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Proportional Individual Rationality and the Provision of a Public Good in a Large Economy 比例个人理性与大经济体中公共产品的供给
Public Economics: Publicly Provided Goods eJournal Pub Date : 2013-02-11 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2227287
Kang Rong
{"title":"Proportional Individual Rationality and the Provision of a Public Good in a Large Economy","authors":"Kang Rong","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2227287","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2227287","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the public good provision problem in which a non-excludable public good can be provided and payments can be collected from agents only if the proportion of agents who obtain nonnegative interim expected utilities from the public good provision mechanism weakly exceeds a prespecified ratio α. We call this requirement “α proportional individual rationality”. We identify a key threshold such that if α is less than this threshold, then efficiency obtains asymptotically. If α is greater than the threshold, then inefficiency obtains asymptotically. In addition, we obtain the convergence rate of the probability of provision to its efficient/inefficient level. Moreover, as a methodological contribution of this paper, we propose the standard deviation of an agent’s interim expected provision as a measure of the agent’s influence in a mechanism. We find that as the economy becomes large, an agent’s influence in any sequence of anonymous mechanisms converges to zero, and thus any sequence of anonymous feasible mechanisms must converge to a constant mechanism. We obtain uniform bounds for those rates of convergence.","PeriodicalId":113748,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Publicly Provided Goods eJournal","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"116683241","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Security of Property as a Public Good: Institutions, Socio-Political Environment and Experimental Behavior in Five Countries 作为公共物品的财产安全:制度、社会政治环境和五个国家的实验行为
Public Economics: Publicly Provided Goods eJournal Pub Date : 2012-11-07 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2172473
Francisco Campos-Ortiz, L. Putterman, T. Ahn, Loukas Balafoutas, Mongoljin Batsaikhan, Matthias Sutter, Chentong Xu, I. Chen, J. Tarrasó, M'exico City, Benjamin Furlan, In Innsbruck, M. Kang, Sangyeol Ahn, Namun Cho, I. Seoul, Amarsanaa Dashdavaa, D. Batjargal
{"title":"Security of Property as a Public Good: Institutions, Socio-Political Environment and Experimental Behavior in Five Countries","authors":"Francisco Campos-Ortiz, L. Putterman, T. Ahn, Loukas Balafoutas, Mongoljin Batsaikhan, Matthias Sutter, Chentong Xu, I. Chen, J. Tarrasó, M'exico City, Benjamin Furlan, In Innsbruck, M. Kang, Sangyeol Ahn, Namun Cho, I. Seoul, Amarsanaa Dashdavaa, D. Batjargal","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2172473","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2172473","url":null,"abstract":"We study experimentally the protection of property in five widely distinct countries— Austria, Mexico, Mongolia, South Korea and the United States. Our main results are that the security of property varies with experimental institutions, and that our subject pools exhibit significantly different behaviors that correlate with country-level property security, trust and quality of government. Subjects from countries with higher levels of trust or perceptions of safety are more prone to abstain initially from theft and devote more resources to production, and subjects from countries with higher quality political institutions are more supportive of protecting property through compulsory taxation. This highlights the relevance of socio-political factors in determining countries’ success in addressing collective action problems including safeguarding property rights.","PeriodicalId":113748,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Publicly Provided Goods eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131086122","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 49
Parties, Institutions and Political Budget Cycles at the Municipal Level 市一级的政党、机构和政治预算周期
Public Economics: Publicly Provided Goods eJournal Pub Date : 2012-10-26 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2182583
Marika Cioffi, G. Messina, Pietro Tommasino
{"title":"Parties, Institutions and Political Budget Cycles at the Municipal Level","authors":"Marika Cioffi, G. Messina, Pietro Tommasino","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2182583","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2182583","url":null,"abstract":"We study the magnitude, the determinants and the electoral consequences of pre-electoral fiscal manipulation by incumbent politicians. To this aim, we build a dataset covering all the Italian municipalities. We document several facts. First, there is a clear political cycle in the path of expenditures, driven by capital outlays. Second, only mayors not affiliated to a national political party induce an election-driven expenditure cycle. Third, pre-electoral expenditure boosts increase re-election prospects of the incumbent only if she is not affiliated to a party. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that national parties have both the incentives and the resources to curb the pre-electoral profligacy of party-affiliated mayors. We also consider the impact of formal institutions. In particular, we find that budget rules reduce the effects of the political cycle, whereas binding term limits seem to be ineffective.","PeriodicalId":113748,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Publicly Provided Goods eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128037283","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 54
