Margarida Gonçalves, Andreia Guimarães, Tânia Carvalho, Pedro Antunes, Sofia Mendes, João Soares, Raquel Gonçalves, Bruno Arroja, Ana Rebelo
{"title":"Safety of Endoscopy Units during the COVID-19 Pandemic.","authors":"Margarida Gonçalves, Andreia Guimarães, Tânia Carvalho, Pedro Antunes, Sofia Mendes, João Soares, Raquel Gonçalves, Bruno Arroja, Ana Rebelo","doi":"10.1159/000526125","DOIUrl":"10.1159/000526125","url":null,"abstract":"<p><strong>Introduction: </strong>The COVID-19 pandemic drastically changed the daily routine of all healthcare systems worldwide, and endoscopy units were no exception. Endoscopic exams were considered to have a high risk of transmission, and therefore, the safety of endoscopy units and the consequent need for pre-endoscopy SARS-CoV-2 screening were questioned early on. The aim of our study was to assess the safety of endoscopy units during the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as the effectiveness/necessity for SARS-CoV-2 screening prior to endoscopies.</p><p><strong>Material and methods: </strong>This is a retrospective and single-center study carried out in a Portuguese tertiary hospital. All patients who underwent endoscopic procedures between September 1, 2020 and February 28, 2021 were included. The pre-endoscopy screening consisted of a specific questionnaire or a RT-PCR test for SARS-CoV-2 (nasal and oropharyngeal swab). Data were obtained through patient's clinical records and the Trace COVID platform.</p><p><strong>Results: </strong>A total of 2,166 patients were included. Patients had a mean age of 61.8 years and were predominantly male (56.2%, <i>n</i> = 1,218). Eighty-one (3.7%) patients had previous SARS-CoV-2 infection, with a median difference of 74 days (IQ 40.5:160.5) between infection and endoscopy. Most patients (70.2%, <i>n</i> = 1,521) underwent PCR screening for SARS-CoV-2 up to 72 h before the procedure, with the remaining patients (29.8%, <i>n</i> = 645) answering a questionnaire of symptoms and risk contacts up to 3 days before endoscopy. Of the patients who underwent RT-PCR screening for SARS-CoV-2, 21 (1.4%) tested positive, and all were asymptomatic at the time of the screening. The evaluation for SARS-CoV-2 infection up to 14 days after the endoscopic exams identified 9 positive patients (0.42%) for SARS-CoV-2. The median difference in days between endoscopy and the diagnosis of infection was 10 days.</p><p><strong>Discussion/conclusion: </strong>Pre-endoscopy screening with RT-PCR test for SARS-CoV-2 identified a very small number of patients with COVID-19 infection as well as patients with COVID-19 infection in the following 14 days. Therefore, the risk of infection in endoscopy units is negligible if screening of symptoms and risk contacts is applied and individual protective equipment is used.</p>","PeriodicalId":85383,"journal":{"name":"Recherches economiques de Louvain","volume":"1 1","pages":"4-10"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10661713/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78991753","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Anal fistula metastasis of rectal cancer after neoadjuvant therapy: a case report.","authors":"Shota Fukai, Shingo Tsujinaka, Yasuyuki Miyakura, Natsumi Matsuzawa, Yuuri Hatsuzawa, Ryo Maemoto, Nao Kakizawa, Toshiki Rikiyama","doi":"10.1186/s40792-022-01410-z","DOIUrl":"10.1186/s40792-022-01410-z","url":null,"abstract":"<p><strong>Background: </strong>Anal metastasis of colorectal cancer is very rare and may present synchronously or metachronously, regardless of pre-existing anal diseases. We report a case of anal fistula metastasis after completion of neoadjuvant therapy for rectal cancer, followed by surgical resection of the primary tumor and metastatic lesion.</p><p><strong>Case presentation: </strong>A 50-year-old man was diagnosed with rectal cancer located 5 cm from the anal verge, with a clinical stage of cT3N0M0. He denied any medical or surgical history, and physical examination revealed no perianal disease. He underwent preoperative chemoradiation therapy (CRT) consisting of a tegafur/gimeracil/oteracil potassium (S-1)-based regimen with 45 Gy of radiation. After completion of CRT, computed tomography (CT) revealed the primary tumor's partial response, but a liver mass highly suggestive of metastasis was detected. This mass was later diagnosed as cavernous hemangioma 3 months after CRT initiation. He then underwent and completed six cycles of consolidation chemotherapy with a capecitabine-based regimen. Subsequent colonoscopy revealed the complete response of the primary tumor, but CT showed thickening of the edematous rectal wall. Therefore, we planned to perform low anterior resection as a radical surgery. However, he presented with persistent anal pain after the last chemotherapy, and magnetic resonance imaging revealed a high-intensity mass behind the anus, suggestive of an anal fistula. We considered the differential diagnosis of a benign anal fistula or implantation metastasis into the anal fistula. Fistulectomy was performed, and a pathological diagnosis of tubular adenocarcinoma, suggestive of implantation metastasis, was made. Thereafter, we performed laparoscopic abdominoperineal resection. Histopathological examination revealed well-differentiated adenocarcinoma, ypT2N0, with a grade 2 therapeutic effect. Subsequent immunohistochemistry of the resected anal fistula showed a CDX-2-positive, CK20-positive, CK7-negative, and GCDFP-15 negative tumor, with implantation metastasis. There was no cancer recurrence 21 months after the radical surgery.