我们能从股价中学到什么?现金流量、风险与股东福利

Joshua Mitts
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引用次数: 0

摘要

价格是按无风险率贴现的预期现金流量和风险敞口的折扣。价格等价性并不总是意味着福利等价性:股东们不一定对现金流增加1美元的价格和风险敞口降低增加1美元的价格无动于衷。即使在完全市场中,如果管理者享有控制的私人利益,社会计划者可能更喜欢低风险暴露,而不是更多投资者保护带来的等价价格的公司价值增长。这对事件研究、主要成本和代理成本之间的权衡以及宏观经济风险和公司治理之间的联系都有影响。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
What Can We Learn from Stock Prices? Cash Flow, Risk and Shareholder Welfare
Price is expected cash flows discounted at the risk-free rate and a discount for risk exposure. Price-equivalency does not always imply welfare-equivalency: shareholders are not necessarily indifferent between a price increase of $1 from higher cash flows and the same $1 increase from lower risk exposure. Even in complete markets, if managers enjoy private benefits of control, the social planner may prefer lower risk exposure to a price-equivalent increase in firm value from greater investor protection. This has implications for event studies, the tradeoff between principal costs and agency costs, and the link between macroeconomic risk and corporate governance.
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