Pace law reviewPub Date : 2020-01-17DOI: 10.58948/2331-3528.2012
A. Ferraro, Karen Oehme, Ian Waldick, Nat Stern
{"title":"Improving Court-Mandated Divorce Education by Recognizing the Effects of Parents’ Childhood Trauma","authors":"A. Ferraro, Karen Oehme, Ian Waldick, Nat Stern","doi":"10.58948/2331-3528.2012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.58948/2331-3528.2012","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":82250,"journal":{"name":"Pace law review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49441480","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pace law reviewPub Date : 2020-01-17DOI: 10.58948/2331-3528.2015
S. V. Gomes
{"title":"New York’s Raise the Age Law: Restoring the Juvenile Justice System Leaves Courts Legislating from the Bench","authors":"S. V. Gomes","doi":"10.58948/2331-3528.2015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.58948/2331-3528.2015","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":82250,"journal":{"name":"Pace law review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44821158","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pace law reviewPub Date : 2020-01-17DOI: 10.58948/2331-3528.2013
Elettra Bietti
{"title":"Consent as a Free Pass: Platform Power and the Limits of the Informational Turn","authors":"Elettra Bietti","doi":"10.58948/2331-3528.2013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.58948/2331-3528.2013","url":null,"abstract":"Across the United States and Europe, notice and consent, the act of clicking that “I have read and agree” to a platform’s terms of service, is the central device for legitimating and enabling platforms’ data processing, acting as a free pass for a variety of intrusive activities which include profiling and behavioral advertising. Notwithstanding literature and findings that lay significant doubts on notice and consent’s adequacy as a regulatory device in the platform ecosystem, courts, regulators and other public authorities across these regions keep adopting and legitimating these practices. While consent seems a good proxy for ensuring justice in the platform economy, it is an empty construct. \u0000 \u0000This paper explains how notice and consent practices in the platform economy are not only normatively futile but also positively harmful. Narrow understandings that focus on voluntariness and disclosure such as the ones generally adopted by regulators and courts fail to account for the systemically unjust background conditions within which voluntary individual acts of consent take place. Through such narrow approaches, regulators are failing to acknowledge that consent cannot be reasonably taken to morally transform the rights, obligations and relationships that it purports to reshape. Further, it positively harms consumers in at least three ways: burdening them with decisions they cannot meaningfully make, subordinating their core inalienable rights to respect and dignity to the economic interests of platforms, and creating widespread ideological resistance against alternatives. Notice and consent as a discourse is hardly contestable and is currently part of the rigid background of assumed facts about our digital environment. \u0000 \u0000As new legislation is devised in the US and new opportunities to reinterpret the GDPR present themselves in the EU, we must be more courageous in looking beyond the facade of individual control and instead must grapple with the core structure of corporate surveillance markets. The longer we fail to acknowledge consent’s irrelevance to data governance, the longer we will deny ourselves respect and protection from the ever-growing expansion of digital markets into our lives.","PeriodicalId":82250,"journal":{"name":"Pace law review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42378033","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pace law reviewPub Date : 2020-01-17DOI: 10.58948/2331-3528.2009
Hodge, D. Samuel
{"title":"What Can Be Done About A Disruptive Physician? A Legal Analysis","authors":"Hodge, D. Samuel","doi":"10.58948/2331-3528.2009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.58948/2331-3528.2009","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":82250,"journal":{"name":"Pace law review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43281469","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pace law reviewPub Date : 2020-01-01DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3518082
L. Trautman
{"title":"Impeachment, Donald Trump and Ukraine Extortion","authors":"L. Trautman","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3518082","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3518082","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":82250,"journal":{"name":"Pace law review","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"68601994","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pace law reviewPub Date : 2019-09-24DOI: 10.58948/2331-3528.2008
J. McGoldrick
{"title":"The Dormant Commerce Clause: The Endgame—From Southern Pacific to Tennesse Wine & Spirits—1945 to 2019","authors":"J. McGoldrick","doi":"10.58948/2331-3528.2008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.58948/2331-3528.2008","url":null,"abstract":"This article attempts to develop the undue burdens balancing and the virtually per se discrimination tests of the modern Dormant Commerce Clause starting with the 1945 case of Southern Pacific v. Arizona and moving to Tennessee Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass'n v. Thomas, a case decided by the United States Supreme Court in June of 2019. The Commerce Clause, Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 gives Congress the power “To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” Our most famous Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, John Marshall, defined Congress’s commerce power “among the several states” to be plenary and