{"title":"Pandemic Modeling, Good and Bad","authors":"R. Northcott","doi":"10.5195/pom.2022.79","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5195/pom.2022.79","url":null,"abstract":"What kind of epidemiological modeling works well? This is determined by the nature of the target: the relevant causal relations are unstable across contexts. I look at two influential examples of modeling from the Covid pandemic. The first is the paper from Imperial College London, which, in March 2020, was influential in persuading the UK government to impose a lockdown. Because it assumes stability, this first example of modeling fails. A different modeling strategy is required, one less ambitious but more effective. This is illustrated by a second paper from Imperial College London, which, in December 2020, first estimated the transmissibility of the Alpha variant.","PeriodicalId":82846,"journal":{"name":"Studies in philosophy of medicine","volume":"115 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-05-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81258879","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Adverse Event Paradox","authors":"Thomas Milovac","doi":"10.5195/pom.2022.119","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5195/pom.2022.119","url":null,"abstract":"The placebo effect has a sibling, known as the nocebo effect, which is the expectation by study participants that they will experience negative, treatment-related effects (adverse events). In a similar fashion to the placebo effect, nocebo effects have been studied and shown to impact the control arm of trials (Colloca and Miller 2011). Prior to the start of clinical trials, prospective participants are required to express their consent to the study protocol and, depending on the kind of trial (for example, Phase I, II, III, IV, and so on), any negative effects of the treatment may be well known. It is part of the consent process to inform prospective study participants of potential negative effects that have been linked with the treatment in previous trials—without this knowledge the consent obtained could not be rightfully called “informed.” For participants, this means that should they consent and enter the trial, they know what negative effects are likely; their expectations for improvement are then bound up, to some real psychological extent, with their experience of adverse events (Kirsch 2010). Adverse events are paradigmatic of active treatments—in some sense medications do not have side effects; they only have positive and negative effects based on what the individual taking the medication hopes to achieve. And if one hopes to achieve improvement with respect to some ailment, one may also expect to experience adverse events, the very same adverse events communicated prior to the onset of the study. The adverse event paradox (AEP) arises because the same logic behind comparing placebo to treatment with respect to improvement ought to be applied to the comparison of adverse events. Participants may improve as a result of their expectations of a positive outcome—the","PeriodicalId":82846,"journal":{"name":"Studies in philosophy of medicine","volume":"2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88866042","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"When Is Lockdown Justified?","authors":"L. White, Philippe van Basshuysen, Mathias Frisch","doi":"10.5195/philmed.2022.85","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5195/philmed.2022.85","url":null,"abstract":"How could the initial, drastic decisions to implement “lockdowns” to control the spread of Covid-19 infections be justifiable, when they were made on the basis of such uncertain evidence? We defend the imposition of lockdowns in some countries by, first, looking at the evidence that undergirded the decision (focusing particularly on the decision-making process in the United Kingdom); second, arguing that this provided sufficient grounds to restrict liberty, given the circumstances; and third, defending the use of poorly empirically constrained epidemiological models as tools that can legitimately guide public policy.","PeriodicalId":82846,"journal":{"name":"Studies in philosophy of medicine","volume":"50 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79796292","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Reviewing the Reproduction Number R in Covid-19 Models","authors":"M. Amoretti, E. Lalumera","doi":"10.5195/philmed..78","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5195/philmed..78","url":null,"abstract":"Most of the epidemiological models of the Covid-19 pandemic contain the reproduction number (R) as a parameter. In this article we focus on some shortcomings regarding its role in driving health policies and political decisions. First, we summarize what R is and what it is used for. Second, we introduce a three-question matrix for the evaluation of any construct or parameter within a model. We then review the main literature about R to highlight some of its shortcomings and apply to them our three-question matrix. Finally, we argue that these shortcomings are important for an epistemic and political evaluation of R.","PeriodicalId":82846,"journal":{"name":"Studies