{"title":"Litigating Reproductive Health Rights in the Inter-American System: What Does a Winning Case Look Like?","authors":"Ciara O’Connell","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2553649","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2553649","url":null,"abstract":"Remedies and reparation measures emerging from the Inter-American System of Human Rights in reproductive health cases have consistently highlighted the need to develop, and subsequently implement, non-repetition remedies that protect, promote, and fulfill women's reproductive health rights. Litigation outcomes that determine there have been violations of reproductive rights are regarded as a \"win\" for health rights litigation, but when implementation fails, is a \"win\" still a win? There has been considerable success in litigating reproductive health rights cases, yet the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights are not adequately equipped to follow up on cases after they have been won. Successful and sustainable implementation of reproductive health rights law requires incorporation of non-repetition remedies in the form of legislation, education, and training that seeks to remodel existing social and cultural practices that hinder women's enjoyment of their reproductive rights. In order for a reproductive health rights case to ultimately be a \"winner,\" case recommendations and decisions emerging from the Commission and Court must incorporate perspectives from members of civil society, with the ultimate goal being to develop measurable remedies that address underlying obstacles to domestic implementation.","PeriodicalId":113747,"journal":{"name":"Litigation & Procedure eJournal","volume":"98 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-12-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121373208","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Тенденция Становления и Развития Законодательства О Защите Публично-Правового Интереса в Гражданском Судопроизводстве (The Tendency of Formation and Development of Legislation on the Protection of Public-Interest Law in Civil Proceedings)","authors":"R. Karaev, Karaev Murat, E. Polyakova","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2641467","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2641467","url":null,"abstract":"Russian Abstract: В статье рассмотрены исторические аспекты проблемы защиты публичного интереса в гражданском процессе. Проанализированы характерные особенности генезиса органов прокуратуры как средства защиты публичного интереса в различных политических системах России. Выявлено и обосновано, что полное устранение прокурора в вопросе защиты публичного интереса имеет крайние отрицательные последствия, также как и чрезмерное их доминирование.English Abstract: The article deals with the historical aspects of the problem relating to the protecting of public interest in civil proceedings. The characteristics which form the bodies of prosecutor's office as a means that protects the public interest in different political systems of Russia were analyzed. The authors consider that the complete elimination of the public prosecutor relating to protection of the public interest has extremely negative consequences, as well as their excessive dominance.","PeriodicalId":113747,"journal":{"name":"Litigation & Procedure eJournal","volume":"14 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"120894110","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Plausibility, Facts and Economics in Antitrust Law","authors":"Mariateresa Maggiolino","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2738519","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2738519","url":null,"abstract":"According to EU competition law, the existence of an anticompetitive agreement can be inferred from a number of coincidences and indicia only in the absence of another plausible explanation of the facts at stake. According to U.S. federal law (antitrust law included), only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief can survive a motion to dismiss at the pleading stage. What is plausible, however? After explaining the relationship between facts and evidence law, this chapter analyses the general meaning of the notion of plausibility, discusses the degree of discretion that it introduces, how it affects the justifications that judges and fact-finders make for their choices, and remarks on how this concept relates to substantial accuracy. On the other hand, the chapter acknowledges that antitrust law, by relating our understanding of what is plausible to economic models, debunks these concerns and raises another issue. Namely, since economics is rooted in various axioms and value-choices, the antirust link between plausibility, evidence standards and economics grants to these axioms and value-choices the possibility of affecting even antitrust decisions about facts, even though these decisions should amount to pure descriptions of the concrete facts.","PeriodicalId":113747,"journal":{"name":"Litigation & Procedure eJournal","volume":"42 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"121441534","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Accounting for Contingent Liabilities: What You Disclose Can Be Used Against You","authors":"Linda Allen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2457177","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2457177","url":null,"abstract":"Accounting standards require disclosure of estimable losses from contingent liabilities such as litigation expenses. However, revelation of the firm’s private estimates of the probability of loss and possible legal damages can be detrimental to the firm by encouraging litigation and increasing the costs of settlement. In this paper, I propose a model (the US-patented TMTM) that uses publicly-available data to provide accurate and unbiased estimates of litigation damages without requiring firms to publicly disclose their private assessments or litigation reserves. This provides valuable information to the users of financial statements without undermining the firm’s right to preserve sensitive internal information.","PeriodicalId":113747,"journal":{"name":"Litigation & Procedure eJournal","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"132748336","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Great Disruption: How Machine Intelligence Will Transform the Role of Lawyers in the Delivery of Legal Services","authors":"John O. McGinnis, Russell G. Pearce","doi":"10.21202/1993-047X.13.2019.2.1230-1250","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.21202/1993-047X.13.2019.2.1230-1250","url":null,"abstract":"This Article argues that machines are coming to disrupt the legal profession and that bar regulation cannot stop them. Part I describes the relentless growth of computer power in hardware, software, and data collection capacity. This Part emphasizes that machine intelligence is not a one-time event that lawyers will have to accommodate. Instead, it is an accelerating force that will invade an ever-larger territory and exercise a more firm dominion over this larger area. We then describe five areas in which machine intelligence will provide services or factors of production currently provided by lawyers: discovery, legal search, document generation, brief generation, and prediction of case outcomes. Superstars and specialists in fast changing areas of the law will prosper — and litigators and counselors will continue to profit — but the future of the journeyman lawyer is insecure. Part II discusses how these developments may create unprecedented competitive pressures in many areas of lawyering. This Part further shows that bar regulation will be unable to stop such competition. The legal ethics rules permit, and indeed where necessary for lawyers to provide competent representation, require lawyers to employ machine intelligence. Even though unauthorized practice of law statutes on their face prohibit nonlawyers’ use of machine intelligence to