Corporate Law: Law & Finance eJournal最新文献_第7页

Does the Endowment Effect Prevail When Traders Act Strategically? 当交易者采取战略行动时，禀赋效应是否占上风?

Corporate Law: Law & Finance eJournal Pub Date : 2018-02-22 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3128015

Stephan Tontrup

{"title":"Does the Endowment Effect Prevail When Traders Act Strategically?","authors":"Stephan Tontrup","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3128015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3128015","url":null,"abstract":"Trading is more than a personal valuation of own property. Traders try to anticipate the WTP potential buyers have for the good they want to sell. They do not focus on the value the entitlement has for them, their personal valuation is only a reservation price. The law analyzes the Endowment Effect because it wants to protect gains from trade; most economic and psychological Endowment Effect studies by contrast are concerned with a different question: They test theories of preference formation; unlike in trading behavior they focus the participants on their entitlement to demonstrate that valuation depends on ownership and expectations. We show in this study that an experimental design that focuses the subjects' attention on their good elevates the size of the Endowment Effect and can mislead the legal debate. Our experiment provides the subjects with incentives for strategic behavior. As typical for trading, the participants can earn more if they ask for a price that exceeds their personal valuation of the good they are endowed with. The incentives shift the attention of the subjects to the potential WTP of the buyer. The results we find show that the cognitively more complex trading task weakens the owners' occupation with their entitlement and significantly decreases their loss aversion. Our findings should apply to most business transactions, as strategic behavior is very common in professional relationships. The study suggests that the Endowment Effect is likely less prominent in real markets than often suggested and that private ordering may seldom need legal protection against it.","PeriodicalId":10698,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Law: Law & Finance eJournal","volume":"117 S150","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-02-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91436060","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

For Better or for Worse? The Economic Consequences of Frequent Accounting Standard Changes 是好是坏?频繁变更会计准则的经济后果

Corporate Law: Law & Finance eJournal Pub Date : 2018-01-31 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3134789

Melanie Demirtas, J. R. Werner

{"title":"For Better or for Worse? The Economic Consequences of Frequent Accounting Standard Changes","authors":"Melanie Demirtas, J. R. Werner","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3134789","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3134789","url":null,"abstract":"This paper sheds light on the short-term capital-market effects of all changes or amendments to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in the period between 2005 and 2014. The dynamic nature of IFRS is an interesting, yet underexplored setting. Since 2005 the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) has adopted more than 100 changes to its accounting standards, claiming to improve transparency of financial reporting. We ask whether these standard changes are always for the better, or – at least sometimes – for the worse. Based on an international sample of more than 35,000 firm-year observations from 39 countries, we show that the IASB is generally compliant with its mission to increase the usefulness of financial reports for capital market participants. We however also show that positive capital market effects mainly arise when disclosure rules are changed whereas changing definition or measurement sections in accounting standards can also increase short-term opacity. Moreover, changing accounting standards may have adverse effects for firms closer to covenant violations. The paper contributes to the scarce literature on effects of (frequently) changing accounting standards.","PeriodicalId":10698,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Law: Law & Finance eJournal","volume":"95 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86515938","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Regulatory Arbitrage in Cross Border Crowdfunding 跨境众筹中的监管套利

Corporate Law: Law & Finance eJournal Pub Date : 2018-01-31 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3115886

Arjya B. Majumdar

{"title":"Regulatory Arbitrage in Cross Border Crowdfunding","authors":"Arjya B. Majumdar","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3115886","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3115886","url":null,"abstract":"In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, small businesses found it increasingly difficult to raise funds. Equity crowdfunding has emerged as a viable alternative for sourcing capital to support innovative, entrepreneurial ventures. Equity crowdfunding merges the complexity of public funding, with the systemic risks of venture capital funding. A key responsibility of any securities regulator is that of investor protection. Securities laws, involving stringent eligibility criteria for fundraising companies and detailed disclosure requirements have been instrumental in mitigating risks for public retail investors to some extent. A number of securities regulators across the world have dealt with, or are in the process of dealing with equity crowdfunding as a disruptive innovation to established processes of corporate fundraising. However, most equity crowdfunding regulations do not take into account one critical aspect of crowdfunding - that of cross-border crowdfunding. I argue that in jurisdictions where crowdfunding activities are unregulated or have a low threshold of regulations, the opportunities arising from the resultant regulatory arbitrage could then be used by fund-seeking companies based in jurisdictions where crowdfunding is prohibited or highly regulated. As a result, securities regulators must work together to derive minimum standards of acceptable behavior in cross-border crowdfunding markets. This is a draft of a chapter that has been accepted for publication by Oxford University Press in the Oxford Handbook of IPOs edited by Douglas Cummings and Sofia Johan published in 2018. An earlier version of this paper was drafted as part of a visiting research fellowship at the Melbourne Law School. The author is grateful to Mr Lakshay Garg, BBALLB Class of 2013, Jindal Global Law School for his research assistance.","PeriodicalId":10698,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Law: Law & Finance eJournal","volume":"244 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87044957","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Financial Bank Guarantees and Moratorium under IBC, 2016 2016年IBC下的金融银行担保和暂停