in philosophy of medicine","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-04-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76861656","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Erratum to Simons, M. (2022). Vital Norms: Canguilhem’s \"The Normal and the Pathological\" in the Twenty-First Century, edited by Pierre-Olivier Méthot. Philosophy of Medicine, 3(1). https://doi.org/10.5195/philmed.2022.102","authors":"Jonah McAllister-Erickson","doi":"10.5195/philmed.2022.113","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5195/philmed.2022.113","url":null,"abstract":"At initial publication, Simons, M. (2022). Vital Norms: Canguilhem’s \"The Normal and the Pathological” in the Twenty-First Century, edited by Pierre-Olivier Méthot. was incorrectly published in Volume 2, Number 2, 2021. After discovery of the error, the article was assigned to the correct issue: Volume 3, Number 1, 2022.","PeriodicalId":82846,"journal":{"name":"Studies in philosophy of medicine","volume":"15 5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83376584","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Erratum to Kurth, C. (2022). Should Doctors Care About Their Patients?. Philosophy of Medicine, 3(1). https://doi.org/10.5195/philmed.2022.98","authors":"Jonah McAllister-Erickson","doi":"10.5195/philmed.2022.114","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5195/philmed.2022.114","url":null,"abstract":"At initial publication, Kurth, C. (2022). Should Doctors Care About Their Patients? was incorrectly published in Volume 2, Number 2, 2021. After discovery of the error, the article was assigned to the correct issue: Volume 3, Number 1, 2022.","PeriodicalId":82846,"journal":{"name":"Studies in philosophy of medicine","volume":"140 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86254228","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Vital Norms: Canguilhem’s \"The Normal and the Pathological\" in the Twenty-First Century, edited by Pierre-Olivier Méthot","authors":"M. Simons","doi":"10.5195/philmed.2021.102","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5195/philmed.2021.102","url":null,"abstract":"Review of Vital Norms: Canguilhem’s The Normal and the Pathological in the Twenty-First Century, edited by Pierre-Olivier Méthot","PeriodicalId":82846,"journal":{"name":"Studies in philosophy of medicine","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82040304","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Should Doctors Care About Their Patients?","authors":"Charlie Kurth","doi":"10.5195/philmed.2021.98","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5195/philmed.2021.98","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":82846,"journal":{"name":"Studies in philosophy of medicine","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83388219","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"\"Doctor Knows Best\"","authors":"Dylan Mirek Popowicz","doi":"10.5195/philmed.2021.49","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5195/philmed.2021.49","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 \u0000 \u0000We often consider medical practitioners to be epistemic authorities: “Doctor knows best,” as the saying goes. The place of expert judgment in evidence-based medicine hierarchies, and the crucial role of patient preferences and values in medical decision-making, however, pose problems for making sense of such authority. I argue that there is an account of such medical epistemic authority that does justice to the complexities of the doctor–patient relationship, while maintaining that medical practitioners hold an epistemically privileged position. Such a view can better inform medical practice by clearly illuminating the distinct roles of patients and doctors in decision-making processes. \u0000 \u0000 \u0000","PeriodicalId":82846,"journal":{"name":"Studies in philosophy of medicine","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88505520","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Dementia and the Boundaries of Secular Personhood","authors":"Nicholas Covaleski","doi":"10.5195/philmed.2021.65","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5195/philmed.2021.65","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000For many, dementia disrupts basic ideas about what it means to be human, raising profound philosophical and theological questions on the nature of personhood. In this article I ask what dementia might reveal about personhood in a “secular age.” I suggest that the ill-fitting relationship between Western bioethics, with its emphasis on autonomy, and dementia throws into relief the boundaries of a secular self, and I tease out the ethical implications of the limits of those boundaries by highlighting a biopolitics of secularism. Lastly, I offer a theological account of dementia that situates dependence as a central feature of the human condition, and enriches a secular biomedical understanding of this neurocognitive disorder. \u0000","PeriodicalId":82846,"journal":{"name":"Studies in philosophy of medicine","volume":"280 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76296047","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}