Columbia Law School最新文献

{"title":"'Une Chose Publique'? The Author's Domain and the Public Domain in Early British, French and Us Copyright Law","authors":"J. Ginsburg","doi":"10.1017/S0008197306007252","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008197306007252","url":null,"abstract":"Much contemporary copyright rhetoric casts copyright as a derogation from a primordial public domain. Placing the public domain in the initial position buttresses attempts to contain a perceived over-expansion of copyright. I do not take issue with the normative role these endeavors assign to the public domain. The public domain is today and should remain copyright's constraining counterpart. But normative arguments that also claim the support of history may be fundamentally anachronistic. The ensuing examination of the respective domains of author and public at copyright's inception, in 18th-19th century Britain, France and America, reveals more ambiguity than today's critiques generally acknowledge. In England, John Locke supplied the philosophical basis for a common law of authorial property rights before the passage of the first copyright statute, the Statute of Anne of 1710. The post-statutory caselaw belies the proposition that the statute provided the sole source of authors' enforceable legal rights. Had the Statute of Anne created property rights ex nihilo, then the following propositions should be true: 1. Subject matter not included within the statute was not protected 2. Protection for covered subject matter depended on compliance with statutory formalities 3. Rights not included within the statute were not protected 4. The duration of rights was limited to the statutory term In fact, only the last of these ultimately proved to be correct, and the decision that determined the issue, Donaldson v. Beckett, was hotly debated, even deplored, at the time by significant expositors of the common law. More importantly, resolution of the duration issue did not fully contain the author's domain. English judges continued both to grant extra-statutory protections, and to interpret hospitably claims that pushed the limits of statutory scope. In revolutionary France, the rhetoric of \"propriete publique\" held greater sway than in Britain. Advocates stressed both the public utility of works of authorship and the public's claims to unfettered use following a statutory period to which the author, as the work's creator, was justly entitled. But the author's claims were set against the backdrop of a broader public entitlement. Paradoxically, however, while the French sources articulated a concept of the public domain in many ways consistent with today's characterizations, the substantive law was in fact far more protective of authorial property rights than either British or American law at the time. Finally, early American copyright history reveals even greater ambiguities. If the word \"securing\" in the constitutional copyright clause indicates that the Framers perceived that authors enjoyed preexisting common law property rights in their works, the heavy formalities imposed by subsequent statutes suggest a more positivistic view. In Wheaton v. Peters, the Supreme Court rejected common law copyright in published works, but for reasons extraneous to compet","PeriodicalId":10506,"journal":{"name":"Columbia Law School","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81874481","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Whose Ox is Being Gored? When Attitudinalism Meets Federalism","authors":"Michael C. Dorf","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.887744","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.887744","url":null,"abstract":"Empirical research indicates that factors such as an individual Justice's general political ideology play a substantial role in the decision of Supreme Court cases. Although this pattern holds in federalism cases, views about the proper allocation of authority between the state and federal governments - independent of whether the particular outcome in any given case is \"liberal\" or \"conservative\" - can sometimes be decisive, as demonstrated by the 2005 decision in Gonzales v. Raich, in which \"conservative\" Justices voted to invalidate a strict federal drug provision in light of California's legalization of medical marijuana, and \"liberal\" Justices voted to uphold the federal law. Proponents of a strongly legal realist view of the Court might argue that views about federalism are themselves ideological, or that Justices who commit themselves to defending or opposing states' rights do so because of a calculation about the likely long-term consequences of such a position. But they do so only by draining the realist enterprise of its descriptive and normative power, because, as this Essay argues, genuine principles about federalism are distinctly legal, even if formed on the basis of long-term calculations about the likely effects of various views about federalism. Taking federalism as a point of departure, this Essay describes and justifies a method by which Justices choose the legal principles that bind them.","PeriodicalId":10506,"journal":{"name":"Columbia Law School","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74405135","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Takeovers in the Boardroom: Burke Versus Schumpeter","authors":"R. Gilson, Reinier H. Kraakman","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.732783","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.732783","url":null,"abstract":"This article was written for a symposium on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of Martin Lipton's 1979 article, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom. In our view, Takeover Bids is a Burkean take on a messy Schumpeterian world that, during 1980s, reached its apex in Drexel Burnham's democratization of finance through the junk bond market. But the irony is that today, long after the Delaware Supreme Court has adopted many of Lipton's views, there is a new market for corporate control that no longer poses the threats - or supports the opportunities - that the market of the 1980s