{"title":"\"First, do no harm\"--the fiction of legal parental consent to genital-normalizing surgery on intersexed infants.","authors":"K-K Ford","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":83556,"journal":{"name":"Yale law & policy review","volume":"19 2","pages":"469-88"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2001-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"22392035","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Impeachment and Presidential Immunity from Judicial Process","authors":"Joseph Isenbergh","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.193849","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.193849","url":null,"abstract":"The Lewinsky affair played out under ground rules shaped in the Watergate affair, an earlier episode involving misconduct by a President. A predicate of the impeachment of President Clinton was the President's involvement in a private civil lawsuit. A sitting President's exposure to compulsory judicial process has been accepted almost without demur among academic commentators since the 1974 case of United States v. Nixon. As for impeachment, the academic consensus is that the Constitution defines impeachable offenses as \"treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors,\" the latter terms describing an imprecisely bounded category of serious offenses. This paper contends that both of these views are misconceived. The prevailing view of impeachment and presidential immunity slights both the terms of the Constitution and history. The scope of impeachment, based on a straightforward reading of the constitutional provisions concerning it, is demonstrably different from the academic consensus. The text of the Constitution and relevant history reveal that 1) impeachable offenses are not defined in the Constitution; 2) \"high crimes and misdemeanors\" are an historically well-defined category of offenses aimed specifically against the state, for which removal from office is mandatory upon conviction by the Senate; 3) Congress has the power to impeach and remove civil officers for a range of offenses other than high crimes and misdemeanors; and 4) the Senate can impose sanctions less severe than removal from office--censure, for example--on civil officers convicted of such other offenses. The textual and historical support for these propositions is powerful, if not overwhelming. When impeachment is correctly understood, the question of the President's immunity from judicial process takes on a different light. There is neither a constitutional basis nor a sound footing in policy for any official action against a sitting President other than impeachment.","PeriodicalId":83556,"journal":{"name":"Yale law & policy review","volume":"18 1","pages":"53"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1999-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67802384","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
G S Brand, G M Munoz, M G Nichols, M U Okata, J B Pitt, S Seager
{"title":"The two faces of gag provisions: patients and physicians in a bind.","authors":"G S Brand, G M Munoz, M G Nichols, M U Okata, J B Pitt, S Seager","doi":"","DOIUrl":"","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":83556,"journal":{"name":"Yale law & policy review","volume":"17 ","pages":"249-80"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1998-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"25821240","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Presidents, Pardons, and Prosecutors: Legal Accountability and the Separation of Powers","authors":"P. Shane","doi":"10.31228/osf.io/uqc8b","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.31228/osf.io/uqc8b","url":null,"abstract":"This article compares the philosophies of what I call “categorical separation of powers” and “checked separation of powers” with respect to a single concern: the capacity of government structure to promote executive fidelity to the rule of law. The thesis, illustrated by the Iran-Contra episode, is that the advantages offered by checks and balances in promoting the rule of law are significant, and that categorical separation tends to subvert, rather than encourage, executive conformity to law. Promoting the rule of law is only one aspect of sound governance; political accountability, policy coherence, and efficiency require separate consideration. Yet, the link between the rule of law and the separation of powers is at the core of both the historic and the current appeal of separation of powers as a principle of government structure. Most citizens would hesitate to consciously trade much by way of legality to achieve other governmental virtues.","PeriodicalId":83556,"journal":{"name":"Yale law & policy review","volume":"11 1","pages":"5"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1993-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"69640955","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Third Criterion: Compactness as a Procedural Safeguard Against Partisan Gerrymandering","authors":"D. Polsby, R. Popper","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2936284","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2936284","url":null,"abstract":"This paper addresses partisan gerrymandering and proposes a formal remedy. In addition to adhering to criteria which mandate that representational districts be composed of contiguous territories and have equal populations, we suggest that those who define district boundaries must also be required to respect a third criterion, the constraint of compactness.","PeriodicalId":83556,"journal":{"name":"Yale law & policy review","volume":"9 1","pages":"6"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1991-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.2139/SSRN.2936284","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68438366","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}