{"title":"Corporate Governance through Codes","authors":"Ilir Haxhi, Ruth V. Aguilera","doi":"10.1002/9781118785317.WEOM060097","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118785317.WEOM060097","url":null,"abstract":"The UK's 1992 Cadbury Report defines corporate governance (CG) as the system by which businesses are directed and controlled. CG codes are a set of best practices designed to address deficiencies in the formal contracts and institutions by suggesting prescriptions on the preferred role and composition of the board of directors, relationships with shareholders and top management, auditing and information disclosure, and the remuneration and dismissal of directors. Codes can be distinguished from other modes of regulation in that they are formally non binding, exemplified in the widely used comply-or-explain principle, issued by committees of experts, flexible in their application, built on the market mechanism for evaluation of deviations and evolutionary in nature. Several scholars consider the Cadbury Code (1992) as the original code, although the first code was created in 1978 in the US. Today about 90 nations worldwide have issued their own code(s). Regulating CG through codes is seen as a process, where \"soft rules\" for example codes, are favored over traditional \"hard rules\". However, unlike \"hard\" law regulation, for example, Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, codes may not lead to the optimal CG; that is they merely reduce the worst corporate behavior but do not foster the best practices through strict compliance.","PeriodicalId":114900,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Corporate Governance International (Topic)","volume":"147 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"115117850","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Functional Regulation of Finance","authors":"S. Schwarcz","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2437544","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2437544","url":null,"abstract":"How should we think about regulating our dynamically changing financial system? Existing regulatory approaches have two temporal flaws. The obvious flaw, driven by politics and human nature (and addressed in other writings), is that financial regulation is overly reactive to past crises. This article addresses a less obvious flaw: that financial regulation is normally tethered to the financial architecture, including the distinctive design and structure of financial firms and markets, in place when the regulation is promulgated. In order to effectively address future crises, this article argues, financial regulation must transcend that time-bound architecture. This could be done by regulating the underlying economic functions of the financial system — the provision, allocation, and deployment of financial capital — as well as the financial system’s capacity to serve as a network within which those functions can be conducted. The article analyzes how to design and implement such a “functional” approach to financial regulation. Although this approach is primarily normative, it provides regulatory ordering principles that should have practical utility — not only as a set of standards to inform actual regulatory design but also as a counterweight to the prevailing view that macroprudential regulation of systemic risk can be adequately served by an ad hoc assortment of regulatory “tools.”","PeriodicalId":114900,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Corporate Governance International (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-06-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131084228","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Company Law as a Restriction to Free Movement – Examination of the Notion of 'Restriction' Using Company Law as the Frame of Reference","authors":"K. Sørensen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2386145","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2386145","url":null,"abstract":"Focusing on recent judgments from the Court of Justice of the European Union this article investigates how the notion of ‘restriction’ – which is the first step in examining whether there is an infringement of the free movement rights – is used in cases involving company law measures. There is evidence that non-discriminatory obstacles to free movement found in company law can be restrictions. However, recent cases show that the Court may be willing to apply a more restrictive approach where only non-discriminatory measures that have a qualified deterrent effect may constitute restrictions. Furthermore, the article examines when measures undertaken by private parties – for instance when adopting articles of association – may constitute restrictions and finally the relationship between secondary EU-law and the free movement right is discussed.","PeriodicalId":114900,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Corporate Governance International (Topic)","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"122173764","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Legal Framework Governing Business Firms and its Implications for Manufacturing Scale and Performance: The UK Experience in International Perspective","authors":"S. Deakin","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2394724","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2394724","url":null,"abstract":"This paper reviews empirical studies examining the economic effects of laws governing the formation, financing and organisation of business firms with the aim of putting the UK experience in a comparative perspective. The literature identifies two models of legal support for manufacturing which imply different directions for policy: on the one hand, the Silicon Valley model of venture capital funded growth which depends on liquid capital markets and flexible labour markets, and the northern European and Japanese model which is based on long-term innovation, stable ownership, and institutionalised worker-management cooperation. The UK has some of the legal features of the Silicon Valley model, but important parts are missing: for example, the Californian rule under which post-employment restraints ('restrictive covenants') are void on the grounds of their anti-competitive effects has no equivalent in the UK. Conversely, although the UK has certain elements of the northern European or east Asian model of institutionalised corporate governance, it is unlikely to be able to replicate the 'productive coalition' approach of these countries as long as the legal framework prioritises shareholder rights and the market for corporate control, and provides limited encouragement for job security. The Silicon Valley and 'productive coalition' models are ideal types which can distract from the fact that most countries, the UK included, are hybrid systems with some of the characteristics of each model. Rather than designing laws and policies exclusively with one model or the other in mind, it may be preferable to consider specific laws and policies on their own merits, while bearing in mind that a given legal rule or policy does not operate in isolation from others and that there may be some 'network effects' in operation due to the way that particular rules interact.","PeriodicalId":114900,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Corporate Governance International (Topic)","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-12-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126413173","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises: An Empirical Survey of the Model of Temasek Holdings in Singapore","authors":"Christopher C. Chen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2366699","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2366699","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores the effect of Temasek Holdings Pte Ltd, one of Singapore’s two prominent sovereign wealth funds, on the corporate governance of its target companies in Singapore. It compares companies associated with Temasek with the other listed companies on the Singapore Exchange that form the components of the Straits Times Index. Based on these companies’ 2012 annual reports, this paper finds that the companies in which Temasek has direct stakes have a higher proportion of independent directors and are more likely to have an independent director serving as chairman, indicating a higher quality of corporate governance. However, Temasek’s success is not necessarily a result of law, but may have more to do with its self-disciplinary nature and the hands-off approach of the Singaporean government. This means that the Temasek model may not easily be copied by state-owned enterprises in other countries. However, the fact that Temasek plays like an active investor and complies with corporate law may prove that state-owned enterprises may still enjoy a higher quality of corporate governance, and that sovereign wealth funds may behave akin to responsible investors.","PeriodicalId":114900,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Corporate Governance International (Topic)","volume":"466 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116785288","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Shariah Governance and Corporate Governance: A Malaysian Case Study","authors":"M. Salim, S. Kunhibava, Lim Soo H'an","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2499354","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2499354","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines Shariah Governance in Islamic financial institutions in Malaysia and identifies issues from a corporate governance regulatory perspective.","PeriodicalId":114900,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Corporate Governance International (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-09-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128564146","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Why Shareholders Shouldn't Vote: A Marxist‐Progressive Critique of Shareholder Empowerment","authors":"Lorraine E. Talbot","doi":"10.1111/1468-2230.12036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.12036","url":null,"abstract":"This paper argues that liquidity, short-termism and low involvement in corporate governance are fundamental ingredients of shareholders’ value maximisation strategies. Neither shareholders nor their representatives will voluntarily adopt restrictions which inhibit their ability to pursue these strategies, such as those presented by the Stewardship Codes. Utilising Marxist and progressive theory this paper evidences the tendency for all capital (including shares) to seek liquidity. It presents historical evidence which shows that political policy can either restrict this tendency, as it did in the progressive and post war period, or facilitate it, as it did in nineteenth century England and in the current neoliberal period. The shareholder empowerment initiatives examined in this paper are therefore best understood as strategies to justify shareholder claims in the current crisis and to thereby protect the neoliberal status quo.","PeriodicalId":114900,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Corporate Governance International (Topic)","volume":"477 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129725411","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Acquisition of Listed vs Unlisted Firms: Determinants in Different Legal and Institutional Environments","authors":"Isabel Feito-Ruiz, Susana Menéndez Requejo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2291049","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2291049","url":null,"abstract":"Acquiring firm shareholders place greater value on the purchase of unlisted firms (2.71%) than listed ones (0.59%) for Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) performed by European listed firms from 2002 to 2007. Managerial opportunism is a determinant in the acquisition of listed firms, occurring with greater probability in countries in which acquiring firm shareholders receive less protection. Another determinant is information asymmetry, which favors a discount in the price of acquisitions of unlisted firms. In line with this result, the less developed the capital market in the country of the acquired firm, the greater the probability of acquisitions of listed firms.","PeriodicalId":114900,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Corporate Governance International (Topic)","volume":"475 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"126897864","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Independent Directors in Companies in the Backdrop of Corporate Failures","authors":"B. Ronald","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2266966","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2266966","url":null,"abstract":"The article considers the role of independent directors in the governance of companies. It puts forth the role of independent directors in the good governance of companies and looks at the issues that question the independence of the independent directors.","PeriodicalId":114900,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Corporate Governance International (Topic)","volume":"674 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121997133","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Differential Ability to Recognize Emerging Developments and Corporate Performance Under Uncertainty","authors":"Chia‐Chun Hsieh, Zhiming Ma, K. Novoselov","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2256292","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2256292","url":null,"abstract":"Research in psychology and biology shows that individuals differ in their ability to recognize changes in the environment and that these differences arise as an adaptive response to uncertainty. We argue that the said ability is relevant to decision making under uncertainty. We conduct empirical tests in which we infer the ability to recognize emerging developments from the propensity to take costly precautionary actions in the face of uncertainty (we dub it prudence). Using a large sample of U.S.-listed firms over a thirty-year period, we report that (i ) prudent firms exhibit greater long-term profitability than firms that have never taken precautionary actions, (ii ) the positive association between prudence and profitability monotonically increases in uncertainty, (iii ) prudence does not convey any benefits in low-uncertainty environments, and (iv) prudent firms are more responsive to changes in investment opportunities. The results are consistent with the theoretical predictions.","PeriodicalId":114900,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Corporate Governance International (Topic)","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-04-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117136242","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}