谁的牛被捅了?当态度主义遇上联邦制

Michael C. Dorf
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引用次数: 3

摘要

实证研究表明,大法官个人的一般政治意识形态等因素在最高法院案件的判决中起着重要作用。尽管这种模式在联邦制案件中成立,但关于州政府和联邦政府之间权力的适当分配的观点——与任何特定案件的特定结果是“自由派”还是“保守派”无关——有时可能是决定性的,正如2005年冈萨雷斯诉莱希案的判决所证明的那样,在该案中,“保守派”法官根据加州医用大麻的合法化投票否决了一项严格的联邦药物规定。而“自由派”法官则投票支持联邦法律。对最高法院持强烈法律现实主义观点的支持者可能会争辩说,关于联邦制的观点本身就是意识形态的,或者那些致力于捍卫或反对各州权利的法官之所以这样做,是因为他们对这种立场可能产生的长期后果进行了计算。但他们只有通过耗尽现实主义事业的描述性和规范性力量才能做到这一点,因为,正如本文所论证的那样,关于联邦制的真正原则显然是合法的,即使是在对关于联邦制的各种观点可能产生的影响进行长期计算的基础上形成的。本文以联邦制为出发点,描述并论证了法官选择约束他们的法律原则的方法。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Whose Ox is Being Gored? When Attitudinalism Meets Federalism
Empirical research indicates that factors such as an individual Justice's general political ideology play a substantial role in the decision of Supreme Court cases. Although this pattern holds in federalism cases, views about the proper allocation of authority between the state and federal governments - independent of whether the particular outcome in any given case is "liberal" or "conservative" - can sometimes be decisive, as demonstrated by the 2005 decision in Gonzales v. Raich, in which "conservative" Justices voted to invalidate a strict federal drug provision in light of California's legalization of medical marijuana, and "liberal" Justices voted to uphold the federal law. Proponents of a strongly legal realist view of the Court might argue that views about federalism are themselves ideological, or that Justices who commit themselves to defending or opposing states' rights do so because of a calculation about the likely long-term consequences of such a position. But they do so only by draining the realist enterprise of its descriptive and normative power, because, as this Essay argues, genuine principles about federalism are distinctly legal, even if formed on the basis of long-term calculations about the likely effects of various views about federalism. Taking federalism as a point of departure, this Essay describes and justifies a method by which Justices choose the legal principles that bind them.
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