Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society. ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society最新文献_第9页

Privacy management for secure mobility 用于安全移动的隐私管理

Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society. ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society Pub Date : 2006-10-30 DOI: 10.1145/1179601.1179612

J. Lindqvist, Laura Takkinen

引用次数: 14

Scanning electronic documents for personally identifiable information 扫描电子文件以获取个人身份信息

Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society. ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society Pub Date : 2006-10-30 DOI: 10.1145/1179601.1179608

T. Aura, T. A. Kuhn, M. Roe

引用次数: 45

Scratch & vote: self-contained paper-based cryptographic voting Scratch & vote:独立的基于纸张的加密投票

Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society. ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society Pub Date : 2006-10-30 DOI: 10.1145/1179601.1179607

B. Adida, R. Rivest

引用次数: 165

Measuring relationship anonymity in mix networks 混合网络中关系匿名性的度量

Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society. ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society Pub Date : 2006-10-30 DOI: 10.1145/1179601.1179611

Vitaly Shmatikov, Ming-Hsiu Wang

{"title":"Measuring relationship anonymity in mix networks","authors":"Vitaly Shmatikov, Ming-Hsiu Wang","doi":"10.1145/1179601.1179611","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1179601.1179611","url":null,"abstract":"Many applications of mix networks such as anonymousWeb browsing require relationship anonymity: it should be hard for the attacker to determine who is communicating with whom. Conventional methods for measuring anonymity, however, focus on sender anonymity instead. Sender anonymity guarantees that it is difficult for the attacker to determine the origin of any given message exiting the mix network, but this may not be sufficient to ensure relationship anonymity. Even if the attacker cannot identify the origin of messages arriving to some destination, relationship anonymity will fail if he can determine with high probability that at least one of the messages originated from a particular sender, without necessarily being able to recognize this message among others. We give a formal definition and a calculation methodology for relationship anonymity. Our techniques are similar to those used for sender anonymity, but, unlike sender anonymity, relationship anonymity is sensitive to the distribution of message destinations. In particular, Zipfian distributions with skew values characteristic of Web browsing provide especially poor relationship anonymity. Our methodology takes route selection algorithms into account, and incorporates information-theoretic metrics such as entropy and min-entropy. We illustrate our methodology by calculating relationship anonymity in several simulated mix networks.","PeriodicalId":74537,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society. ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society","volume":"29 1","pages":"59-62"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85211489","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 67

Private social network analysis: how to assemble pieces of a graph privately 私人社交网络分析:如何私下组装图的碎片

Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society. ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society Pub Date : 2006-10-30 DOI: 10.1145/1179601.1179619

Keith B. Frikken, P. Golle

{"title":"Private social network analysis: how to assemble pieces of a graph privately","authors":"Keith B. Frikken, P. Golle","doi":"10.1145/1179601.1179619","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1179601.1179619","url":null,"abstract":"Connections in distributed systems, such as social networks, online communities or peer-to-peer networks, form complex graphs. These graphs are of interest to scientists in fields as varied as marketing, epidemiology and psychology. However, knowledge of the graph is typically distributed among a large number of subjects, each of whom knows only a small piece of the graph. Efforts to assemble these pieces often fail because of privacy concerns: subjects refuse to share their local knowledge of the graph. To assuage these privacy concerns, we propose reconstructing the whole graph privately, i.e., in a way that hides the correspondence between the nodes and edges in the graph and the real-life entities and relationships that they represent. We first model the privacy threats posed by the private reconstruction of a distributed graph. Our model takes into account the possibility that malicious nodes may report incorrect information about the graph in order to facilitate later attempts to de-anonymize the reconstructed graph. We then propose protocols to privately assemble the pieces of a graph in ways that mitigate these threats. These protocols severely restrict the ability of adversaries to compromise the privacy of honest subjects.","PeriodicalId":74537,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society. ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society","volume":"5 1","pages":"89-98"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88205095","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 67

Enhancing privacy of federated identity management protocols: anonymous credentials in WS-security 增强联邦身份管理协议的隐私性:WS-security中的匿名凭据

Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society. ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society Pub Date : 2006-10-30 DOI: 10.1145/1179601.1179613

J. Camenisch, Thomas Gross, Dieter Sommer

{"title":"Enhancing privacy of federated identity management protocols: anonymous credentials in WS-security","authors":"J. Camenisch, Thomas Gross, Dieter Sommer","doi":"10.1145/1179601.1179613","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1179601.1179613","url":null,"abstract":"Federated Identity Management (FIM) allows for securely provisioning certified user identities and attributes to relying parties. It establishes higher security and data quality compared to user-asserted attributes and provides for stronger user privacy protection than technologies based upon user-side attribute certificates. Therefore, industry pursues the deployment of FIM solutions as one cornerstone of the WS-Security framework. Current research proposes even more powerful methods for security and privacy protection in identity management with so called anonymous credential systems. Being based on new, yet well-researched, signature schemes and cryptographic zero-knowledge proofs, these systems have the potential to improve the capabilities of FIM by superior privacy protection, user control, and multiple use of single credentials. Unfortunately, anonymous credential systems and their semantics being based upon zero-knowledge proofs are incompatible with the XML Signature Standard which is the basis for the WS-Security and most FIM frameworks. We put forth a general construction for integrating anonymous credential systems with the XML Signature Standard and FIM protocols. We apply this method to the WS-Security protocol framework and thus obtain a very flexible WS-Federation Active Requestor Profile with strong user control and superior privacy protection.","PeriodicalId":74537,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society. ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society","volume":"14 1","pages":"67-72"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2006-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75281561","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 15

