Compensation Consultants and Executive Pay: Evidence from the United States and the United Kingdom

M. Conyon
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引用次数: 149

Abstract

Executive Overview Executive compensation consultants are investigated using data from the United States and the United Kingdom. The study yields a number of findings. First, CEO pay is generally greater in firms that use compensation consultants, consistent with a rent-extraction theory of executive pay. Second, the amount of equity used in the CEO compensation package, such as stock options, is greater in firms that use consultants. This is consistent with alignment of manager and shareholder interests. Third, there is little evidence that using consultants with potential conflicts of interest, such as supplying other business to client firms, leads to greater CEO pay or the adverse design of pay contracts. Copyright by the Academy of Management.
薪酬顾问和高管薪酬:来自美国和英国的证据
高管薪酬顾问的调查使用了来自美国和英国的数据。这项研究得出了一些发现。首先,在聘用薪酬顾问的公司中,首席执行官的薪酬通常更高,这与高管薪酬的租金提取理论相一致。其次,在聘用顾问的公司,CEO薪酬方案中使用的股票期权等权益金额更高。这与管理者和股东利益的一致性是一致的。第三,几乎没有证据表明,使用有潜在利益冲突的顾问,比如向客户公司提供其他业务,会导致CEO薪酬提高或薪酬合同设计不利。版权归美国管理学会所有。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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