{"title":"On the Relationship between Asymptomatic Infections and Diseases","authors":"Martin Zach","doi":"10.5195/pom.2023.171","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5195/pom.2023.171","url":null,"abstract":"Many microbes responsible for infectious diseases are known to run an asymptomatic course in a significant portion of the population. By highlighting the conceptual complexities of host-microbe interactions, this paper elucidates the fact that while many infections remain asymptomatic, this does not necessarily mean that such infections are of no concern for health. The paper builds on the so-called damage-response framework and considers several developments required to gain a more comprehensive perspective on infections and their relationship to diseases. Irrespective of their (short-term) clinical manifestation, infections leave an imprint with consequences for health. Finally, these considerations regarding host-microbe interactions must be incorporated into policy decisions and public understanding of health if we hope to handle future pandemics such as Covid-19 better.","PeriodicalId":82846,"journal":{"name":"Studies in philosophy of medicine","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135949258","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Allure of Simplicity","authors":"Thomas Grote","doi":"10.5195/pom.2023.139","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5195/pom.2023.139","url":null,"abstract":"This paper develops an account of the opacity problem in medical machine learning (ML). Guided by pragmatist assumptions, I argue that opacity in ML models is problematic insofar as it potentially undermines the achievement of two key purposes: ensuring generalizability and optimizing clinician–machine decision-making. Three opacity amelioration strategies are examined, with explainable artificial intelligence (XAI) as the predominant approach, challenged by two revisionary strategies in the form of reliabilism and the interpretability by design. Comparing the three strategies, I argue that interpretability by design is most promising to overcome opacity in medical ML. Looking beyond the individual opacity amelioration strategies, the paper also contributes to a deeper understanding of the problem space and the solution space regarding opacity in medical ML.","PeriodicalId":82846,"journal":{"name":"Studies in philosophy of medicine","volume":"65 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134904353","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Equal Access to Parenthood and the Imperfect Duty to Benefit","authors":"J.Y. Lee, Ezio Di Nucci","doi":"10.5195/pom.2023.151","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5195/pom.2023.151","url":null,"abstract":"Should involuntarily childless people have the same opportunities to access parenthood as those who are not involuntarily childless? In the context of assisted reproductive technologies, affirmative answers to this question are often cashed out in terms of positive rights, including rights to third-party reproduction. In this paper, we critically explore the scope and extent to which any such right would hold up morally. Ultimately, we argue for a departure away from positive parental rights. Instead, we argue that the state has an imperfect duty to benefit involuntarily childless people in relation to their parental aspirations.","PeriodicalId":82846,"journal":{"name":"Studies in philosophy of medicine","volume":"39 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83941196","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"“Tortured Phrases” in Covid-19 Literature","authors":"J. A. Teixeira da Silva","doi":"10.5195/pom.2023.164","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5195/pom.2023.164","url":null,"abstract":"Medical practitioners and healthcare workers rely on information accuracy in academic journals. Some Covid-19 papers contain “tortured phrases”, nonstandard English expressions, or imprecise or erroneous terms, that give the impression of jargon but are not. Most post-publication attention paid to Covid-19 literature has focused on the accuracy of biomedical aspects, the validity of claims, or the robustness of data, but little has been published on linguistic specificity. This paper highlights the existence of “tortured phrases” in select Covid-19 literature, arguing that they could serve as a class of epistemic marker when evaluating the integrity of the scientific and biomedical literature.\u0000 ","PeriodicalId":82846,"journal":{"name":"Studies in philosophy of medicine","volume":"9 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79433777","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Medical Disorder Is Not a Black Box Essentialist Concept","authors":"Harriet Fagerberg","doi":"10.5195/pom.2023.165","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5195/pom.2023.165","url":null,"abstract":"Introduction Defining Mental Disorder: Jerome Wakefield and His Critics, edited by Denis Forest and Luc Faucher, is essential reading for students and researchers in philosophy of medicine whose work is informed by that of Jerome Wakefield, or the disease debate in general. If you are anything like me, this book will open the door to a new depth of understanding of the harmful dysfunction analysis (HDA) and its methodical underpinnings, and an enriched appreciation of what is at stake in defining medical disorder. To those confident that they understand Wakefield’s view and the surrounding debate, thinking perhaps that they do not need a refresher, I would say: perhaps you do not understand it as well as you think. Defining Mental