Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies. Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium最新文献

{"title":"PROVGEN: A Privacy-Preserving Approach for Outcome Validation in Genomic Research.","authors":"Yuzhou Jiang, Tianxi Ji, Erman Ayday","doi":"10.56553/popets-2026-0064","DOIUrl":"10.56553/popets-2026-0064","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>As genomic research has grown increasingly popular in recent years, dataset sharing has remained limited due to privacy concerns. This limitation hinders the reproducibility and validation of research outcomes, both of which are essential for identifying computational errors during the research process. In this paper, we introduce PROVGEN, a privacy-preserving method for sharing genomic datasets that facilitates reproducibility and outcome validation in genome-wide association studies (GWAS). Our approach encodes genomic data into binary space and applies a two-stage process. First, we generate a differentially private version of the dataset using an XOR-based mechanism tailored to biological characteristics. Second, we restore data utility by adjusting the Minor Allele Frequency (MAF) values in the noisy dataset to align with public MAFs using optimal transport. Finally, we convert the processed binary data back into its genomic representation and publish the resulting dataset. We evaluate PROVGEN on three real-world genomic datasets and compare it with local differential privacy and three synthesis-based methods. Our results show that PROVGEN overall outperforms existing approaches in detecting GWAS outcome errors, preserving data fidelity, and resisting membership inference attacks (MIAs). By adopting our method, genomic researchers will be inclined to share differentially private datasets while maintaining high data quality for reproducibility of their findings.</p>","PeriodicalId":74556,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies. Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium","volume":"2026 2","pages":"642-661"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2026-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC13215393/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"148058855","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Summation-based Private Segmented Membership Test from Threshold-Fully Homomorphic Encryption.","authors":"Nirajan Koirala, Jonathan Takeshita, Jeremy Stevens, Taeho Jung","doi":"10.56553/popets-2024-0114","DOIUrl":"10.56553/popets-2024-0114","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>In many real-world scenarios, there are cases where a client wishes to check if a data element they hold is included in a set segmented across a large number of data holders. To protect user privacy, the client's query and the data holders' sets should remain encrypted throughout the whole process. Prior work on Private Set Intersection (PSI), Multi-Party PSI (MPSI), Private Membership Test (PMT), and Oblivious RAM (ORAM) falls short in this scenario in many ways. They either require data holders to possess the sets in plaintext, incur prohibitively high latency for aggregating results from a large number of data holders, leak the information about the party holding the intersection element, or induce a high false positive. This paper introduces the primitive of a Private Segmented Membership Test (PSMT). We give a basic construction of a protocol to solve PSMT using a threshold variant of approximate-arithmetic homomorphic encryption and show how to overcome existing challenges to construct a PSMT protocol without leaking information about the party holding the intersection element or false positives for a large number of data holders ensuring IND-CPA ^<i>D</i> security. Our novel approach is superior to existing state-of-the-art approaches in scalability with regard to the number of supported data holders. This is enabled by a novel summation-based homomorphic membership check rather than a product-based one, as well as various novel ideas addressing technical challenges. Our PSMT protocol supports many more parties (up to 4096 in experiments) compared to prior related work that supports only around 100 parties efficiently. Our experimental evaluation shows that our method's aggregation of results from data holders can run in 92.5s for 1024 data holders and a set size of 2²⁵, and our method's overhead increases very slowly with the increasing number of senders. We also compare our PSMT protocol to other state-of-the-art PSI and MPSI protocols and discuss our improvements in usability with a better privacy model and a larger number of parties.</p>","PeriodicalId":74556,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies. Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium","volume":"2024 4","pages":"209-225"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC12063338/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144037803","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Compact and Divisible E-Cash with Threshold Issuance","authors":"Alfredo Rial, Ania M. Piotrowska","doi":"10.56553/popets-2023-0116","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.56553/popets-2023-0116","url":null,"abstract":"Decentralized, offline, and privacy-preserving e-cash could fulfil the need for both scalable and byzantine fault-resistant payment systems. Existing offline anonymous e-cash schemes are unsuitable for distributed environments due to a central bank. We construct a distributed offline anonymous e-cash scheme, in which the role of the bank is performed by a quorum of authorities, and present its two instantiations. Our first scheme is compact, i.e. the cost of the issuance protocol and the size of a wallet are independent of the number of coins issued, but the cost of payment grows linearly with the number of coins spent. Our second scheme is divisible and thus the cost of payments is also independent of the number of coins spent, but the verification of deposits is more costly. We provide formal security proof of both schemes and compare the efficiency of their implementations.","PeriodicalId":74556,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies. Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium","volume":"147 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135010611","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"On the Robustness of Topics API to a Re-Identification Attack","authors":"Nikhil Jha, Martino Trevisan, Emilio Leonardi, Marco Mellia","doi":"10.56553/popets-2023-0098","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.56553/popets-2023-0098","url":null,"abstract":"Web tracking through third-party cookies is considered a threat to users' privacy and is supposed to be abandoned in the near future. Recently, Google proposed the Topics API framework as a privacy-friendly alternative for behavioural advertising. Using this approach, the browser builds a user profile based on navigation history, which advertisers can access. The Topics API has the possibility of becoming the new standard for behavioural advertising, thus it is necessary to fully understand its operation and find possible limitations. This paper evaluates the robustness of the Topics API to a re-identification attack where an attacker reconstructs the user profile by accumulating user's exposed topics over time to later re-identify the same user on a different website. Using real traffic traces and realistic population models, we find that the Topics API mitigates but cannot prevent re-identification to take place, as there is a sizeable chance that a user's profile is unique within a website's audience. Consequently, the probability of correct re-identification can reach 15-17%, considering a pool of 1,000 users. We offer the code and data we use in this work to stimulate further studies and the tuning of the Topic API parameters.","PeriodicalId":74556,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies. Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135010612","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"DP-SIPS: A simpler, more scalable mechanism for differentially private partition selection","authors":"Marika Swanberg, Damien Desfontaines, Samuel Haney","doi":"10.56553/popets-2023-0109","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.56553/popets-2023-0109","url":null,"abstract":"Partition selection, or set union, is an important primitive in differentially private mechanism design: in a database where each user contributes a list of items, the goal is to publish as many of these items as possible under differential privacy. In this work, we present a novel mechanism for differentially private partition selection. This mechanism, which we call {DP-SIPS}, is very simple: it consists of iterating the naive algorithm over the data set multiple times, removing the released partitions from the data set while increasing the privacy budget at each step. This approach preserves the scalability benefits of the naive mechanism, yet its utility compares favorably to more complex approaches developed in prior work.","PeriodicalId":74556,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies. Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135010613","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Privacy-Preserving Federated Recurrent Neural Networks","authors":"Sinem Sav, Abdulrahman Diaa, Apostolos Pyrgelis, Jean-Philippe Bossuat, Jean-Pierre Hubaux","doi":"10.56553/popets-2023-0122","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.56553/popets-2023-0122","url":null,"abstract":"We present RHODE, a novel system that enables privacy-preserving training of and prediction on Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs) in a cross-silo federated learning setting by relying on multiparty homomorphic encryption. RHODE preserves the confidentiality of the training data, the model, and the prediction data; and it mitigates federated learning attacks that target the gradients under a passive-adversary threat model. We propose a packing scheme, multi-dimensional packing, for a better utilization of Single Instruction, Multiple Data (SIMD) operations under encryption. With multi-dimensional packing, RHODE enables the efficient processing, in parallel, of a batch of samples. To avoid the exploding gradients problem, RHODE provides several clipping approximations for performing gradient clipping under encryption. We experimentally show that the model performance with RHODE remains similar to non-secure solutions both for homogeneous and heterogeneous data distributions among the data holders. Our experimental evaluation shows that RHODE scales linearly with the number of data holders and the number of timesteps, sub-linearly and sub-quadratically with the number of features and the number of hidden units of RNNs, respectively. To the best of our knowledge, RHODE is the first system that provides the building blocks for the training of RNNs and its variants, under encryption in a federated learning setting.","PeriodicalId":74556,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies. Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135010614","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Editors' Introduction","authors":"Michelle Mazurek, Micah Sherr","doi":"10.56553/popets-2023-0094","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.56553/popets-2023-0094","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":74556,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies. Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135010599","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Lessons in VCR Repair: Compliance of Android App Developers with the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA)","authors":"Nikita Samarin, Shayna Kothari, Zaina Siyed, Oscar Bjorkman, Reena Yuan, Primal Wijesekera, Noura Alomar, Jordan Fischer, Chris Hoofnagle, Serge Egelman","doi":"10.56553/popets-2023-0072","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.56553/popets-2023-0072","url":null,"abstract":"The California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) provides California residents with a range of enhanced privacy protections and rights. Our research investigated the extent to which Android app developers comply with the provisions of the CCPA that require them to provide consumers with accurate privacy notices and respond to \"verifiable consumer requests\" (VCRs) by disclosing personal information that they have collected, used, or shared about consumers for a business or commercial purpose. We compared the actual network traffic of 109 apps that we believe must comply with the CCPA to the data that apps state they collect in their privacy policies and the data contained in responses to \"right to know\" requests that we submitted to the app's developers. Of the 69 app developers who substantively replied to our requests, all but one provided specific pieces of personal data (as opposed to only categorical information). However, a significant percentage of apps collected information that was not disclosed, including identifiers (55 apps, 80%), geolocation data (21 apps, 30%), and sensory data (18 apps, 26%) among other categories. We discuss improvements to the CCPA that could help app developers comply with \"right to know\" requests and other related regulations.","PeriodicalId":74556,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies. Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135111117","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Editors' Introduction","authors":"Michelle Mazurek, Micah Sherr","doi":"10.56553/popets-2023-0066","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.56553/popets-2023-0066","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":74556,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies. Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135111119","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Story Beyond the Eye: Glyph Positions Break PDF Text Redaction","authors":"Maxwell Bland, Anushya Iyer, Kirill Levchenko","doi":"10.56553/popets-2023-0069","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.56553/popets-2023-0069","url":null,"abstract":"In this work we find that many current redactions of PDF text are insecure due to non-redacted character positioning information. In particular, subpixel-sized horizontal shifts in redacted and non-redacted characters can be recovered and used to effectively deredact first and last names. Unfortunately these findings affect redactions where the text underneath the black box is removed from the PDF. We demonstrate these findings by performing a comprehensive vulnerability assessment of common PDF redaction types. We examine 11 popular PDF redaction tools, including Adobe Acrobat, and find that they leak information about redacted text. We also effectively deredact hundreds of real-world PDF redactions, including those found in OIG investigation reports and FOIA responses. To correct the problem, we have released open source algorithms to fix vulnerable redactions and reduce the amount of information leaked by nonexcising redactions (where the text underneath the redaction is copy-pastable). We have also notified the developers of the studied redaction tools. We have notified the Office of Inspector General, the Free Law Project, PACER, Adobe, Microsoft, and the US Department of Justice. We are working with several of these groups to prevent our discoveries from being used for malicious purposes.","PeriodicalId":74556,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies. Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium","volume":"95 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135960827","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}