AnxietyPub Date : 2020-12-17DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197539712.003.0015
B. Bergo
{"title":"Epilogue","authors":"B. Bergo","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197539712.003.0015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197539712.003.0015","url":null,"abstract":"Opening to further reflection, the epilogue recalls Franz Neumann’s 1954 arguments that anxiety arises in response to economic and cultural threats to identity and status, often paralyzing political participation. In times of disillusionment and social unrest, anxiety precipitates unreflective responses, including adherence to “caesaristic movements,” grounded on “false concreteness” or social prejudices. Another great observer of the rise of authoritarian movements, Hermann Broch, ties anxiety to our embodied ego’s existence in its world, to its self-enhancement, and to responses to perceived threats. When confronted with dangers to its self-expansion, anxiety, panic, and compensatory behaviors aiming at sadistic “over-satisfactions” (Superbefriedigungen) ensue. These responses can be seen in individuals and in the groups and movements they form. Together, these authors strongly support the book’s argument for abiding with anxiety and approaching it with a certain existential knowledge—of oneself and one’s circumstances.","PeriodicalId":79474,"journal":{"name":"Anxiety","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"61547439","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
AnxietyPub Date : 2020-12-17DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197539712.003.0004
B. Bergo
{"title":"Anxiety, Freedom, and Evil","authors":"B. Bergo","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197539712.003.0004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197539712.003.0004","url":null,"abstract":"Overcoming his early admiration of Fichte’s Doctrine of Science and his philosophy of the “absolute I,” Schelling crowned his own philosophy of nature with an account of the emergence of the absolute out of itself. The only way in which God or the absolute might thus emerge and evolve was if it encompassed within itself what was both itself and not itself. Two years after Hegel’s Phenomenology, Schelling published his Freedom essay, arguably setting Hegel’s 1807 dialectic on its head. Starting with God (or what-is) as a self-organizing being, Schelling introduced vitality and self-origin into an absolute that was no longer a historic terminus ad quem. By reviving Spinoza’s holism, Schelling proposed a new logic of identity: A=A and their indiscernible difference, or B. The possibility of the living absolute giving rise to itself thus resulted from two principles existing in “indifference to each other” yet inseparable, and there was no third term by which to distinguish them. Eschewing Hegelian dialectic in favor of contrariety in a genre, Schelling characterized the coexistence as Sehnsucht, an objectless “affect” out of which emerged an incipient order. All living beings contained this bi-une principle. However, in humans the two could become unbalanced, thereby accounting for the possibility of evil, of “a merely particular will” striving for ascendency. While this characterized evil in humans, the tension between the two principles, which had begun as Sehnsucht, would soon be called angst in the Ages of the World, underscoring the importance of the affect.","PeriodicalId":79474,"journal":{"name":"Anxiety","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46748846","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
AnxietyPub Date : 2020-12-17DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197539712.003.0003
B. Bergo
{"title":"From Kant to Hegel via Philippe Pinel","authors":"B. Bergo","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197539712.003.0003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197539712.003.0003","url":null,"abstract":"This excursus reviews Kant’s treatment of Affectus and Leidenschafte (affects and passions) in the Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (lectures given over a span of many years). Having argued that empirical psychology was scientifically unfeasible and established his rational psychology as beyond the fictions of dogmatic metaphysicians, Kant could only treat affects from the perspective of practice in the world, like a behaviorism before its time. Nevertheless, his classification of passions ran as if parallel with psychopathologies—ordered according to representations, imagination, judgement, and reason. Building on his 1763 essay “Negative Magnitudes,” the anthropology was profoundly critical of affects, pointing to those “tensions constantly ready to explode,” and requiring vigilance. In sharp contrast, Hegel reintegrated passions into his mature Philosophy of Mind (1813) arguing that inclinations and passions overcame their subjective enclosure thanks to the idea of freedom. He supported his arguments using the French revolutionary psychiatry of Philippe Pinel. Pinel’s original taxonomy had the advantage of being monist; thus different from the binary of neurosis and psychosis, Pinel argued in favor of forms of “mania.” Crucial for Hegel was that even manias with delirium, grouping passions around an idée fixe, an indestructible kernel of rationality endured. This allowed Hegel to claim that freedom and nature were rooted in reason, and although reason might find itself tangled in contradictions it never entirely disappeared. This audacious claim resignified the function of reason as Geistlichkeit (spirituality) apt to integrate psychology into the dialectical movement of mind subjective.","PeriodicalId":79474,"journal":{"name":"Anxiety","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42497592","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
