Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society. ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society最新文献_第10页

Anonymous yet accountable access control 匿名但可靠的访问控制

Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society. ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society Pub Date : 2005-11-07 DOI: 10.1145/1102199.1102208

M. Backes, J. Camenisch, Dieter Sommer

{"title":"Anonymous yet accountable access control","authors":"M. Backes, J. Camenisch, Dieter Sommer","doi":"10.1145/1102199.1102208","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1102199.1102208","url":null,"abstract":"This paper introduces a novel approach for augmenting attribute-based access control systems in a way that allows them to offer fully anonymous access to resources while at the same time achieving strong accountability guarantees. We assume that users hold attribute certificates and we show how to exploit cryptographic zero-knowledge proofs to allow requesting users to prove that they hold suitable certificates for accessing a resource. In contrast to the commonly taken approach of sending all possibly relevant certificates to the access control system, our approach hence does not release any information to the access control system except for the presence of a set of certificates satisfying the access condition. This constitutes the minimal amount of information that has to be released for coming up with a correct access decision, and our approach is the first to achieve this. Additionally given a trusted third party for identity escrow, we furthermore show that a concise application of zero-knowledge proofs offers the access control system the capability to hold a requesting user accountable for her actions under specific, well-defined conditions. All the employed cryptographic techniques are highly efficient, and an architecture for exploiting our approach in practical scenarios is already in place.","PeriodicalId":74537,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society. ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society","volume":"18 1","pages":"40-46"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74471643","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 56

Mining rule semantics to understand legislative compliance 挖掘规则语义以理解立法遵从性

Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society. ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society Pub Date : 2005-11-07 DOI: 10.1145/1102199.1102210

T. Breaux, A. Antón

引用次数: 54

Secure off-the-record messaging 保密保密信息

Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society. ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society Pub Date : 2005-11-07 DOI: 10.1145/1102199.1102216

M. Raimondo, R. Gennaro, H. Krawczyk

引用次数: 58

Information revelation and privacy in online social networks 在线社交网络中的信息泄露与隐私

Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society. ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society Pub Date : 2005-11-07 DOI: 10.1145/1102199.1102214

R. Gross, A. Acquisti

引用次数: 2446

Disabling RFID tags with visible confirmation: clipped tags are silenced 禁用具有可见确认的RFID标签:夹住的标签将静音

Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society. ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society Pub Date : 2005-11-07 DOI: 10.1145/1102199.1102205

G. Karjoth, P. Moskowitz

引用次数: 107

The pynchon gate: a secure method of pseudonymous mail retrieval 品钦门:一种获取假名邮件的安全方法

Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society. ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society Pub Date : 2005-11-07 DOI: 10.1145/1102199.1102201

Len Sassaman, B. Cohen, Nick Mathewson

引用次数: 77

Quantitative evaluation of unlinkable ID matching schemes 不可链接ID匹配方案的定量评价

Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society. ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society Pub Date : 2005-11-07 DOI: 10.1145/1102199.1102212

Yasunobu Nohara, Sozo Inoue, K. Baba, H. Yasuura

引用次数: 39

Protecting privacy in tabular healthcare data: explicit uncertainty for disclosure control 保护表格式医疗保健数据中的隐私:披露控制的明确不确定性

Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society. ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society Pub Date : 2005-11-07 DOI: 10.1145/1102199.1102203

B. Shand, J. Rashbass

引用次数: 4

Specifying electronic voting protocols in typed MSR 在键入的MSR中指定电子投票协议

Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society. ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society Pub Date : 2005-11-07 DOI: 10.1145/1102199.1102207

Theodoros Balopoulos, S. Gritzalis, S. Katsikas

引用次数: 5

Coercion-resistant electronic elections 抗胁迫电子选举

Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society. ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society Pub Date : 2005-11-07 DOI: 10.1145/1102199.1102213

A. Juels, D. Catalano, M. Jakobsson

{"title":"Coercion-resistant electronic elections","authors":"A. Juels, D. Catalano, M. Jakobsson","doi":"10.1145/1102199.1102213","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1102199.1102213","url":null,"abstract":"We introduce a model for electronic election schemes that involves a more powerful adversary than previous work. In particular, we allow the adversary to demand of coerced voters that they vote in a particular manner, abstain from voting, or even disclose their secret keys. We define a scheme to be coercion-resistant if it is infeasible for the adversary to determine if a coerced voter complies with the demands.A first contribution of this paper is to describe and characterize a new and strengthened adversary for coercion in elections. (In doing so, we additionally present what we believe to be the first formal security definitions for electronic elections of any type.) A second contribution is to demonstrate a protocol that is secure against this adversary. While it is clear that a strengthening of attack models is of theoretical relevance, it is important to note that our results lie close to practicality. This is true both in that we model real-life threats (such as vote-buying and vote-canceling), and in that our proposed protocol combines a fair degree of efficiency with an unusual lack of structural complexity. Furthermore, previous schemes have required use of an untappable channel throughout. Ours only carries the much more practical requirement of an anonymous channel during the casting of ballots, and an untappable channel during registration (potentially using postal mail).This extended abstract is a heavily truncated version of the full paper available at http://eprint.iacr.org/2002/165.","PeriodicalId":74537,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society. ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society","volume":"47 1","pages":"37-63"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2005-11-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72551291","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 648