University of Richmond law review. University of Richmond最新文献

How (Not) to Talk about Abortion 如何(不)谈论堕胎

University of Richmond law review. University of Richmond Pub Date : 2018-10-03 DOI: 10.31228/osf.io/3jmyc

M. Harbach

引用次数: 0

Tribute to Professor Carroll "John Was Third" 致敬卡罗尔教授“约翰是第三”

University of Richmond law review. University of Richmond Pub Date : 2018-10-03 DOI: 10.31228/osf.io/ep6u3

James J. Gibson

引用次数: 0

Tribute to Chief Justice Harry L. Carrico 向首席大法官哈里·卡里科致敬

University of Richmond law review. University of Richmond Pub Date : 2018-10-03 DOI: 10.31228/osf.io/39djm

J. Douglass

引用次数: 0

The Recent Amendments to UCC Article 9: Problems and Solutions UCC第9条的最新修订:问题和解决办法

University of Richmond law review. University of Richmond Pub Date : 2018-10-03 DOI: 10.31228/osf.io/f3hqv

D. Frisch

引用次数: 3

Harry L. Carrico and the Ideal of the Lawyer-Statesman 哈里·卡里科和律师政治家的理想

University of Richmond law review. University of Richmond Pub Date : 2018-10-03 DOI: 10.31228/osf.io/btqyh

W. Perdue

引用次数: 0

Superficial Proxies for Simplicity in Tax Law 税法简洁性的表面表征

University of Richmond law review. University of Richmond Pub Date : 2018-04-14 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.3162604

Emily L. Cauble

{"title":"Superficial Proxies for Simplicity in Tax Law","authors":"Emily L. Cauble","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3162604","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3162604","url":null,"abstract":"Simplification of tax law is complicated. Yet, political rhetoric surrounding tax simplification often focuses on simplistic, superficial indicators of complexity in tax law such as word counts, page counts, number of regulations, and similar quantitative metrics. This preoccupation with the volume of enacted law often results in law that is more complex in a real sense. Achieving genuine simplification – a reduction in costs faced by taxpayers at various stages in the tax planning, tax compliance, and tax enforcement process – often requires enacting more law not less. In addition, conceptualizing simplicity in simplistic terms can leave the public vulnerable to policies advanced under the guise of simplification that have real aims that are less innocuous. A perennial example involves lawmakers proposing a reduction in the number of tax brackets under the heading of simplifying tax law. In reality, this change does very little, if anything, to simplify law in a meaningful sense, and its truer aim is to reduce progressivity in the tax code. Although the tax legislation ultimately enacted in December 2017 did not change the number of brackets applicable to individual taxpayers, political discourse preceding its enactment once again touted a reduction in the number of tax brackets as a simplifying measure.","PeriodicalId":83423,"journal":{"name":"University of Richmond law review. University of Richmond","volume":"2 1","pages":"329-371"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2018-04-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83004456","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 3

Is it Bad Law to Believe a Politician? Campaign Speech and Discriminatory Intent 相信政客是坏法律吗?竞选演讲和歧视意图

University of Richmond law review. University of Richmond Pub Date : 2017-08-10 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.3016539

Shawn E. Fields

{"title":"Is it Bad Law to Believe a Politician? Campaign Speech and Discriminatory Intent","authors":"Shawn E. Fields","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3016539","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3016539","url":null,"abstract":"In the forty years since Washington v. Davis, courts have struggled to articulate with any consistency an evidentiary standard for determining the existence of impermissible discriminatory motive. Though not required to do so, courts have often avoided considering any evidence of animus not contained within the official legislative or administrative record out of skepticism for the probative value of such “unofficial” statements. Lacking a coherent approach, courts have split on whether and to what extent statements made in the course of an election campaign should factor into discriminatory intent analysis. The 2016 presidential campaign has forced courts to squarely address this issue, as litigants challenging President Trump’s executive orders on immigration dredge up a trove of discriminatory and inflammatory statements made by candidate Trump. \u0000 \u0000Curiously, the wealth of legal scholarship examining the contours of discriminatory intent analysis have largely ignored the relevance and propriety of campaign rhetoric as a permissible form of evidence in the analysis. This Article fills that gap. It proceeds by examining the five primary arguments against considering campaign statements as evidence of subjective animus, and illustrating why none of these arguments justify such a bright-line evidentiary bar. In short, traditional claims that campaign statements are of limited probative value address their evidentiary weight rather than their admissibility and fail to account for a court’s ability to discount the evidence as necessary. By adopting a more fact-specific, objective, and flexible approach to campaign statements, courts not only will more faithfully adhere to the spirit of Davis and its progeny, but will also be equipped to address the atypical case of a politician who speaks his discriminatory mind and then acts on it.","PeriodicalId":83423,"journal":{"name":"University of Richmond law review. University of Richmond","volume":"33 1","pages":"273-325"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76970431","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The Equal Protection Component of Legislative Generality 立法普遍性的平等保护要素

University of Richmond law review. University of Richmond Pub Date : 2017-01-17 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2715278

E. C. Zoldan

{"title":"The Equal Protection Component of Legislative Generality","authors":"E. C. Zoldan","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2715278","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2715278","url":null,"abstract":"The Equal Protection Clause is a powerful and flexible tool for enforcing equality. Nevertheless, equal protection doctrine has been unable to restrain a particularly pernicious cause of inequality known as special legislation, which is legislation that singles out an individual or small, identifiable group for benefits or burdens that do not apply to anyone else. Through special legislation, state legislatures and Congress transfer public wealth to named individuals, exempt them from the generally applicable laws, and define the elements of torts and crimes to reach specific targets. This Article considers whether the Equal Protection Clause, which is the Constitution’s most explicit restraint on unequal treatment by government actors, is capable of restraining special legislation. Although special legislation creates significant inequalities, limitations on the scope of the Equal Protection Clause make it inadequate, standing alone, to curtail special legislation. Nevertheless, this Article’s analysis of the Equal Protection Clause reveals the clause’s surprising connection to a number of other clauses of the Constitution; together, these clauses suggest a principle that can restrain special legislation effectively and coherently. This principle – a value of legislative generality – is deeply rooted in the Constitution’s text, history, and jurisprudential underpinnings.This Article is an integral part of a larger project of describing and defining the contours of the Constitution’s value of legislative generality. After describing why the Equal Protection Clause, on its own, fails to restrain special legislation, this Article concludes by demonstrating how the Clause plays a vital role in contributing to an independent and coherent principle of legislative generality.","PeriodicalId":83423,"journal":{"name":"University of Richmond law review. University of Richmond","volume":"57 1","pages":"489-551"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2017-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79234759","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Some Thoughts Raised by Magna Carta: The Popular Re-Election of Judges 《大宪章》提出的几点思考:法官的普选

University of Richmond law review. University of Richmond Pub Date : 2016-10-26 DOI: 10.31228/osf.io/958ta

W. Bryson

引用次数: 0

Clarence Thomas, Fisher v. University of Texas, and the Future of Affirmative Action in Higher Education 克拉伦斯·托马斯，费希尔诉德克萨斯大学案，以及高等教育平权法案的未来

University of Richmond law review. University of Richmond Pub Date : 2016-06-20 DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2798038

S. Gerber

引用次数: 1