AnxietyPub Date : 2020-12-17DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197539712.003.0009
B. Bergo
{"title":"Freud and the Three Anxieties","authors":"B. Bergo","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197539712.003.0009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197539712.003.0009","url":null,"abstract":"Anxiety in Freud takes three basic forms over the course of his intellectual evolution. Initially it belies the interactions of neural energies and sexuality. From its mechanistic origins it gradually comes to denote the explicitly psychological situation of the subject caught in a conflict between its bodily drives and social norms. Finally, Freud traces the origin of angst in a surprisingly Schellingian way, with the trauma of birth. Against his brilliant colleague Otto Rank, he argues that anxiety is “there” before a mature ego has taken shape and is able to recollect its onset. Therefore anxiety in Freud precedes what we consider our subjecthood, our self or ego. As a symptom and defense response, anxiety echoes Nietzsche’s great intelligence of the Nietzschean body, and thereafter goes through a hermeneutic transformation as a sign of the human being caught between nature and culture.","PeriodicalId":79474,"journal":{"name":"Anxiety","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42257874","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
AnxietyPub Date : 2020-12-17DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197539712.003.0012
Bettina Bergo
{"title":"Heidegger II","authors":"Bettina Bergo","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197539712.003.0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197539712.003.0012","url":null,"abstract":"Following claims that Being and Time was essentially philosophical anthropology, and questions about the embodiment and mortality of Dasein, and Heidegger recurred to the distinction between humans who, as being-there, create a “world” for themselves and confront their death resolutely, versus animals who are caught up in their natural environments and do not die so much as “perish” biologically. In 1929 he studied the work of gestalt biologists like Jakob von Uexküll to support his arguments for the world-poverty of animals, unable hermeneutically to forge a real “world.” By 1936, nevertheless, his logic faltered when he argued that the age of technology and giganticism had reduced most humans to mere “technicized animals.” Even if this was a rhetorical flourish, it remained that only an anxious few remained among us who could dwell poetically and be free for their death, an idea with significant implications for the metaphysical politics Heidegger developed in response to Nazi politics. By 1949, the technicized animal—poor in world—appeared to perish with no greater resoluteness and dignity than its animal relatives.","PeriodicalId":79474,"journal":{"name":"Anxiety","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45934385","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
AnxietyPub Date : 2020-12-17DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197539712.003.0014
B. Bergo
{"title":"Conclusion","authors":"B. Bergo","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197539712.003.0014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197539712.003.0014","url":null,"abstract":"The conclusion revisits the characterization of anxiety by each thinker examined: Kant, Hegel, Schelling, Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Darwin, Freud, Husserl, Heidegger, and Levinas. It proposes a three-part overview of anxiety (1) as the fundamental affect supervening upon, and accompanying, pleasure and displeasure; (2) as a sign or symptom of “the possible” or indeed of a conflict between bodily and cultural forces, and (3) as the affect that poses questions—about the conditions of emergence of a moral subject and, ultimately, about what-is. It examines some recent debates about the meaning and rationality of emotions, their evolutionary status, and concludes that this affect cannot be reduced to a cognitive emotion or what the idealist tradition called a “passion.” Rather than intellectualizing it, anxiety must be grasped in its many senses and abided with, like a site of sojourning.","PeriodicalId":79474,"journal":{"name":"Anxiety","volume":"102 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"61547356","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
AnxietyPub Date : 2020-12-17DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197539712.003.0008
B. Bergo
{"title":"Nietzsche and the Intensification of the Dialectic of Anxiety","authors":"B. Bergo","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197539712.003.0008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197539712.003.0008","url":null,"abstract":"After Marx but in a profoundly different way, Nietzsche would set German idealism on its head, proposing to philosophize out of what he called the great intelligence of the body. Adopting a critical phenomenalism, Nietzsche reproved Schopenhauer’s metaphysics of the Will with its intellectualist ascetic response. He repondered the latter’s noumenal Will as an infinity of “hermeneutic” forces, which governed aristocratically, in view of life and creativity. When forced back into themselves under sociohistoric conditions, these forces were res-senties and re-experienced as anxiety and fear. This morbid cultural situation might gradually be reversed by a “transvaluation” of values following the death of God. It was Scheler who explored a psychology of resentment, where anxiety formed the core of the European complex.","PeriodicalId":79474,"journal":{"name":"Anxiety","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44946453","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
