Presidential War Powers and Humanitarian Intervention

Michael J. Sherman
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Abstract

Does the fact that Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution reserves to Congress the authority to “declare war” mean that the president needs congressional approval before using military force?1 As this Article discusses, there are a range of answers to this question. The Article examines this debate in the context of humanitarian intervention, i.e. military actions taken, not for purposes of conquest, but instead to stop largescale, serious violations of human rights. If the president wishes to use the military for these purposes, should he have more authority under the Constitution to do so? Less? The same? What this Article suggests is that the concerns which drove the Founders to place limits on the President’s war powers, especially the fear that a glory-seeking chief executive would precipitously use the military in order to serve his own desire for fame, are not as serious when it comes to humanitarian intervention. Presidents are unlikely to significantly enhance their short-term popularity or historical legacies by using the military in this way. As a result, there is less reason to fear that they will be incautious in these situations. In addition, it is possible to establish standards by which to judge presidential action in this arena, placing another effective limit on the President. In light of the reduced risks, as well as the terrible costs of inaction in the face of grave human rights crises, we should accept some flexibility for the President to decide to intercede for humanitarian reasons. * LL.M. Georgetown University Law Center, J.D. University of Michigan. The author is an attorney with the federal government. The views expressed here are solely his own. 1. U.S. CONST. art, I, § 8, cl. 11.
总统战争权力和人道主义干预
美国宪法第一条第8款将“宣战”的权力保留给国会,这是否意味着总统在使用武力之前需要国会批准?1正如本文所讨论的,这个问题有一系列的答案。该条在人道主义干预的背景下审查了这场辩论,即采取军事行动,不是为了征服,而是为了制止大规模、严重侵犯人权的行为。如果总统希望将军队用于这些目的,根据宪法,他是否应该有更多的权力这样做?较少的还是一样?这篇文章表明,在人道主义干预方面,促使创始人限制总统战争权力的担忧,尤其是担心一位追求荣誉的首席执行官会为了满足自己的成名欲望而突然动用军队,并没有那么严重。总统不太可能通过这种方式使用军队来显著提高他们的短期声望或历史遗产。因此,在这种情况下,人们没有理由担心他们会不小心。此外,可以制定标准来评判总统在这一领域的行动,从而对总统施加另一个有效的限制。鉴于风险的减少,以及在严重的人权危机面前无所作为的可怕代价,我们应该接受总统出于人道主义原因决定调解的一些灵活性。*乔治敦大学法律中心法学硕士,密歇根大学法学博士。提交人是联邦政府的律师。这里所表达的观点完全是他自己的。1.美国常量。第一条第8条第11条。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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