Philosophy in context最新文献_第4页

Persons and the Measurement of Illness 人和疾病的测量

Philosophy in context Pub Date : 1984-07-01 DOI: 10.5840/PHILCONTEXT1984149

E. Bartlett

引用次数: 0

In the interest of infants. 为了婴儿的利益。

Philosophy in context Pub Date : 1984-07-01 DOI: 10.5840/PHILCONTEXT1984143

M. Mahowald

引用次数: 1

The case for deception in medical experimentation. 医学实验中的欺骗案。

Philosophy in context Pub Date : 1984-07-01 DOI: 10.5840/PHILCONTEXT1984148

J. Newell

{"title":"The case for deception in medical experimentation.","authors":"J. Newell","doi":"10.5840/PHILCONTEXT1984148","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/PHILCONTEXT1984148","url":null,"abstract":"Any attempt to argue in favor of deceptive practices is bound to meet with at least initial resistance. In the context of health care activities, where what goes on is often quite literally a matter of life and death, deceptive practices would seem to be totally objectionable. But with a little reflection, we might be led to alter our generally negative attitude toward using deceptive techniques in medical experimentation. One of the aims of this essay is to engage the reader in this sort of reflection. In what follows, I shall argue that deception, when properly understood, can justifiably be used in research involving human subjects even where informed consent is not obtained. The case for deception will be presented in two phases. In the first section, I will attempt an analysis of the concept of deception itself, with a view to showing the many and diverse forms which deceptive practices may take. The argument there is designed to show that deception can be understood as a morally neutral strategy. I maintain that this is the sense of the term which is needed to establish a moral justification for the use of deception in human experimentation. In the second section, I shall use this sense of the term in presenting an argument for deceiving human subjects in certain circumstances. If my arguments succeed, I hope to have taken some of the edge off our general reticence to approve of deceptive research techniques which could result in monumental gains in medicine for modern man.","PeriodicalId":82314,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy in context","volume":"14 1","pages":"51-9"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1984-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71071500","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Some moral problems of the damaged neonate. 受损新生儿的一些道德问题。

Philosophy in context Pub Date : 1984-07-01 DOI: 10.5840/PHILCONTEXT1984144

J. Hoaglund

引用次数: 0

John T. Noonan and Baby Jane Doe. 约翰·t·努南和无名女婴。

Philosophy in context Pub Date : 1984-07-01 DOI: 10.5840/PHILCONTEXT1984146

D. Levin

引用次数: 0

Non-medical burdens of the defective infant. 缺陷婴儿的非医疗负担。

Philosophy in context Pub Date : 1984-01-01 DOI: 10.5840/philcontext1984145

Gary E. Jones

引用次数: 0

Medical ethics and the value of human life. 医德与人的生命价值。

Philosophy in context Pub Date : 1984-01-01 DOI: 10.5840/PHILCONTEXT1984147

H. Khatchadourian

引用次数: 1

Philosophy and Continuing Education 哲学及继续教育

Philosophy in context Pub Date : 1983-07-01 DOI: 10.5840/PHILCONTEXT1983137

T. Organ

引用次数: 0

The Practical Relevance of Practical Philosophy: Philosophers' Impact on History 实践哲学的实践意义:哲学家对历史的影响

Philosophy in context Pub Date : 1983-07-01 DOI: 10.5840/PHILCONTEXT1983134

W. McBride

{"title":"The Practical Relevance of Practical Philosophy: Philosophers' Impact on History","authors":"W. McBride","doi":"10.5840/PHILCONTEXT1983134","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5840/PHILCONTEXT1983134","url":null,"abstract":"In considering the alleged — and, as I happen to believe, real — revival of practical philosophy, it seems to me very appropriate to spend some time reflecting on the question, \"To what good?\" Any one of the following might be thought to quahfy as an exercise in practical philosophy: a nonabstract, experienced-based systematic analysis of (a) virtues and vices (the Aristotelean tradition), or (b) authenticity and bad faith (the existentialist tradition), or (c) alienation and community (the Hegelian-Marxist tradition), and there are no doubt many other possible alternatives. In any case, the exercise is at first, necessarily, the practical activity of only a single individual, the analyst (or, in the still rare case of a joint effort, the analysts). There are, of course, familiar ways of multiplying this activity of practical reasoning: notably, by delivering a more or less formal lecture about it, or by writing about it. The original analyst's listeners and/or readers will presumably never exactly repeat his or her original activity; they may, in their own thinking, add to it, probably more often reconstruct a partly inaccurate and less detailed version of it, and sometimes react to it in such a way as to produce a very different analytic outcome. This is what all of us expect, optimally, when we publicly engage in the activity of philosophizing, whether as practical philosophers or in some purely theoretical area of the discipline. In this admittedly minimal sense the much-discussed union of theory and practice, said to be so difficult to attain, is constantly being achieved — if we take seriously A l thusser's idea of theoretical practice. It is widely believed, however, that the practical philosopher is by definition committed to more ambitious expectations if he or she is to be able validly to claim success. In short, the practical philosopher is ordinarily expected to want to exert some effect — to have an influence or an impact, as we say — on the social world. In Western thought, this expectation goes back at least as far as Plato's advocacy of philosopher-kings in the Republic. It is true, as we all know, that Plato's own attempt at influencing government poHcy through his pupil in Syracuse was, let us say, counterproductive, but it is also true that he was working under very imperfect conditions there. A t any rate, it is possible to dist inguish, as commentators frequently have done, between the practical effects of the","PeriodicalId":82314,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy in context","volume":"13 1","pages":"31-44"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"1983-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.5840/PHILCONTEXT1983134","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"71070914","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

The Role of Ideals: A Model for Applied Ethics 理想的作用:应用伦理学的典范

Philosophy in context Pub Date : 1983-07-01 DOI: 10.5840/PHILCONTEXT1983135

J. Demarco

引用次数: 0