Contemporary Accounting Research最新文献_第8页

Auditor communication on critical audit matters: Timing, inspection likelihood, and the audit committee 审计师对 CAM 的沟通：时间、检查可能性和审计委员会

IF 3.6 3区管理学

Contemporary Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-01-24 DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12934

Aubrey R. Whitfield, Yoon Ju Kang, Ken T. Trotman

{"title":"Auditor communication on critical audit matters: Timing, inspection likelihood, and the audit committee","authors":"Aubrey R. Whitfield, Yoon Ju Kang, Ken T. Trotman","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.12934","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1911-3846.12934","url":null,"abstract":"In response to the extended audit report regulations implemented in the United States and internationally, both audit firms and regulators have increased scrutiny over critical audit matters/key audit matters (collectively referred to as CAMs) through internal and external inspections. At the same time, auditors and audit committees (ACs) have altered the content and timing of CAM-related discussions by communicating specific planned audit procedures earlier in the audit process. This study explores the effect of early communication of CAM-related audit procedures to the AC and increased scrutiny from inspections on auditors' propensity to adjust planned audit procedures in the presence of newly identified audit risks. Based on self-justification theory, we predict and find that early communication of planned audit procedures to the AC causes auditors to be less likely to adjust planned audit procedures even when additional risks arise that necessitate change, especially when inspection is likely. This has the potential for diminished audit quality. Interviews with audit partners provide context for how these findings relate to the current auditing environment.","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"41 2","pages":"976-999"},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1911-3846.12934","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139554027","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Voluntary disclosures regarding open market repurchase programs 关于公开市场回购计划的自愿披露

IF 3.6 3区管理学

Contemporary Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-01-24 DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12937

Leonce Bargeron, Alice Bonaimé, William Docimo, Mei Feng, Shawn Thomas

引用次数: 0

Audit firm tenure disclosure and nonprofessional investors' perceptions of auditor independence: The mitigating effect of partner rotation disclosure 审计公司任期披露与非专业投资者对审计师独立性的看法：合伙人轮换披露的缓解效应

IF 3.6 3区管理学

Contemporary Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-01-24 DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12936

Sarah Judge, Brian M. Goodson, Chad M. Stefaniak

{"title":"Audit firm tenure disclosure and nonprofessional investors' perceptions of auditor independence: The mitigating effect of partner rotation disclosure","authors":"Sarah Judge, Brian M. Goodson, Chad M. Stefaniak","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.12936","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1911-3846.12936","url":null,"abstract":"In 2017, the PCAOB began requiring audit firm tenure disclosure within the audit report for SEC registrant clients. Many commenters raised the concern that prominent disclosure of firm tenure would lead investors to inappropriately infer a negative relation between audit quality and long tenure. This is particularly troubling given that empirical evidence generally does not support this concern. In our first experiment, we predict and find that disclosing an audit firm's long tenure within the audit report increases investors' perceptions that the audit firm's independence was impaired while conducting the audit. However, we also identify an intervention that mitigates the effects of disclosing long tenure—an accompanying disclosure in the audit report of the firm's adherence to the SEC's mandatory partner rotation requirement. We find that such a disclosure moderates the effect of long tenure disclosure such that in the absence (presence) of a partner rotation disclosure, investors do (do not) perceive increased independence impairment when long firm tenure is disclosed. In a second experiment, we predict and find that long firm tenure disclosure reduces investors' preference to invest in an otherwise quantitatively optimal investment and that this relation is driven, in part, by perceptions of independence impairment. Again, this result is attenuated by partner rotation disclosure. Our results should be useful to regulators in understanding the effects of their disclosure mandate and to audit firms in understanding a practical way in which they might mitigate the implications of such effects.","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"41 2","pages":"1284-1310"},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-01-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1911-3846.12936","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139553989","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Information aggregation to form earnings expectations: Evidence from CEO networks and management forecast accuracy 信息聚合形成收益预期：CEO 网络和管理层预测准确性的证据

IF 3.6 3区管理学

Contemporary Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-01-22 DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12933

Sam (Sunghan) Lee, Steven R. Matsunaga, Peter (Seung Hwan) Oh, Hyun A. Hong

引用次数: 0

Segment disaggregation and equity-based pay contracts 分部分类和股权薪酬合同

IF 3.6 3区管理学

Contemporary Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-01-15 DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12928

