{"title":"LER volume 77 issue 2-3 Cover and Back matter","authors":"","doi":"10.1017/s077045180000169x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s077045180000169x","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":85383,"journal":{"name":"Recherches economiques de Louvain","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/s077045180000169x","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"56969297","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"LER volume 77 issue 1 Cover and Front matter","authors":"","doi":"10.1017/s0770451800000014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0770451800000014","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":85383,"journal":{"name":"Recherches economiques de Louvain","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2011-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/s0770451800000014","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"56969153","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"LER volume 76 issue 3 Cover and Front matter","authors":"","doi":"10.1017/s0770451800011003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0770451800011003","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":85383,"journal":{"name":"Recherches economiques de Louvain","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"56977666","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"LER volume 76 issue 1 Cover and Back matter","authors":"","doi":"10.1017/s0770451800006321","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0770451800006321","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":85383,"journal":{"name":"Recherches economiques de Louvain","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2010-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"56973226","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"La manipulation stratégique des régies de vote : une étude expérimentale","authors":"Virginie Béhue, Pierre Favardin, D. Lepelley","doi":"10.1017/S0770451800005546","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0770451800005546","url":null,"abstract":"L'analyse théorique de la vulnérabilité des règles de vote aux comportements stratégi-ques montre que le caractère plus ou moins manipulable d'une règle dépend du concept d'équilibre auquel l'on se réfère. Une question cruciale est de savoir si l'on doit ou non tenir compte des possibilités qu'ont les électeurs de réagir en présence d'une menace de manipulation. Nous étudions cette question à l'aide d'une approche expérimentale. Nos résultats tendent à valider empiriquement la notion de réaction.","PeriodicalId":85383,"journal":{"name":"Recherches economiques de Louvain","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"56971919","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Trade integration and the destination of subsidies","authors":"Nelly Exbrayat, C. Gaigné, S. Riou","doi":"10.3917/REL.754.0407","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/REL.754.0407","url":null,"abstract":"We build a model of trade and location with two countries which differ with respect to their level of productivity. Public spending has two possible allocations: a direct subsidy to immobile households or a wage subsidy to mobile firms. We show that firms receive a lower net of tax subsidy in the high-productivity country than in the low-productivity one. Despite this less generous policy, the former country can host a larger share of firms, so that its total spending for firms can be higher than in the low-productivity country when trade costs are low enough. The welfare analysis suggests that the second-best optimum requires an increase in the subsidy to households in both countries when the economies are weakly integrated or the productivity gap is low or the share of capital incomes redistributed outside the two economies is high.","PeriodicalId":85383,"journal":{"name":"Recherches economiques de Louvain","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70308427","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Les facteurs de la dépollution dans les pays en transition","authors":"Natalia Zugravu, Katrin Millock, G. Duchêne","doi":"10.3917/REL.754.0461","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/REL.754.0461","url":null,"abstract":"Les pays en transition ont considérablement réduit leurs émissions de CO2 entre 1995 et 2003. Cette performance est-elle due à l'application d'une politique volontariste de la part des gouvernements, ou bien est-elle un simple effet collatéral de la transformation industrielle majeure subie par ces pays ? Nous tentons de répondre à cette question en développant deux équations structurelles pour la demande (émissions) et l'offre (politique) de pollution. L'équation de l'offre prend en compte la qualité institutionnelle du pays, aussi bien que les préférences des consommateurs pour la qualité de l'environnement. Nos résultats montrent que, toutes choses égales par ailleurs, l'effet d'échelle de la production seul aurait expliqué une augmentation de 31 % des émissions industrielles de CO2 dans les pays en transition entre 1995 et 2003, et l'effet de structure de la production aurait contribué à une augmentation de 8,4 % de ces émissions. Cependant, l'effet technique, qui découle de la sévérité de la politique environnementale, s'est traduit par une réduction de 58 % des émissions industrielles de CO2, et a permis ainsi une réduction nette des émissions industrielles de CO2 de 18 % en 2003 par rapport à 1995. Enfin, notre étude confirme l'importance des facteurs institutionnels dans l'explication des émissions dans les pays en transition.","PeriodicalId":85383,"journal":{"name":"Recherches economiques de Louvain","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.3917/REL.754.0461","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70308040","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Bank Capital Channel and Counter-Cyclical Prudential Regulation in a DSGE model","authors":"Grégory Levieuge","doi":"10.1017/S0770451800005522","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0770451800005522","url":null,"abstract":"This article proposes to insert a bank capital channel (BCC) in the theoretical framework proposed by Bernanke et al. (1999) (BGG), in order 1) to evaluate the mean features of the BCC and 2) to assess the benefits of a countercyclical prudential measure. In a costly state verification framework, banks are charged a financing premium on their external funds which depends on the structure of their balance sheets and which then fluctuates in a counter-cyclical way. This premium is lastly passed on to firms' credit conditions. Simulations confirm that shocks are more amplified than in the BGG model, and confirm the importance of the financial context for macroeconomic volatility. Given the effects of this channel and the ineffectiveness of monetary policy in a capital crunch context, the model finally allows a conclusive evaluation of the advantages associated with a preemptive and counter-cyclical prudential measure in a DSGE model to be made.","PeriodicalId":85383,"journal":{"name":"Recherches economiques de Louvain","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"56971868","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Investissement public et effets non linéaires des déficits budgétaires","authors":"Alexandru Minea, Patrick Villieu","doi":"10.3917/REL.753.0281","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/REL.753.0281","url":null,"abstract":"Dans cet article, nous proposons un modèle théorique simple dans lequel l'impact du déficit budgétaire sur les dépenses publiques d'investissement dépend du niveau de dette publique (en pourcentage du PIB). Lorsque la dette publique est faible, l'impact du déficit est positif, car la charge de la dette peut être absorbée par une diminution des dépenses de consommation. Lorsque la dette est très élevée, en revanche, il n'est plus possible de réduire les dépenses de consommation, et l'ajustement s'opère par les dépenses d'investissement, de sorte que la relation entre déficit et dépenses publiques d'investissement devient négative. Une analyse empirique menée dans un modèle économétrique avec effets de seuil en panel sur 22 pays de l'OCDE vient confirmer cette non linéarité.","PeriodicalId":85383,"journal":{"name":"Recherches economiques de Louvain","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.3917/REL.753.0281","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70307758","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Threat of Exit as a Source of Bargaining Power","authors":"F. Bergès, Claire Chambolle","doi":"10.3917/REL.753.0353","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/REL.753.0353","url":null,"abstract":"Cet article analyse un jeu simple à deux périodes dans lequel deux producteurs farbriquant un bien homogène se font concurrence pour fournir un distributeur. Nous montrons que si les producteurs sont vulnérables (c'est-à-dire s'ils sont exclus du marché en cas d'une commande insuffisante en première période), ils peuvent alors exploiter cette menace de banqueroute et s'approprier ainsi tout le profit de l'industrie en première période. En effet, le distributeur sera prêt à accepter de payer un prix fort aux producteurs pour éviter leur faillite et maintenir ainsi une concurrence en amont pour la seconde période. Ce résultat reste valable dans le cas d'une structure de marché différente ou de contrats verticaux plus élaborés.","PeriodicalId":85383,"journal":{"name":"Recherches economiques de Louvain","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2009-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70308344","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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