The case for deception in medical experimentation.

Abstract

Any attempt to argue in favor of deceptive practices is bound to meet with at least initial resistance. In the context of health care activities, where what goes on is often quite literally a matter of life and death, deceptive practices would seem to be totally objectionable. But with a little reflection, we might be led to alter our generally negative attitude toward using deceptive techniques in medical experimentation. One of the aims of this essay is to engage the reader in this sort of reflection. In what follows, I shall argue that deception, when properly understood, can justifiably be used in research involving human subjects even where informed consent is not obtained. The case for deception will be presented in two phases. In the first section, I will attempt an analysis of the concept of deception itself, with a view to showing the many and diverse forms which deceptive practices may take. The argument there is designed to show that deception can be understood as a morally neutral strategy. I maintain that this is the sense of the term which is needed to establish a moral justification for the use of deception in human experimentation. In the second section, I shall use this sense of the term in presenting an argument for deceiving human subjects in certain circumstances. If my arguments succeed, I hope to have taken some of the edge off our general reticence to approve of deceptive research techniques which could result in monumental gains in medicine for modern man.