complete, setting the stage for Congress to use this power over interstate commerce as the basis for much of Congress’ power to pass legislation. Out of this immense federal power, Chief Justice Marshall deduced that since Congress had plenary power over interstate commerce, the states had none. Only Congress could regulate interstate commerce. Marshall called the implied limitations of the Commerce Clause “dormant” leading to what we now call the Dormant Commerce Clause. There are two main aspects to the modern Dormant Commerce Clause. First, states may pass evenhanded laws that impact interstate commerce, but even evenhanded laws may not impose undue burdens on interstate commerce. Second, states may not discriminate against interstate commerce by treating commerce from other states differently than in-state commerce simply because it is out of state. Under the undue burdens test, the Court will consider a number of factors, but primarily the Court will undertake a factual evaluation of the importance of the state interest in passing the law that impacted interstate commerce versus a practical consideration of the harm to interstate commerce. Under the discrimination rule, the Court will almost certainly find the discriminatory state law to violate the Dormant Commerce Clause, but the Court uses an almost tortuous series of approaches to reach what is close to a foregone conclusion. This tortious approach has led some to say that it is impossible to know which of the two tests to apply. This article attempts to identify the key factors involved in the Court’s undue burden’s balancing approach and to closely explore the Court’s attempt to define discrimination and to determine when a state might be allowed to discriminate against interstate commerce. The hope is that at the very least students, lawyers, and lower courts might have some guidance in applying the two tests and in knowing the difference between the two.","PeriodicalId":82250,"journal":{"name":"Pace law review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47009116","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pace law reviewPub Date : 2019-09-09DOI: 10.58948/2331-3528.2006
J. D. Fry, Hu Yining
{"title":"The Semisecret Life of Late Mao-Era International Law Scholarship","authors":"J. D. Fry, Hu Yining","doi":"10.58948/2331-3528.2006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.58948/2331-3528.2006","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":82250,"journal":{"name":"Pace law review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45442940","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pace law reviewPub Date : 2019-09-09DOI: 10.58948/2331-3528.2004
Scott R. Thomas
{"title":"Domicile in Multistate Personal Income Tax Residency Matters: Enter the Swamp at Your Own Peril","authors":"Scott R. Thomas","doi":"10.58948/2331-3528.2004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.58948/2331-3528.2004","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":82250,"journal":{"name":"Pace law review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48514044","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pace law reviewPub Date : 2019-09-09DOI: 10.58948/2331-3528.2003
Mary Leto Pareja
{"title":"Humanizing Work Requirements for Safety Net Programs","authors":"Mary Leto Pareja","doi":"10.58948/2331-3528.2003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.58948/2331-3528.2003","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":82250,"journal":{"name":"Pace law review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48220990","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pace law reviewPub Date : 2019-09-04DOI: 10.58948/2331-3528.1998
Michael J. Sherman
{"title":"Presidential War Powers and Humanitarian Intervention","authors":"Michael J. Sherman","doi":"10.58948/2331-3528.1998","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.58948/2331-3528.1998","url":null,"abstract":"Does the fact that Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution reserves to Congress the authority to “declare war” mean that the president needs congressional approval before using military force?1 As this Article discusses, there are a range of answers to this question. The Article examines this debate in the context of humanitarian intervention, i.e. military actions taken, not for purposes of conquest, but instead to stop largescale, serious violations of human rights. If the president wishes to use the military for these purposes, should he have more authority under the Constitution to do so? Less? The same? What this Article suggests is that the concerns which drove the Founders to place limits on the President’s war powers, especially the fear that a glory-seeking chief executive would precipitously use the military in order to serve his own desire for fame, are not as serious when it comes to humanitarian intervention. Presidents are unlikely to significantly enhance their short-term popularity or historical legacies by using the military in this way. As a result, there is less reason to fear that they will be incautious in these situations. In addition, it is possible to establish standards by which to judge presidential action in this arena, placing another effective limit on the President. In light of the reduced risks, as well as the terrible costs of inaction in the face of grave human rights crises, we should accept some flexibility for the President to decide to intercede for humanitarian reasons. * LL.M. Georgetown University Law Center, J.D. University of Michigan. The author is an attorney with the federal government. The views expressed here are solely his own. 1. U.S. CONST. art, I, § 8, cl. 11.","PeriodicalId":82250,"journal":{"name":"Pace law review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2019-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45596516","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}