Corporate Law: Law & Finance eJournal最新文献_第6页

The Single Supervisory Mechanism: Competitive Implications for the Banking Sectors in the Euro Area 单一监管机制:对欧元区银行业竞争的影响

Corporate Law: Law & Finance eJournal Pub Date : 2018-12-31 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3309201

Iryna Okolelova, J. Bikker

引用次数: 3

What Can We Learn from Stock Prices? Cash Flow, Risk and Shareholder Welfare 我们能从股价中学到什么?现金流量、风险与股东福利

Corporate Law: Law & Finance eJournal Pub Date : 2018-11-16 DOI: 10.1628/JITE-2019-0009

Joshua Mitts

引用次数: 0

The Governance of Foundation-Owned Firms 基金会所有企业的治理

Corporate Law: Law & Finance eJournal Pub Date : 2018-11-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1641496

Henry Hansmann, Steen Thomsen

{"title":"The Governance of Foundation-Owned Firms","authors":"Henry Hansmann, Steen Thomsen","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1641496","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1641496","url":null,"abstract":"The burgeoning literature on corporate governance, both in economics and in law, has focused heavily on the agency costs of delegated management. It is therefore striking to encounter a large number of well-established and highly successful companies that have long been under the complete control of a self-appointing board of directors whose compensation is divorced from the profitability of the company and who cannot be removed or replaced by anyone except themselves. The companies in question are those controlled by “industrial foundations,” which are nonprofit entities that possess a controlling interest in an otherwise conventional business corporation. Although common throughout Northern Europe, industrial foundations are particularly numerous in Denmark, where they control a quarter of the country’s 100 largest corporations. We work with a data set of 110 foundation-owned Danish firms to explore whether, and how, the governance structure of industrial foundations helps explain the strong performance of the firms they control. Given the absence of substantial material incentives, we concentrate on governance structures. We find a strong and robust relationship between the structure of foundation governance and firm performance. These results reinforce the view that, with the proper governance structure, pure fiduciaries can perform more efficiently than conventional economic models would predict. More specifically, these results underline the potential importance of the legislation that, in 2018, removed the long-standing barrier to forming industrial foundations in the USA.","PeriodicalId":10698,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Law: Law & Finance eJournal","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82283544","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 6

Shareholdings of Alternative Investment Funds in Listed Companies and in Banks. A Legal Perspective 另类投资基金在上市公司和银行的持股情况。法律视角

Corporate Law: Law & Finance eJournal Pub Date : 2018-09-24 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.3253177

S. Alvaro, Filippo Annunziata

{"title":"Shareholdings of Alternative Investment Funds in Listed Companies and in Banks. A Legal Perspective","authors":"S. Alvaro, Filippo Annunziata","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3253177","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3253177","url":null,"abstract":"The harmonization of the European regulations on collective investment schemes (CIS) – with UCITS regulation first and, most recently, with the AIFM Directive - has expanded the areas of operation of asset managers. In particular, Alternative Investment Funds are emerging as increasingly relevant shareholders in listed companies and banks. In light of such market development, the paper explores the interaction of CIS regulation with corporate governance regulation and prudential supervision rules. First, the paper shows that the application of takeover rules to CIS as shareholders raises significant complexities. These complexities derive from the fact that the Italian law on listed issuers (takeovers, disclosure of significant shareholdings, groups and conflict of interest, slate voting, etc.) implicitly assumes that shareholders are mainly individuals or joint-stock companies rather than funds managed by a third party. Second, the paper discusses the issues posed by the acquisition of qualifying shareholdings in the capital of banks by CIS in the perspective of the compliance with micro-stability rules. The paper argues that the typical objectives of CIS regulations, in terms of transparency, fairness of conducts and the duty to serve at best CIS investors, may trade off with the need to ensure compliance with prudential rules for the invested company. More specifically, though the investment policies of CIS are obviously targeted to the search of the specific risk-return profile declared in the fund prospectus, the need to take into account further interests, such as stability and sound and prudent management of the invested banks, may not necessarily be in the best interest of CIS investors. \u0000The papers are presented in their original Italian version, along with a shorter English version, that is intended to target foreign audiences, so that they may better contribute to the international debate.","PeriodicalId":10698,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Law: Law & Finance eJournal","volume":"89 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82232054","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The Macroeconomic Effects of Bank Capital Requirement Tightenings: Evidence from a Narrative Approach 银行资本要求收紧的宏观经济效应:来自叙事方法的证据

Corporate Law: Law & Finance eJournal Pub Date : 2018-09-17 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3250499

Sandra Eickmeier, Benedikt Kolb, Esteban Prieto

引用次数: 5

Does Tax Drive the Headquarters Locations of the World’s Biggest Companies? 税收是全球大公司总部选址的驱动因素吗?

Corporate Law: Law & Finance eJournal Pub Date : 2018-08-14 DOI: 10.18356/CEE26E02-EN

K. Clausing

引用次数: 6

Bitcoin as Asset Class 比特币作为资产类别

Corporate Law: Law & Finance eJournal Pub Date : 2018-07-22 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3218007

L. Trautman, Taft Dorman

{"title":"Bitcoin as Asset Class","authors":"L. Trautman, Taft Dorman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3218007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3218007","url":null,"abstract":"A five cent $0.05 investment in Bitcoin on July 17, 2010, the first date in which there appears to have been a published value had grown to $7,383.39 on July 18, 2018. While Bitcoin as a currency has existed for less than a decade it had a very limited liquidity and usage during the first few years. During calendar year 2017 alone, Bitcoin increased in value from about $970 to $14,292, an increase of approximately 1,735 percent. Highly volatile, and having reached a market capitalization of almost $300 billion by December 13, 2017, Bitcoin had become equivalent to the world’s sixth largest currency and has, despite its volatility, attracted considerable attention as an investment asset. \u0000Our research examines the history of Bitcoin from inception until mid-year 2018 and compares and contrasts price performance and correlation with other asset classes: Dow Jones 30 Industrial Average; SP NASDAQ; Russell 2000; gold; real estate; Nikki; MSCI; and bond market. We believe our study covers performance of this important alternative class over the greatest period of time to date. We conclude that Bitcoin may be an attractive investment from a diversification perspective because of its low correlation with equities markets. However, Bitcoin’s characteristics of high volatility and potential illiquidity make it difficult to compare with more traditional assets such as equities and bonds.","PeriodicalId":10698,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Law: Law & Finance eJournal","volume":"6 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73581283","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 11

Bank Bailouts, Bail-Ins, or No Regulatory Intervention? A Dynamic Model and Empirical Tests of Optimal Regulation 银行救助，内部纾困，还是不进行监管干预?最优调控的动态模型及实证检验

Corporate Law: Law & Finance eJournal Pub Date : 2018-05-15 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3179226

Allen N. Berger, C. Himmelberg, Raluca A. Roman, S. Tsyplakov

引用次数: 21

Central Clearing of Financial Contracts: Theory and Regulatory Implications 金融合约中央结算:理论与监管意义

Corporate Law: Law & Finance eJournal Pub Date : 2018-05-03 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.3104079

S. Schwarcz

引用次数: 1

Hacking Corporate Reputations 黑客攻击企业声誉

Corporate Law: Law & Finance eJournal Pub Date : 2018-03-16 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3143740

Pat Akey, Stefan Lewellen, I. Liskovich, Christopher M. Schiller

引用次数: 40