Maintaining privacy on derived objects 维护派生对象的私密性

Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society. ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society Pub Date : 2005-11-07 DOI: 10.1145/1102199.1102202

Nicola Zannone, S. Jajodia, F. Massacci, D. Wijesekera

{"title":"Maintaining privacy on derived objects","authors":"Nicola Zannone, S. Jajodia, F. Massacci, D. Wijesekera","doi":"10.1145/1102199.1102202","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1102199.1102202","url":null,"abstract":"Protecting privacy means to ensure users that access to their personal data complies with their preferences. However, information can be manipulated in order to derive new objects that may disclose part of the original information. Therefore, control of information flow is necessary for guaranteeing privacy protection since users should know and control not only who access their personal data, but also who access information derived from their data. Actually, current approaches for access control do not provide support for managing propagation of information and for representing user preferences.This paper proposes to extend the Flexible Authorization Framework (FAF) in order to automatically verify whether a subject is entitled to process personal data and derive the authorizations associated with the outcome of data processing. In order to control information flow, users may specify the range of authorizations that can be associated with objects derived from their data. The framework guarantees that every \"valid\" derived object does not disclose more information than users want and preserves the permissions that users want to maintain. To make the discussion more concrete, we illustrate the proposal with a bank case study.","PeriodicalId":74537,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society. ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society","volume":"21 1","pages":"10-19"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81648347","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 7

The privacy cost of the second-chance offer 第二次机会的隐私成本

Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society. ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society Pub Date : 2005-11-07 DOI: 10.1145/1102199.1102218

Sumit Joshi, Yu-An Sun, P. Vora

{"title":"The privacy cost of the second-chance offer","authors":"Sumit Joshi, Yu-An Sun, P. Vora","doi":"10.1145/1102199.1102218","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1102199.1102218","url":null,"abstract":"This paper examines a generalization of a two-stage game common on eBay: an ascending-price auction followed by price discrimination (the second chance offer). High bids in the auction lead to high price offers during price discrimination, and a financial disadvantage in the second stage. The disadvantage depends on (a) the amount of information revealed to the seller in the first stage, and hence the extent of privacy protection provided and (b) whether the bidder is non-strategic (ignores the possibility of price discrimination) or rational. A privacy cost of one mechanism over another is defined and studied.For the non-strategic bidder, the second chance offer provides a zero payoff. Addition of privacy protection (anonymity and bid secrecy) decreases revenue and increases expected payoff, with higher bidders benefiting more. Privacy protection can, however, decrease an individual bidder's payoff by shielding potential buyers from the seller and thus causing an opportunity loss.If the bidder is rational, price discrimination results in a lower revenue than consecutive auctions, and is a bad strategy for the seller. Additionally, rational behavior provides more advantage to the bidder than does anonymity protection.","PeriodicalId":74537,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society. ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society","volume":"30 1","pages":"97-106"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87483616","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 10

Anonymous yet accountable access control 匿名但可靠的访问控制

Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society. ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society Pub Date : 2005-11-07 DOI: 10.1145/1102199.1102208

M. Backes, J. Camenisch, Dieter Sommer

{"title":"Anonymous yet accountable access control","authors":"M. Backes, J. Camenisch, Dieter Sommer","doi":"10.1145/1102199.1102208","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1102199.1102208","url":null,"abstract":"This paper introduces a novel approach for augmenting attribute-based access control systems in a way that allows them to offer fully anonymous access to resources while at the same time achieving strong accountability guarantees. We assume that users hold attribute certificates and we show how to exploit cryptographic zero-knowledge proofs to allow requesting users to prove that they hold suitable certificates for accessing a resource. In contrast to the commonly taken approach of sending all possibly relevant certificates to the access control system, our approach hence does not release any information to the access control system except for the presence of a set of certificates satisfying the access condition. This constitutes the minimal amount of information that has to be released for coming up with a correct access decision, and our approach is the first to achieve this. Additionally given a trusted third party for identity escrow, we furthermore show that a concise application of zero-knowledge proofs offers the access control system the capability to hold a requesting user accountable for her actions under specific, well-defined conditions. All the employed cryptographic techniques are highly efficient, and an architecture for exploiting our approach in practical scenarios is already in place.","PeriodicalId":74537,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society. ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society","volume":"18 1","pages":"40-46"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74471643","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 56

Determining user privacy preferences by asking the right questions: an automated approach 通过询问正确的问题来确定用户的隐私偏好:一种自动化的方法

Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society. ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society Pub Date : 2005-11-07 DOI: 10.1145/1102199.1102209

Keith Irwin, Ting Yu

引用次数: 10