{"title":"Has financial fair play changed European football?","authors":"Ariela Caglio , Sébastien Laffitte , Donato Masciandaro , Gianmarco Ottaviano","doi":"10.1016/j.serev.2023.100018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.serev.2023.100018","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>In 2011 UEFA, the governing body of European football, introduced the Financial Fair Play Regulation (FFPR), consisting of a set of financial restraints to be met by clubs as a prerequisite for participation to its competitions. The aim of the FFPR was to introduce financial discipline into the clubs’ decision-making processes, and ultimately protect the long-term viability of the European football industry. The reform was criticized because of possible unintended detrimental consequences. In particular, Peeters and Szymanski (2014) provided a model-based <em>ex-ante</em> simulation analysis showing that the reform would increase the profitability of clubs, but also tilt the competitive balance in favor of the top teams, thus reducing the interest of fans and investors as one of the main attractions in sports is precisely that the best team does not always win. Exploiting an original dataset between the seasons 2007–2008 and 2019–2020, we provide an <em>ex-post</em> econometric evaluation of the effects of the introduction of the FFPR revealing causal evidence that largely vindicates those ex-ante predictions.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":101182,"journal":{"name":"Sports Economics Review","volume":"3 ","pages":"Article 100018"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50184504","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Willingness to pay for hosting the Tour de France","authors":"Christian Gjersing Nielsen , Arne Feddersen","doi":"10.1016/j.serev.2023.100014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.serev.2023.100014","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper uses the contingent valuation method to estimate the willingness to pay for hosting the Tour de France start 2022 in Denmark. Using a dichotomous choice format with a one-off tax payment, we estimate a total economic value between €12.8–26.0 million for the 2.788 million Danish households, with €14.7 as our preferred estimate. Spike models reveal that the likelihood of voting in favor of an earmarked tax to retain the Tour de France in Denmark decreases with the physical distance from the route. Moreover, we find a negative effect of living in one of the host municipalities (start or finish of a stage), <em>ceteris paribus</em>. This indicates that if non-use values are higher for residents living in a host municipality, they are offset by the negative externalities associated with hosting.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":101182,"journal":{"name":"Sports Economics Review","volume":"3 ","pages":"Article 100014"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50184507","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The age-performance relationship for a cognitive-intensive task: Empirical evidence from chess grandmasters","authors":"Adriaan Kalwij , Kris De Jaegher","doi":"10.1016/j.serev.2023.100010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.serev.2023.100010","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>To gain insight into the age-performance relationship (APR) for cognitively demanding tasks, we analyse the APR for the task of playing chess from a theoretical and empirical perspective. We set up a game-theoretic model showing that for risk-neutral players who are homogeneous in their linear payoffs, the APR can be estimated with either players' game outcomes or their Elo ratings. This result is empirically substantiated with data on outcomes of games played at an annual international chess tournament (1970–2021), and with players' Elo ratings. Further, the findings support the estimation of the APR with Elo ratings using a model that controls for player fixed effects and period random effects, which is also in accordance with the theoretical model. Next, we show that on average chess performance peaks in grandmasters’ early-thirties and declines thereafter. Implications of the findings for a labour market characterised by an increase in cognitively demanding jobs and individuals working longer are discussed.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":101182,"journal":{"name":"Sports Economics Review","volume":"2 ","pages":"Article 100010"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50194383","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Fair travel distances in tournament schedules: A cooperative game theory approach","authors":"Ondrej Osicka , Mario Guajardo","doi":"10.1016/j.serev.2023.100011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.serev.2023.100011","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The most studied problem in sports scheduling, so-called traveling tournament problem (TTP), aims at finding schedules minimizing the total distance traveled by the teams. While minimizing all the traveling between games is efficient from the overall perspective, it overlooks the distribution of the travel among the teams. Consequently, some teams may end up better than others with respect to their individual goals, an imbalance which may affect teams’ often-limited resources or preparedness for the games. This article adopts a cooperative game theory framework to obtain tournament schedules where the distances traveled by the teams are allocated according to fairness criteria. The approach consists of three steps. First, the scheduling problem is reformulated as a transferable utility game. Second, by means of well-established allocation methods, an ideal distance distribution among the teams is determined. Third, we introduce fairness measures to produce a schedule which approximately resembles the ideal distribution. We also discuss the case of not pursuing fairness, but rather a compromise between fairness and minimum total distance. We illustrate the approach by a numerical example in one of the classic TTP data instances.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":101182,"journal":{"name":"Sports Economics Review","volume":"2 ","pages":"Article 100011"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50194385","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Competitiveness in Formula One","authors":"Ronald Peeters, Dennis Wesselbaum","doi":"10.1016/j.serev.2022.100007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.serev.2022.100007","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We define a measure of competitiveness that is based on full rankings and corrects for partitioning of the parties in exogenously defined clusters. We use the measure to study the change in competitiveness of Formula One racing during the period 1993–2019.