provide legal services to consumers, these laws have failed, and are likely to continue to fail, to limit the delivery of legal services through machine intelligence. As a result, we expect an age of unparalleled innovation in legal services and reject the view of commentators who worry that bar regulations are a significant stumbling block to technological innovation in legal practice. Indeed, in the long run, the role of machine intelligence in providing legal services will speed the erosion of lawyers’ monopoly on delivering legal services and will advantage consumers and society by making legal services more transparent and affordable.","PeriodicalId":113747,"journal":{"name":"Litigation & Procedure eJournal","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"117245410","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Piercing the Fiduciary Veil","authors":"C. P. Marks","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2406217","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2406217","url":null,"abstract":"Limited partnerships (LPs) and limited liability companies (LLCs) permit formation with a unique management structure in that these entities may be managed by another limited liability entity, such as a corporation. Thus, the true managers are those individuals who manage the manager. It is well settled that the managing entity, such as a corporate general partner, owes default fiduciary duties, but what of these second-tier managers? Technically, it is the managing entity that owes the duties, not the managing entity’s owners, officers, and directors, yet courts have struggled with strict adherence to this separation when it would seem inequitable to do so. Unfortunately, courts and commentators have failed, thus far, to articulate a clear rule as to when fiduciary duties should attach to second-tier managers that also makes allowances for countervailing concerns regarding the scope of such a duty. This article offers an approach aimed at resolving this problem by simply re-examining what it is that courts are doing when they attach liability. In the process of doing so, this article makes three major contributions to the existing scholarship. First, it is the only article describing the three main approaches courts have adopted to address the problem. Second, the article explains why alternate equitable theories, as currently applied, are inadequate to address this issue. Finally, this article offers a unique solution as to when fiduciary duties should attach to second-tier managers. Specifically, this article posits that liability should attach under a form of piercing the corporate veil. Unlike traditional piercing, which focuses on the abuse of the corporate form, this limited form of piercing, which I dub “piercing the fiduciary veil,” should focus on the abuse of the control exercised by second-tier managers.","PeriodicalId":113747,"journal":{"name":"Litigation & Procedure eJournal","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129377881","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Finding Order in the Morass: The Three Real Justifications for Piercing the Corporate Veil","authors":"J. Macey, Joshua Mitts","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2398033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2398033","url":null,"abstract":"Few doctrines are more shrouded in mystery and yet more litigated than piercing the corporate veil. We develop a new theoretical taxonomy which postulates that veil-piercing decisions fall into three categories: (1) achieving the purpose of a statutory or regulatory scheme, (2) preventing shareholders from obtaining credit by misrepresentation, and (3) promoting the bankruptcy values of achieving the orderly, efficient resolution of a bankrupt’s estate. We analyze the facts of several veil-piercing cases to show how the outcomes are explained by the three theories we put forth and show that undercapitalization is rarely, if ever, an independent grounds for piercing the corporate veil. In addition, we employ modern quantitative machine learning methods never before utilized in legal scholarship to analyze the full text of 9,380 judicial opinions. We demonstrate that our theories systematically predict veil-piercing outcomes, the widely-invoked rationale of “undercapitalization” of the business poorly explains these cases, and our theories most closely reflect the textual structure of the opinions.","PeriodicalId":113747,"journal":{"name":"Litigation & Procedure eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-02-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129996511","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Too Late to Stipulate: Reconciling Rule 68 with Summary Judgments","authors":"C. Turner","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2398083","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2398083","url":null,"abstract":"This Comment illustrates that the conflict between FRCP 68 and summary judgment can be resolved by reconsidering the assumption that Rule 68 operates like a contract. By interpreting Rule 68 as a stipulation and venerating the difference between summary and final judgments, courts can increase certainty in Rule 68’s operation and, hopefully, promote greater use of the Rule as its drafters intended.","PeriodicalId":113747,"journal":{"name":"Litigation & Procedure eJournal","volume":"36 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"129153679","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Means and Meaning in Patent Remedies","authors":"D. Burk","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2392494","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2392494","url":null,"abstract":"Professor Sichelman’s article on “Purging Patent Law of Private Law Remedies” offers a welcome and useful perspective on the reform of patent remedies. In this comment I critique some of his assumptions regarding the “private” nature of patent and other remedies, then turn to discussing several examples of existing and underutilized tools, such as “reverse liability” rules, that might accomplish much of Professor Sichelman’s agenda without necessarily fomenting a radical re-conceptualization of patent remedies doctrine. Along the way I suggest how deployment of such tools might play out in a variety of current patent controversies, including Sichelman’s example of patent “trolls,” as well as FRAND licensing and pharmaceutical “pay for delay” agreements.","PeriodicalId":113747,"journal":{"name":"Litigation & Procedure eJournal","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"114459332","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Heuristics, Biases, and Consumer Litigation Funding at the Bargaining Table","authors":"Jean Xiao","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2530793","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2530793","url":null,"abstract":"The consumer-litigation-funding market has bloomed in the last decade and garnered significant attention from attorneys, judges, policymakers, and legal scholars. Commentators disagree on whether consumer litigation funding disincentivizes settlement. When discussing the effect of this funding on settlement, commentators have generally assumed a rational plaintiff. However, research from behavioral law and economics shows that not all plaintiffs are rational. No commentator has yet analyzed how consumer litigation funding can affect a plaintiff who is irrational (i.e., subject to cognitive biases). This Note provides this missing analysis and demonstrates that consumer litigation funding may cause irrational plaintiffs to reject wealth-maximizing settlement offers. To address this potential problem, this Note proposes a mandatory information-disclosure policy to help irrational plaintiffs avoid cognitive pitfalls.","PeriodicalId":113747,"journal":{"name":"Litigation & Procedure eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"128439577","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}