Young Jun Cho, Hojun Seo

引用次数: 0

The role of target difficulty and career tournaments in retaining creative R&D employees 目标难度和职业前景对留住创意研发员工的作用

IF 3.6 3区管理学

Contemporary Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-01-15 DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12931

Isabella Grabner, Mischa Seiter, Markus Wabnegg, Henning Wirth

{"title":"The role of target difficulty and career tournaments in retaining creative R&D employees","authors":"Isabella Grabner, Mischa Seiter, Markus Wabnegg, Henning Wirth","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.12931","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1911-3846.12931","url":null,"abstract":"We explore the turnover intentions of creative R&D employees and the role of performance management practices in shaping these considerations. Since the success of a firm's R&D efforts hinges on the innovative ideas of its employees, it is crucial to retain particularly creative individuals. At the same time, however, we argue that this is especially difficult because both the higher outside options of creative employees and their specific individual characteristics make them, on average, more likely to leave their company. Most importantly, we suggest that two widely studied performance management design choices (target difficulty and career tournaments) typically used to motivate effort may influence the loss of creative talent. Using survey data from our unique access to R&D employees of a large manufacturing firm and a complementary experiment among business students, we find evidence that creative employees are, on average, more likely to leave their firm. Consistent with creative employees possessing a stronger learning orientation, we also predict and find that this tendency to leave is mitigated by target difficulty (as difficult targets speak to creative individuals' learning orientation) and exacerbated by the intensity of career tournaments (as they reduce team cohesion and, ultimately, undermine learning opportunities).","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"41 2","pages":"1058-1088"},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-01-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1911-3846.12931","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139496805","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Navigating through the noise: The effect of color-coded performance feedback on decision-making 在噪音中导航：彩色编码的绩效反馈对决策的影响

IF 3.6 3区管理学

Contemporary Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-01-15 DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12932

Eddy Cardinaels, Stephan Kramer, Victor S. Maas

引用次数: 0

Following the crowd? Peer influence on voluntary bank audits 从众？同行对银行自愿审计的影响

IF 3.6 3区管理学

Contemporary Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-01-13 DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12930

Matthew J. Beck, Nathan G. Lundstrom, Sarah B. Stuber

引用次数: 0

Are firms as liquid as they appear in annual reports? 公司的流动性是否与年度报告中显示的一样？

IF 3.6 3区管理学

Contemporary Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-01-11 DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12929

Abdul-Rahman Khokhar, Jiaping Qiu, Mohammad M. Rahaman

引用次数: 0

Reporting bias and feedback effect 报告偏差和反馈效应†

IF 3.6 3区管理学

Contemporary Accounting Research Pub Date : 2024-01-05 DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12926

Hui Chen, Evgeny Petrov

{"title":"Reporting bias and feedback effect","authors":"Hui Chen, Evgeny Petrov","doi":"10.1111/1911-3846.12926","DOIUrl":"10.1111/1911-3846.12926","url":null,"abstract":"Stock prices often provide firm managers with new information that can be used in real decisions. Studies generally focus on the ex ante disclosure policy and show that the presence of market feedback crowds out firms' disclosure. We instead examine a manager's ex post biasing incentives and find that market feedback amplifies overreporting bias, but not necessarily underreporting bias, due to three interacting effects. First, the manager biases the report more with feedback since decreased information quality crowds in the speculator's private information acquisition and improves investment efficiency, regardless of the reporting scenario (the information rationing effect). Second, the manager biases more in the overreporting scenario and less in the underreporting scenario, because reporting more favorable information crowds in private information acquisition, as the speculator expects a higher subsequent investment and therefore higher trading profits (the investment scale effect). Third, market feedback influences reporting bias not only through the speculator's information acquisition but also directly through the market maker's pricing function. Specifically, the market maker decreases the price discount, as he expects that the manager may learn correct information from the price and may invest more efficiently. Expecting a lower price penalty in the presence of feedback, the manager biases more in the overreporting scenario and less in the underreporting scenario (the investment correction effect). Overall, our results suggest that granting firms reporting discretion could improve investment efficiency and firm value when managers can learn through price.","PeriodicalId":10595,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Accounting Research","volume":"41 2","pages":"872-913"},"PeriodicalIF":3.6,"publicationDate":"2024-01-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139373256","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0