</p><p><strong>Conclusions: </strong>This is the first report of anal fistula metastasis after neoadjuvant therapy for rectal cancer in a patient without a previous history of anal disease. If an anal fistula is suspected during or after neoadjuvant therapy, physical and radiological assessment, differential diagnosis, and surgical intervention timing for fistula must be carefully discussed.</p>","PeriodicalId":85383,"journal":{"name":"Recherches economiques de Louvain","volume":"1 1","pages":"57"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8971341/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78983510","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Fiscal Integration and Growth Stimulation in Europe","authors":"J. Drèze, A. Durre, J. Carpantier","doi":"10.1017/S0770451800002098","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0770451800002098","url":null,"abstract":"With the current sovereign debt crisis, the incompleteness of economic integration in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has become patent, leading to an intense debate among academics and policy makers. Much of the debate concerns fiscal rules and austerity measures, both of which weigh on growth prospects. In this paper we look at the main structural shortcomings of EMU through the lens of general equilibrium theory. We address two issues (international sharing of macroeconomic risks and coordinated growth stimulation) which are at the heart of the sustainability of EMU. We propose: (A) a specific scheme for mutual insurance of macroeconomic risks; (B) locating responsibility for demand policies at the EMU level, with ambitious investment programs (public, or fiscally-neutral private) as main instrument.","PeriodicalId":85383,"journal":{"name":"Recherches economiques de Louvain","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"56969047","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Does the competition structure impact the performance of multi-unit auctions? An experimental investigation","authors":"R. Préget, S. Thoyer","doi":"10.3917/REL.802.0085","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/REL.802.0085","url":null,"abstract":"Competition in a multi-unit auction is measured both by the number of bidders and by the relative size of their demands, compared to the number of units on sale. For the same degree of competition (identical aggregate demand and supply), we can observe different demand structures. Do they have an impact on the auction efficiency and revenue-raising properties? It is essential to understand better the impact of competition structure on performance in order to draw recommendations for the design of multi-unit auctions. Theoretical results demonstrate on a simple case contrasting a uniform-price auction of two bidders with a demand of 6 units each, and an auction of 6 bidders with a demand of two units each, that there are multiple equilibria leading to different performance outcome. Experiments are conducted to compare the performance of these two auctions. Results support that with a constant competition degree, the seller gets higher expected revenue with a lower variance when he faces a large number of bidders with small individual demands. We show that this result is attained with no significant effect on allocative efficiency.","PeriodicalId":85383,"journal":{"name":"Recherches economiques de Louvain","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70308234","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Lobbying for carbon permits in Europe","authors":"Julien Hanoteau","doi":"10.1017/S0770451800002037","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0770451800002037","url":null,"abstract":"Using cross-sector and cross-country data, this paper evidences that rent seeking influenced the allocation of CO2 emission permits in the two first phases of the European emissions trading scheme. Industry lobbies effectively used the 'job loss' and 'competitiveness' arguments, as unemployment proxy variables significantly impacted the allocation in both phases, and carbon intensity influenced it in the second phase. The countries that adopted a partial auction scheme also gave relatively more permits and in particular to the politically more powerful sectors. This suggests a compensation mechanism and supports the assumption of a political tradeoff between the quantity of permits issued and the decision between free grant and auction. It also confirms that the initial allocation is not neutral in the presence of special interest lobbying.","PeriodicalId":85383,"journal":{"name":"Recherches economiques de Louvain","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"56968918","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Une étude expérimentale de la forte stabilité","authors":"A. Aziz Ndiaye","doi":"10.1017/s0770451800002049","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0770451800002049","url":null,"abstract":"Dans