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":101182,"journal":{"name":"Sports Economics Review","volume":"2 ","pages":"Article 100007"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50194386","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Doping and uncertainty of outcome","authors":"Kjetil K. Haugen","doi":"10.1016/j.serev.2022.100002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.serev.2022.100002","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper demonstrates, by simple classical game theory, that the claim by Savulescu et al. (2004) of a safer and fairer sport with legalized doping is a highly unlikely outcome. This result, with added arguments related to adverse effects on both demand and supply for the sports product, should hopefully affect the debate on legalization of performance-enhancing drugs. The Nash equilibrium obtained in the analysis predicts more doping, and maybe more importantly, use of more dangerous performance-enhancing drugs. As a consequence, a legalization of performance.enhancing drugs may threaten the actual existence of professional sports markets.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":101182,"journal":{"name":"Sports Economics Review","volume":"2 ","pages":"Article 100002"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50194384","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Ghost games and ex-post viewing preferences for the English Premier League: Evidence from YouTube highlights","authors":"David Butler, Robert Butler","doi":"10.1016/j.serev.2023.100012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.serev.2023.100012","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We ask if the move to play elite football (soccer) matches without spectators during the COVID-19 pandemic impacted online viewership. Using a new dataset from YouTube, we depart from the traditional ex ante approach to modelling football demand and investigate streaming preferences for known results in football. Our data is collected in real-time and considers English Premier League matches from 2019 to 2021 played both in front of crowds and behind closed doors. The results indicate increased viewership for matches played without crowds. The findings also allow a deeper understanding of direct demand for football as we identify motivators, including different pre-game and in-game characteristics as well as scheduling effects, that make fans curious to view content after the fact. The research adds to our understanding of the effects of the pandemic on fan viewer behaviour and speaks to broadcasting firms developing digital extension strategies.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":101182,"journal":{"name":"Sports Economics Review","volume":"2 ","pages":"Article 100012"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50194382","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Estimated costs of injuries in college and high school female sports","authors":"Ray C. Fair , Christopher Champa","doi":"10.1016/j.serev.2022.100006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.serev.2022.100006","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Injury rates in thirteen U.S. women’s college sports and four U.S. girls’ high school sports are examined in this paper. The sports are categorized as high injury (<em>H</em>) or low injury (<em>L</em>) and differences in injury rates between the two are examined. Estimates are presented of the injury savings that would result if the <em>H</em> sports were changed to have injury rates similar to those in the <em>L</em> sports.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":101182,"journal":{"name":"Sports Economics Review","volume":"1 ","pages":"Article 100006"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50191638","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Maradona plays Minimax","authors":"Ignacio Palacios-Huerta","doi":"10.1016/j.serev.2022.100001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.serev.2022.100001","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper tests the theory of mixed strategy equilibrium using Maradona's penalty kicks during his lifetime professional career. The results are remarkably consistent with equilibrium play in every respect: (i) Maradona's scoring probabilities are statistically identical across strategies; (ii) His choices are serially independent. These results show that Maradona's behavior is consistent with Nash's predictions, specifically with both implications of von Neumann's Minimax Theorem.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":101182,"journal":{"name":"Sports Economics Review","volume":"1 ","pages":"Article 100001"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50191289","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The consequences of promotion and relegation in European soccer leagues: A regression discontinuity approach","authors":"Jamin D. Speer","doi":"10.1016/j.serev.2022.100003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.serev.2022.100003","url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>European soccer leagues operate on a ”promotion and relegation” system, in which poor-performing teams are moved to a lower division of play, and high-performing teams are moved up. Because of the prestige and television exposure of higher divisions, promotions and relegations have major financial and competitive consequences for clubs. I use a regression discontinuity design to study the consequences of promotion and relegation in Europe’s top soccer leagues, comparing just-relegated teams to just-surviving teams, and the same for promotion. On the field, both relegation and promotion have lasting impacts, with significant effects lasting 3 or more years, and the point estimates suggest even longer effects. The effects of promotion are slightly larger and more persistent. Financially, promotion is worth between $238–280 million over the next 7 years, while relegation costs between $225–262 million.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":101182,"journal":{"name":"Sports Economics Review","volume":"1 ","pages":"Article 100003"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50191635","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}