直接民主与资源分配:来自阿富汗的实验证据

A. Beath, Fotini Christia, R. Enikolopov
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引用次数: 57

摘要

直接民主旨在使公共资源分配决策更好地符合公民的偏好。通过在阿富汗250个村庄进行的随机实地实验,本文比较了无记名投票全民公决和协商会议的结果,后者坚持习惯的决策实践。研究发现,精英们会对会议结果施加影响,但不会对公投结果施加影响,公投结果主要由公民的偏好驱动。全民公决也能提高公众满意度,而精英对分配过程的支配则有负面影响。结果表明,在公共资源分配中使用直接民主比使用习惯程序产生的结果更合法。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Direct Democracy and Resource Allocation: Experimental Evidence from Afghanistan
Direct democracy is designed to better align public resource allocation decisions with citizen preferences. Using a randomized field experiment in 250 villages across Afghanistan, this paper compares outcomes of secret-ballot referenda with those of consultation meetings, which adhere to customary decision-making practices. Elites are found to exert influence over meeting outcomes, but not over referenda outcomes, which are driven primarily by citizen preferences. Referenda are also found to improve public satisfaction, whereas elite domination of allocation processes has a negative effect. The results indicate that the use of direct democracy in public resource allocation results in more legitimate outcomes than those produced by customary processes.
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