cet article, nous étudions la forte stabilité d'une règle de vote telle que définie par Dutta et al. [2001] par l'intermédiaire de la méthode expérimentale. Dans ce sens, une règle de vote est dite fortement stable si le vainqueur de l'élection reste inchangé après une tentative de manipulation par candidature stratégique d'un candidat potentiel. Dans le cadre d'une élection avec trois candidats en lice et d'un électorat de petite taille, nous évaluons de façon expérimentale les fréquences de la forte stabilité des règles de vote parlementaires et de la pluralité.","PeriodicalId":85383,"journal":{"name":"Recherches economiques de Louvain","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"56968980","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Macroéconomie du court terme et politique climatique: quelques leçons d'un modèle d'offre et demande globales","authors":"Jean-François Fagnart, M. Germain","doi":"10.1017/S0770451800002025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0770451800002025","url":null,"abstract":"Nous introduisons le concept d'empreinte carbone dans un modèle d'offre globale et demande globale avec formation imparfaitement concurrentielle des prix et salaires et en examinons les propriétés de l'équilibre en présence d'une politique climatique. Nous étudions deux instruments possibles de cette politique, une taxe carbone ou un quota de permis de pollution. Nous montrons qu'à court terme, la politique climatique (ou son durcissement) constitue à la fois un choc d'offre globale négatif et, ceteris paribus, un choc de demande globale positif. Elle provoque donc des effets inflationnistes mais a un impact ambigu sur l'activité économique, l'emploi et le chômage. Ce n'est que dans une économie avec des ridigités nominales suffisantes que la politique climatique stimulera -sous certaines conditions- l'activité à court terme. Dans tous les cas de figure, elle pèsera négativement sur les salaires réels.Nous étudions encore les interactions entre la politique climatique et les politiques macroéconomiques traditionnelles de demande (stimulus budgétaire ou monétaire) et d'offre (baisse des cotisations sociales). Les effets multiplicateurs de ces politiques sont influencés par l'existence d'une politique climatique et diffèrent selon l'intrument choisi (taxe ou permis).Nous montrons les conditions sous lesquelles une réforme combinant durcissement de la politique climatique et baisse des cotisations sociales sur le travail peut atteindre le double objectif de réduire l'empreinte carbone de l'économie et le chômage, sans pénaliser les salaires réels des travailleurs. Une telle politique a toutefois des effets incertains sur le solde des finances publiques.","PeriodicalId":85383,"journal":{"name":"Recherches economiques de Louvain","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"56968900","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"LER volume 80 issue 2 Cover and Front matter","authors":"","doi":"10.1017/s0770451800002074","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0770451800002074","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":85383,"journal":{"name":"Recherches economiques de Louvain","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"56968992","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"LER volume 80 issue 1 Cover and Back matter","authors":"","doi":"10.1017/s0770451800002001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0770451800002001","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":85383,"journal":{"name":"Recherches economiques de Louvain","volume":"29 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2014-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"56968888","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Noncooperative Oligopoly in Markets with a Cobb-Douglas Continuum of Traders","authors":"G. Codognato, Ludovic A. Julien","doi":"10.1017/S0770451800001950","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0770451800001950","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we reconsider two models of noncooperative oligopoly in general equilibrium proposed by Busetto et al. ((2008), (2011)): a version of the Shapley's window model for mixed exchange economies a la Shitovitz and its reformulation a la Cournot-Walras. We introduce the assumption that preferences of the traders belonging to the atomless part are represented by Cobb-Douglas utility functions. This assumption permits us to prove the existence of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the Shapley's window model - called Cobb-Douglas-Cournot-Nash equilibrium - without introducing further assumptions on atoms' endowments and preferences previously used by Busetto et al. (2011). Then, we show that the set of the Cobb-Douglas-Cournot-Nash equilibrium allocations coincides with the set of the Cournot-Walras equilibrium allocations.","PeriodicalId":85383,"journal":{"name":"Recherches economiques de Louvain","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2013-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1017/S0770451800001950","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"56968868","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}