National Policy - Commission on Library and Information System and Services in India: Past, Present, and Future 印度图书馆和信息系统与服务国家政策委员会:过去、现在和未来
Public Economics: Publicly Provided Goods eJournal Pub Date : 2012-09-18 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2302468
Ajit Kumar
{"title":"National Policy - Commission on Library and Information System and Services in India: Past, Present, and Future","authors":"Ajit Kumar","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2302468","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2302468","url":null,"abstract":"This paper describes the actual situation of the National Policy/Commission/Mission on the Library and Information System and Services in India. It represents how library was established, what are the steps has been taken by the Government of India for the holistic development of Library time to time from different platform viz. India Five Year Plans, National Policy on Library and Information System, The Empowered Committee, the Working Group on Libraries (WGL), National Knowledge Commission (NKC), etc. It is now Library Community can hope for the holistic development of libraries in India.","PeriodicalId":113748,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Publicly Provided Goods eJournal","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125236341","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Public Housing Units vs. Housing Vouchers: Accessibility, Local Public Goods, and Welfare 公共住房单元与住房券:可及性、地方公共产品和福利
Public Economics: Publicly Provided Goods eJournal Pub Date : 2012-09-04 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2141225
C. Leung, Sinan Sarpça, K. Yilmaz
{"title":"Public Housing Units vs. Housing Vouchers: Accessibility, Local Public Goods, and Welfare","authors":"C. Leung, Sinan Sarpça, K. Yilmaz","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2141225","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2141225","url":null,"abstract":"We develop a general equilibrium model of residential choice and study the effects of two housing aid policies, public housing units and housing vouchers. Land is differentiated by both residential accessibility and local public goods, and the provision levels of local public goods are determined by property tax revenues and neighborhood compositions. Households differ in their incomes and preferences for local public goods. Housing aid policies are financed by general income taxes. We discuss how the location of public housing units is a fundamental policy variable, in addition to the numbers and sizes of units, and argue that vouchers not only cause less distortion for social welfare compared to public housing, but may also improve overall welfare.","PeriodicalId":113748,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Publicly Provided Goods eJournal","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128963170","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 43
The Importance of Knowing Your Own Reputation 了解自己声誉的重要性
Public Economics: Publicly Provided Goods eJournal Pub Date : 2012-08-03 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2127063
Matthias Greiff, Fabian Paetzel
{"title":"The Importance of Knowing Your Own Reputation","authors":"Matthias Greiff, Fabian Paetzel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2127063","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2127063","url":null,"abstract":"We experimentally investigate a ?nitely repeated public good game with varying partners. Within each period, participants are pairwise matched and contribute simultaneously. Participants are informed about contributions and each participant evaluates her partner’s contribution. At the beginning of the next period, participants are re-matched and, except for the two control treatments, receive information resulting from the previous period’s evaluations. There are three information treatments: Participants receive information either about their own evaluation or about their partner’s evaluation or both. Although participants condition their contributions on their partners’ evaluations, this information alone is insuf?cient to raise contributions. Only if participants also know their own evaluation, we do ?nd a signi?cant increase in contributions relative to the control treatments.","PeriodicalId":113748,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Publicly Provided Goods eJournal","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132585095","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Heterogeneity and Cooperation in Privileged Groups: The Role of Capability and Valuation on Public Goods Provision 特权群体的异质性与合作:能力与价值在公共品供给中的作用
Public Economics: Publicly Provided Goods eJournal Pub Date : 2012-08-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2141855
Felix Kölle
{"title":"Heterogeneity and Cooperation in Privileged Groups: The Role of Capability and Valuation on Public Goods Provision","authors":"Felix Kölle","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2141855","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2141855","url":null,"abstract":"We experimentally investigate cooperation in privileged groups which according to Olson (1965) are groups in which at least one member has an incentive to supply a positive amount of the public good. More specifically, we analyze group member heterogeneity with respect to two dimensions: capability and valuation. Our results reveal that with and without punishment opportunities, heterogeneity crucially affects cooperation and coordination within groups. Compared to non-privileged groups, asymmetric valuations for the public good have negative effects, and asymmetric capabilities in providing the public good have positive effects on voluntary contributions. The main reason for these results are the different externalities contributions have on the other group members’ payoffs affecting individuals’ willingness to cooperate. Hence, whether heterogeneity facilitates or impedes collective action, and whether privileged groups are as privileged as they initially seem is subject to the nature of their asymmetry.","PeriodicalId":113748,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Publicly Provided Goods eJournal","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"131628560","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 6
