior, necessity to the firm, and public perception. Part III introduces two administrative actions designed to address these issues, FASB's FAS 123R and the SEC's more recent requirement of a Compensation Discussion & Analysis. Part IV addresses FASB's main justifications for implementing FAS 123R and finds that those justifications are fallible in that they are either (at best) debatable or (more likely) simply incorrect. Finally, Part V presents the idea that FAS 123R may help to chill outrage, argues that outrage is the driving factor behind FAS 123R, and discusses some of the economic and financial effects of the implementation of FAS 123R.","PeriodicalId":115265,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Compensation Law (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-02-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129114347","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Compensation Consultants and Executive Pay: Evidence from the United States and the United Kingdom","authors":"M. Conyon","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1106729","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1106729","url":null,"abstract":"Executive Overview Executive compensation consultants are investigated using data from the United States and the United Kingdom. The study yields a number of findings. First, CEO pay is generally greater in firms that use compensation consultants, consistent with a rent-extraction theory of executive pay. Second, the amount of equity used in the CEO compensation package, such as stock options, is greater in firms that use consultants. This is consistent with alignment of manager and shareholder interests. Third, there is little evidence that using consultants with potential conflicts of interest, such as supplying other business to client firms, leads to greater CEO pay or the adverse design of pay contracts. Copyright by the Academy of Management.","PeriodicalId":115265,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Compensation Law (Topic)","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2008-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134532562","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"New Vs. Old Economy: Trends and Determinants of Executive Compensation","authors":"J. Vieito, Antonio Cerqueira, Elísio Brandão, Walayet A. Khan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.967513","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.967513","url":null,"abstract":"We analyzed the executive compensation in the new and old economy in the period between 1992 to 2005. We focused on the evolution of the compensation and the factors that explain the executive compensation and if the form of compensation changed after the Nasdaq crash and the Sarbanes-Oxley act. Our results reveal that the new economy executives received, on average, much more than executives from the old economy from 1992 to 2003, but after 2004 the mean difference is very small and not statistically significant. In terms of compensation components, old economy executives always received more salary than new economy executives, and between 1992 to 2000, new economy executives received more bonus than old economy executives, but after this year the situation changes. We also found that the crash of Nasdaq and the Sarbanes Oxley act affected in a different way the executive compensation from new and old economy. In the case of the new economy, executives are changing from stock options based compensation to restricted stocks, and in the case of the old economy, they are changing to bonuses. We also investigated the impact of corporate governance and financial variables on new and old economy CEOs' and Directors' compensation and found evidence that the percentage of stock options that are vested but not exercised, size of the firm, the percentage of firm stocks owned by the executive, volatility, closing price of the company stock for the calendar year, one year total return to shareholders, number of board meetings, age as CEO and the ROA are variables that play important roles in explaining CEO and Director compensation. We also found that these factors are not all the same when we explain CEO and directors compensation from new and old economy and, in the case of the variables that are the same the intensity of the coefficients is different and generally statistically significant","PeriodicalId":115265,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Compensation Law (Topic)","volume":"152 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2007-02-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114927047","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Compensation Representatives: A Prudent Solution to Excessive CEO Pay","authors":"Lawton W. Hawkins","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.924869","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.924869","url":null,"abstract":"Currently, CEO pay is determined by a company's board of directors, subject to limited shareholder approval in certain circumstances. However, as Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried have argued, directors and CEOs do not necessarily engage in real arms length bargaining over CEO pay. Instead, CEOs may exert managerial power to extract economic rents. To address the problem, Bebchuk and Fried have proposed granting large shareholders the right to nominate candidates for the board, and would require the company to pay the expenses for the proxy fight if the nominee received a designated minimum level of support. This article accepts the fundamental point that the CEO pay-setting process is flawed and that reforms are necessary. Nonetheless, it recognises that high CEO pay may be attributable to factors other than managerial power, and it questions whether certain of Bebchuk and Fried's proposed solutions might have negative consequences beyond CEO pay. Therefore, to remedy the problems in the pay-setting process, it proposes that large shareholders be allowed to appoint \"compensation representatives\" to look after the interests of all shareholders on matters relating exclusively to CEO pay. Compensation representatives would have the right to attend all compensation-related meetings, to question board members, to make recommendations, and to report their views to shareholders. Shareholders could use the representative's report as a basis for rejecting unreasonable pay arrangements. This approach would insert into the pay-setting process parties who are immune to CEO pressure and responsive to shareholder concerns. It would address compensation process flaws, without fundamentally altering the relationship between the shareholders and directors. Its implementation is highly feasible, since it could be adopted by shareholder by-law, without changing existing law. Finally, it could be vindicated or discredited by the market itself. As such, it would constitute a prudent solution to excessive CEO pay.","PeriodicalId":115265,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Compensation Law (Topic)","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-08-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117154037","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}