Disorder provides much more than an overview of previously well-trodden ground. The chapters themselves, and Wakefield’s own detailed responses, help to elucidate a number of methodological nuances and peculiarities that have rarely been covered in such depth before. I was startled to learn how philosophically complex Wakefield’s position actually is, and how shallow my own understanding of it has been. It emerges as a far more nuanced and sophisticated account than I had given it credit for, and one that deserves serious reevaluation.","PeriodicalId":82846,"journal":{"name":"Studies in philosophy of medicine","volume":"35 1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79790032","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Polygene Risk Scores","authors":"James Woodward, K. Kendler","doi":"10.5195/pom.2023.156","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5195/pom.2023.156","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores the interpretation and use of polygenic risk scores (PRSs). We argue that PRSs generally do not directly embody causal information. Nonetheless, they can assist us in tracking other causal relationships concerning genetic effects. Although their purely predictive/correlational use is important, it is this tracking feature that contributes to their potential usefulness in other applications, such as genetic dissection, and their use as controls, which allow us, indirectly, to \"see\" more clearly the role of environmental variables.","PeriodicalId":82846,"journal":{"name":"Studies in philosophy of medicine","volume":"108 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79581127","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"When, How, and Why Did “Pain” Become Subjective?","authors":"C. Djordjevic","doi":"10.5195/pom.2023.146","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5195/pom.2023.146","url":null,"abstract":"The pain-assessment literature often claims that pain is subjective. However, the meaning and implications of this claim are left to the reader’s imagination. This paper attempts to make sense of the claim and its problems from the history and philosophy of science perspective. It examines the work of Henry Beecher, the first person to operationalize “pain” in terms of subjective measurements. First, I reconstruct Beecher’s operationalization of “pain.” Next, I argue this operationalization fails. Third, I salvage Beecher’s insights by repositioning them in an intersubjective account. Finally, I connect these insights to current pain-assessment approaches, showing that they enrich each other.","PeriodicalId":82846,"journal":{"name":"Studies in philosophy of medicine","volume":"25 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90306156","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Epistemic Injustice Should Matter to Psychiatrists","authors":"I. Kidd, Lucienne Spencer, E. Harris","doi":"10.5195/pom.2023.159","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5195/pom.2023.159","url":null,"abstract":"The relevance of epistemic injustice to psychiatry has generated a lively literature, and only a few critical pushbacks, a recent example being an article by Brent M. Kious, Benjamin R. Lewis","PeriodicalId":82846,"journal":{"name":"Studies in philosophy of medicine","volume":"74 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83764203","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Does Schizophrenia Exist?","authors":"G. Repnikov","doi":"10.5195/pom.2023.15","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5195/pom.2023.15","url":null,"abstract":"This paper develops and defends a deflationary analysis of existence claims involving psychiatric disorders. According to this analysis, a given psychiatric disorder exists if, and only if, there are people who have the disorder. The implications of this analysis are spelled out for our views of nosological decision making, and for the relationship between claims about the existence of psychiatric disorders and claims about their reality. A pragmatic view of psychiatric nosology is defended and it is argued that worries about the “reality” of any given disorder have to be distinguished clearly from questions about its existence.","PeriodicalId":82846,"journal":{"name":"Studies in philosophy of medicine","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77093380","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Methods of Inference and Shaken Baby Syndrome","authors":"Nicholas Binney","doi":"10.5195/pom.2023.41","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5195/pom.2023.41","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000\u0000\u0000Exploring the early development of an area of medical literature can inform contemporary medical debates. Different methods of inference include deduction, induction, abduction, and inference to the best explanation. I argue that early shaken baby research is best understood as using abduction to tentatively suggest that infants with unexplained intracranial and ocular bleeding have been assaulted. However, this tentative conclusion was quickly interpreted, by some at least, as a general rule that infants with these pathological signs were certainly cases of abuse. Rather than focusing on inductive arguments, researchers today may be better off focusing on making a compelling inference to the best explanation.\u0000\u0000\u0000","PeriodicalId":82846,"journal":{"name":"Studies in philosophy of medicine","volume":"258 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83504214","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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