The Internet and the Network Neutrality Debate 互联网和网络中立性之争
Public Economics: Publicly Provided Goods eJournal Pub Date : 2012-07-25 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199895656.003.0014
Brett M. Frischmann
{"title":"The Internet and the Network Neutrality Debate","authors":"Brett M. Frischmann","doi":"10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199895656.003.0014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199895656.003.0014","url":null,"abstract":"This chapter explores how infrastructure theory applies to the Internet and in particular the network neutrality debate. The chapter demonstrates how the infrastructure analysis, with its focus on demand-side issues and the function of commons management, reframes the network neutrality debate, weights the scale in favor of sustaining end-to-end architecture and an open infrastructure, points toward a particular rule (which the chapter articulates and defends), and encourages a comparative analysis of various nondiscriminatory (commons management compatible) solutions to congestion and supply-side problems. I acknowledge that there are competing considerations and interests to balance, and I acknowledge that quantifying the weight on the scale is difficult, if not impossible. Nonetheless, I maintain that the weight is substantial. The social value attributable to a open Internet infrastructure is immense even if immeasurable. The basic capabilities the infrastructure provides, the public and social goods produced by users, and the transformations occurring on and off the meta-network are all indicative of such value.","PeriodicalId":113748,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Publicly Provided Goods eJournal","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"127480173","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Improving Efficiency Through Consolidation of Jurisdictions? Evidence from the Cantons of Switzerland 通过合并司法管辖区提高效率?来自瑞士各州的证据
Public Economics: Publicly Provided Goods eJournal Pub Date : 2012-07-05 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2103667
Philippe K. Widmer, George M. Elias, P. Zweifel
{"title":"Improving Efficiency Through Consolidation of Jurisdictions? Evidence from the Cantons of Switzerland","authors":"Philippe K. Widmer, George M. Elias, P. Zweifel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2103667","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2103667","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this paper is to analyze the optimal scale of local jurisdictions (cantons) in Switzerland applying Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to the years 2000 to 2004. Aggregate output performance indicators for four local government activities (administration, education, health, and transportation) are used to measure technical and scale efficiency and to derive DEA scores. Results show that these public services fail to exhibit economies of scale, undermining quests for centralization of public good provision while suggesting the possibility of Tiebout competition.","PeriodicalId":113748,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Publicly Provided Goods eJournal","volume":"58 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125735660","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Direct Democracy and Resource Allocation: Experimental Evidence from Afghanistan 直接民主与资源分配:来自阿富汗的实验证据
Public Economics: Publicly Provided Goods eJournal Pub Date : 2012-07-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1935055
A. Beath, Fotini Christia, R. Enikolopov
{"title":"Direct Democracy and Resource Allocation: Experimental Evidence from Afghanistan","authors":"A. Beath, Fotini Christia, R. Enikolopov","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1935055","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1935055","url":null,"abstract":"Direct democracy is designed to better align public resource allocation decisions with citizen preferences. Using a randomized field experiment in 250 villages across Afghanistan, this paper compares outcomes of secret-ballot referenda with those of consultation meetings, which adhere to customary decision-making practices. Elites are found to exert influence over meeting outcomes, but not over referenda outcomes, which are driven primarily by citizen preferences. Referenda are also found to improve public satisfaction, whereas elite domination of allocation processes has a negative effect. The results indicate that the use of direct democracy in public resource allocation results in more legitimate outcomes than those produced by customary processes.","PeriodicalId":113748,"journal":{"name":"Public Economics: Publicly Provided Goods eJournal","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2012-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"125786102","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 57
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