created. Today's strategic bidders and their targets share the same boardroom views. And for precisely this reason, \"just say no\" is no longer the battle cry that it once was. It stirred the crowds in the past precisely because hostile takeovers could be credibly depicted as a sweeping threat to the status quo - a claim that no one would make about today's strategic bidders. The market for corporate control now is a process of peer review, rather than an instrument of systemic change. What is lost as a result is just what, in the conservative view, has been gained: the capacity of the market for corporate control to ignite the dynamism that in our view has served the U.S. economy so well. Although Lipton may still lose today's battle to allow targets to just say no to intra-establishment takeovers, he will still have won the larger war. For now, at least, boardrooms are insulated from much of the force of a truly Schumpeterian market in corporate control of the sort we briefly glimpsed during the 1980s.","PeriodicalId":10506,"journal":{"name":"Columbia Law School","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74423428","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Institutional Change and M&A in Japan: Diversity Through Deals","authors":"C. Milhaupt, Mark D. West","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.290744","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.290744","url":null,"abstract":"This Article offers new perspectives on the market for corporate control, the convergence debate, and Japanese corporate governance. We begin by applying in the corporate governance setting two related insights from other fields: from economics, the theory that there is no universally efficient organizational model; from organizational behavior, evidence that diverse groups outperform homogeneous ones. We then consider the potential for convergence toward a particular governance technology - the market for corporate control - to increase the desirable trait of diversity within economic systems. Takeovers, we argue, are not exclusively a disciplinary device, but also an engine of managerial and legal innovation. We apply these insights to Japan through a detailed examination of previously unexplored data on Japanese M&A. We first link the historically low level of Japanese M&A activity to a thick institutional environment much more complex than the conventional focus on cross-shareholding suggests. Among the more startling findings is the existence of negative control premiums in Japanese tender offers and the role of legal shareholder protections in dampening the market for corporate control. Next, we show how the dearth of takeovers is inextricably linked to the lack of diversity in Japanese corporate practices. We then explore how recent changes in \"institutions for deals\" in Japan correlate with increased takeover activity, which in turn is linked to the creation of a broader range of governance practices, managerial innovations, and structural shifts in corporate lawmaking processes. The Article concludes by analyzing the implications of our findings for two academic debates: the role of functional substitutes in comparative corporate governance theory, and the impact of legal investor protections on corporate governance patterns.","PeriodicalId":10506,"journal":{"name":"Columbia Law School","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90427238","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Corporate Control","authors":"M. Roe","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.165143","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.165143","url":null,"abstract":"The large public firm dominates business in the United States despite its critical infirmities, namely the frequently fragile relations between stockholders and managers. Managers' agendas can differ from shareholders'; tying managers tightly to shareholders has been central to American corporate governance. But in other economically-advanced nations ownership is not diffuse but concentrated. It is concentrated in no small measure because the delicate threads that tie managers to shareholders in the public firm fray easily in common political environments, such as those in the continental European social democracies. Social democracies press managers to stabilize employment, press them to forego even some profit-maximizing risks with the firm, and press them to use up capital in place rather than to down-size when markets no longer are aligned with firm's production capabilities. Since managers must have discretion in the public firm, how they use that discretion is crucial to stockholders, and social democratic pressures on managers induce them to stray from their shareholders' preference to maximize profits. Moreover, the means that align managers with diffuse stockholders in the United States--incentive compensation, transparent accounting, hostile takeovers, and strong shareholder-wealth maximization norms--are harder to implement in continental social democracies. Hence, public firms in social democracies will, all else equal, have higher managerial agency costs, and large-block shareholding will persist as shareholders' next best remaining way to control those costs. Indeed, when we line up the world's richest nations on a left-right continuum and then line them up on a close to diffuse ownership continuum, the two correlate powerfully. True, the effects on total social welfare are ambiguous; social democracies may enhance total social welfare, but if they do, they do so with fewer public firms than less socially-responsive nations. We thus uncover not only a political explanation for ownership concentration in Europe, but also a crucial political prerequisite to the rise of the public firm in the United States, namely the absence of a strong social democracy and the concomitant political pressures it would have put on the American business firm.","PeriodicalId":10506,"journal":{"name":"Columbia Law School","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2000-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82212365","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}