AnxietyPub Date : 2020-12-17DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197539712.003.0006
B. Bergo
{"title":"The Universality of Emotions?","authors":"B. Bergo","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197539712.003.0006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197539712.003.0006","url":null,"abstract":"Having adopted Herbert Spencer’s evolutionary mechanism called survival of the fittest in Origin of Species (1859), Darwin turned his attentions to human societies and the remarkable turn entailed “natural selection applying to itself its own selective law.” In this fold in natural selection, human cultures evinced altruistic behaviors as well as egotistical rivalries. With Origin published six years after Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments, Darwin would argue in favor of affects like sympathy and compassion. Yet how did such affects come about and how could they be demonstrated empirically? While hesitating over the origin of instincts in selection and habituation, Darwin simultaneously worked on his “demonstration” of the universality of five basic affects (pleasure, fear, suffering or grief, rage, and disgust). Though the mechanism of transmission of moral sentiments might be in doubt, these basic affects could be read on faces, whether sketched, photographed or through epistolary descriptions. One year after the Descent of Man (1871), Darwin published his thirty-year long research as The expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (1872). In that work, he would argue that human expressions provide us a window into the affective mind, essentially of all human cultures. This was the empirical research needed for supporting the claim for the universality of human emotions. The work inaugurated a debate still current today centered on the role of culture in bodily semiosis. Surprisingly, Darwin aligned anxiety with grief rather than fear and suffering.","PeriodicalId":79474,"journal":{"name":"Anxiety","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42922636","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
AnxietyPub Date : 2020-12-17DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197539712.003.0005
B. Bergo
{"title":"The Dialectics of Affect","authors":"B. Bergo","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197539712.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197539712.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"Initially influenced by Schelling’s lectures on positive philosophy (1841–1842), Kierkegaard ultimately withdrew from his lectures, devoting his attention exclusively to the redaction of Either/Or. The Concept of Anxiety was written in the shadow of that work under a uniquely anonymous pseudonym. Of course, anxiety in his deformalization of late idealism was not a concept; it belonged and did not belong to the understanding. Indeed, it precedes human actions under the sign of inherited “sinfulness” and as sheer possibility. If Kierkegaard aligned freedom with a leap, then anxiety was the affect precursive to it. Anxiety was the prethetic knowing that we are able to do. . . X. Tracing the “spiritual” history of the human race which carries the sins of the fathers even as it freely enacts sin, Kierkegaard urged that the more spiritual the culture, the more anxious it was. No longer the adjuvant of reason as in Hegel, anxiety belonged to the irreducible condition of a living subject. Over the five years that separated the Concept of Anxiety from Sickness onto Death, Kierkegaard’s mood of “Angest” will intensify as it is approached from his new perspective of Coram Deo (“before God”). Within the new perspective, the status and the meaning of the self is altered, showing a clearer relation to infinity. For the task of Kierkegaard’s philosophy—learning to become the nothing that one is—had attained a new stage in his existential dialectic. His arguments influenced Heidegger’s recourse to anxiety as a passage toward the question of being.","PeriodicalId":79474,"journal":{"name":"Anxiety","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48690952","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
AnxietyPub Date : 2020-12-17DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197539712.003.0007
B. Bergo
{"title":"Schopenhauer, “Life,” and the Affects of the Noumenal","authors":"B. Bergo","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197539712.003.0007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197539712.003.0007","url":null,"abstract":"In his unique response to Kant, Schopenhauer worked to combine Spinoza’s monism with Kant’s transcendental investigations. Working at the crossroads between nineteenth-century science (physiology, natural history) and German metaphysics, he redefined the thing-in-itself as a generative principle called the “noumenal will.” The latter stood beyond all our possible representations but could be “known” thanks to an affect; namely, in the urging of anxiety in us. As the “sign” of the will to live, angst followed our brief pleasures and flowed into suffering. It was the basic characteristic of living beings. Nevertheless, drawing from the popular wave of Hindu and Buddhist philosophies, he argued that the striving of the will in us might be quieted intellectually. Schopenhauer’s thought stands at one endpoint of European philosophy, arising when it runs out of metaphoric energy and looks abroad.","PeriodicalId":79474,"journal":{"name":"Anxiety","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-12-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47082448","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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