薪酬代表:CEO薪酬过高的审慎解决方案

Lawton W. Hawkins
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引用次数: 0

摘要

目前,首席执行官的薪酬由公司董事会决定,在某些情况下需要有限的股东批准。然而,正如卢西恩•贝布丘克和杰西•弗里德所指出的那样,董事和首席执行官并不一定会就首席执行官的薪酬进行真正的公平谈判。相反,首席执行官可能会运用管理权力来提取经济租金。为了解决这个问题,Bebchuk和Fried提议授予大股东提名董事会候选人的权利,并要求如果被提名者获得指定的最低支持水平,公司支付代理权之争的费用。本文接受一个基本观点,即CEO薪酬设定过程存在缺陷,改革是必要的。尽管如此,它承认,CEO的高薪酬可能归因于管理权力以外的因素,并质疑Bebchuk和Fried提出的某些解决方案是否会产生CEO薪酬以外的负面影响。因此,为了纠正薪酬设定过程中的问题,它建议允许大股东任命“薪酬代表”,在专门与首席执行官薪酬有关的事项上照顾所有股东的利益。薪酬代表将有权参加所有与薪酬有关的会议,向董事会成员提问,提出建议,并向股东报告他们的观点。股东可以将代表的报告作为拒绝不合理薪酬安排的依据。这种方法将把不受首席执行官压力、对股东关切作出反应的各方纳入薪酬制定过程。它将解决薪酬程序的缺陷,但不会从根本上改变股东与董事之间的关系。它的实施是高度可行的,因为它可以在不改变现行法律的情况下通过股东章程。最后,它可能被市场本身证明是正确的,也可能是不可信的。因此,这将是应对CEO薪酬过高的一个审慎解决方案。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Compensation Representatives: A Prudent Solution to Excessive CEO Pay
Currently, CEO pay is determined by a company's board of directors, subject to limited shareholder approval in certain circumstances. However, as Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried have argued, directors and CEOs do not necessarily engage in real arms length bargaining over CEO pay. Instead, CEOs may exert managerial power to extract economic rents. To address the problem, Bebchuk and Fried have proposed granting large shareholders the right to nominate candidates for the board, and would require the company to pay the expenses for the proxy fight if the nominee received a designated minimum level of support. This article accepts the fundamental point that the CEO pay-setting process is flawed and that reforms are necessary. Nonetheless, it recognises that high CEO pay may be attributable to factors other than managerial power, and it questions whether certain of Bebchuk and Fried's proposed solutions might have negative consequences beyond CEO pay. Therefore, to remedy the problems in the pay-setting process, it proposes that large shareholders be allowed to appoint "compensation representatives" to look after the interests of all shareholders on matters relating exclusively to CEO pay. Compensation representatives would have the right to attend all compensation-related meetings, to question board members, to make recommendations, and to report their views to shareholders. Shareholders could use the representative's report as a basis for rejecting unreasonable pay arrangements. This approach would insert into the pay-setting process parties who are immune to CEO pressure and responsive to shareholder concerns. It would address compensation process flaws, without fundamentally altering the relationship between the shareholders and directors. Its implementation is highly feasible, since it could be adopted by shareholder by-law, without changing existing law. Finally, it could be vindicated or discredited by the market itself. As such, it would constitute a prudent solution to excessive CEO pay.
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