Corporate Law: Law & Finance eJournal Pub Date : 2018-01-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3675997

Manoranjan Ayilyath

引用次数: 0

Nonlinear Incentives and Advisor Bias 非线性激励与顾问偏见

Corporate Law: Law & Finance eJournal Pub Date : 2017-12-09 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3088484

R. Inderst

引用次数: 0

Economic Effects of Regulatory Reform in Korea 规制改革对韩国经济的影响

Corporate Law: Law & Finance eJournal Pub Date : 2017-11-30 DOI: 10.23895/KDIJEP.2017.39.4.51

Jungwook Kim, Subok Chae

引用次数: 0

A Natural Experiment to Measure the Consequences of a Binding Interest Rate Cap 衡量具有约束力的利率上限后果的自然实验

Corporate Law: Law & Finance eJournal Pub Date : 2017-10-25 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3059563

O. Lukongo, Thomas W. Miller

引用次数: 1

Is There a Relationship Between Shareholder Protection and Stock Market Development? 股东保护与股票市场发展有关系吗?

Corporate Law: Law & Finance eJournal Pub Date : 2017-09-01 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3078529

S. Deakin, Prabirjit Sarkar, M. Siems

引用次数: 13

The High Cost of Fewer Appraisal Claims in 2017: Premia Down, Agency Costs Up 2017年评估索赔减少的高成本:溢价下降，代理成本上升

Corporate Law: Law & Finance eJournal Pub Date : 2017-08-29 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3028381

Matthew Schoenfeld

{"title":"The High Cost of Fewer Appraisal Claims in 2017: Premia Down, Agency Costs Up","authors":"Matthew Schoenfeld","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3028381","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3028381","url":null,"abstract":"This Essay considers the preliminary results of an ongoing effort to discourage appraisal litigation. In the year since the August 2016 reforms to the Delaware appraisal statute, Chancery has issued a slew of at-or-below merger price appraisal opinions in cases such as Clearwire and PetSmart, while simultaneously pinioning fiduciary litigation by reiterating the principles of Corwin. The result — as one would expect when costs are raised and benefits are reduced — has been that fewer deals are being challenged via appraisal: In 1H 2017, the number of deals challenged fell by 33%. Those who successfully advocated for curbs on the practice had argued that appraisal claims lowered deal premia by incenting buyers to withhold top dollar, thereby hurting non-appraising shareholders. On their view, curtailment of appraisal should have sent premia upwards. But year to date the average U.S. target premium of 22.4% is the lowest of any year in recent history. The average target premium in 2Q 2017 of 19.3% was the single-lowest of the fifty prior quarterly observations; thus far, 3Q 2017, at 19.6%, is tracking as the second-lowest. Amid the pronounced decline in merger premia, change-in-control payouts have expanded as a percentage of transaction value. When analyzed in concert with other measures indicative of agent rent-seeking — such as target premium to 52-week high over varying periods — the evidence points to a substantial transfer of value from target shareholders to selling CEOs, who have adapted to an environment rendered more permissive by the weakening of the shareholder litigation ‘check’ that had formerly restrained such behavior.","PeriodicalId":10698,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Law: Law & Finance eJournal","volume":"120 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78933038","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 1

The Dual Class Premium: A Family Affair 双层保险:家庭事务

Corporate Law: Law & Finance eJournal Pub Date : 2017-08-14 DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3006669

Ronald C. Anderson, Ezgi Ottolenghi, D. Reeb

引用次数: 10