公司治理评论最新文献

{"title":"Certified B Corporations and Benefit Corporations","authors":"Ke Cao, Joel Gehman","doi":"10.1093/obo/9780199846740-0203","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/obo/9780199846740-0203","url":null,"abstract":"Over the past decade, Certified B Corporations and Benefit Corporations, commonly known as B Corps, have emerged as a global phenomenon. Both organizational forms are for-profit businesses. Whereas Certified B Corporations have been accredited for their environmental, social, and governance (ESG) practices, Benefit Corporations are a new legal form, currently available in 38 states and jurisdictions in the United States (US), as well as British Columbia (Canada), Colombia, Ecuador, and Italy. Both types were promulgated by B Lab, a US-based nonprofit organization. Founded in 2006, in the suburbs of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, B Lab has sought to institutionalize business as a force for good. At present, certification is available to any business worldwide, and approximately 3,700 companies in 74 countries are currently certified. Prominent Certified B Corporations include Ben & Jerry’s, Danone North America, and Patagonia. Examples of Benefit Corporations include Data.World, Kickstarter, and Plum Organics. Overall, the B Corp movement’s radical aspiration to redefine business has garnered substantial attention from policymakers, media, businesses, NGOs, and academe. In this bibliography, we provide an overview of burgeoning scholarly work – ranging from general references and cutting-edge theoretical work to accumulating empirical findings and key pedagogical resources. A core focus is on enumerating the variety of theoretical perspectives that have been taken and the central research themes in extant work, including interdisciplinary publications. We close by discussing exemplary teaching materials and introducing other resources such as the B Academics research community and available datasets for research.","PeriodicalId":57292,"journal":{"name":"公司治理评论","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88649428","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Environmental Governance: Compliances and Consequences","authors":"N. Azhaguraja, Malabika Deo","doi":"10.1007/978-981-33-4076-3_7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4076-3_7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":57292,"journal":{"name":"公司治理评论","volume":"46 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86585375","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Cap & Trap and Alternatives in Price Discrimination","authors":"I. Hirsh, H. Assa","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3733328","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3733328","url":null,"abstract":"Cap and Trap is a mechanism for smoothing rate change at policy renewal. However, this method still can expose an insurance company to a potential conduct risk. Individual clients could be overcharged or undercharged on an individual basis for their risk. This paper discusses alternative methods to better smooth prices with the aim of reducing the effect of price discrimination.","PeriodicalId":57292,"journal":{"name":"公司治理评论","volume":"146 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82268514","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Lending When Relationships Are Scarce: The Role of Information Spread via Bank Networks","authors":"Yan Alperovych, Anantha Divakaruni, S. Manigart","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3708132","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3708132","url":null,"abstract":"We investigate how bank networks facilitate syndicate formation and lending in the leveraged buyout (LBO) market, where ties between banks and borrowers are scarce and borrower opacity is high. Using novel centrality measures that capture how information might flow through the network, we show that networks disseminate borrower-relevant information that influences which banks join the syndicate, the share the lead bank holds, and LBO lending terms. Further, banks’ knowledge of their network is highly localized, unrelated to their reputation, and a useful information source when ties to the borrower are lacking. Our findings emphasize the importance of information diffusion via networks for resolving asymmetric information problems during loan syndication.","PeriodicalId":57292,"journal":{"name":"公司治理评论","volume":"89 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77102489","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Distressed Firm Restructurings and Hedge Funds with Expertise: Saviors or Vultures?","authors":"N. Baranchuk, Michael Rebello","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3696676","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3696676","url":null,"abstract":"We model restructuring when hedge funds with expertise in navigating distress intervene. Whether hedge funds help distressed firms or act like vultures are two sides of the same coin. Interventions help when firm prospects are bright and assets are not easily redeploy-able. Interventions are vulture like when bankruptcy is costly and fire sale conditions prevail in the market for distressed assets. Positive outcomes are more likely when funds intervene by acquiring equity though acquiring debt is more likely. These effects are the result of systematic changes in expectations and strategies of firms' other claimants in response to hedge fund intervention.","PeriodicalId":57292,"journal":{"name":"公司治理评论","volume":"1982 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90318321","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Corporate Governance and Enterprise Success of Selected Deposit Money Banks in Nigeria","authors":"A. T. Hassan","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3682165","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3682165","url":null,"abstract":"The Enterprise Success (ES) of the banking industry is an important factor for the economic development of a nation. The success of deposit money banks (DMBs) in Nigeria in terms of market share, business sustainability, organizational survival and firm size has continued to dwindle, suggestive of ineffective corporate governance (CG) dimensions in terms of transparency, accountability, board diversity, director independence and board size. The study examined the effect of CG on ES of DMBs in Nigeria. <br><br>The study adopted cross-sectional survey research design. The population comprised 226 board and management staff of the selected DMBs. Total enumeration was used. A validated questionnaire was administered to collect data. The Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficients for the constructs ranged from 0.72 to 0.84. The response rate was 84.5%. Data were analysed using descriptive and inferential statistics.<br><br>Findings revealed that CG had significant effect on ES of selected DMBs in Nigeria (Adj.R2 = 0.423, F(5, 185) = 59.142, p &lt; 0.05). CG dimensions (transparency, accountability, board diversity, director independence and board Size) had significant effect on market share (Adj.R2 = 0.209, F(5, 185) = 11.054, p &lt; 0.05). CG dimensions had significant effect on business sustainability (Adj.R2 = 0.488, F(5, 185) = 37.244, p &lt; 0.05). CG dimensions had significant effect on organizational survival (Adj.R2 = 0.511, F(5, 185) = 40.727, p &lt; 0.05). CG dimensions had significant effect on firm size (Adj.R2 = 0.208, F(5, 185) = 32.893, p &lt; 0.05). Self-regulation had no significant moderating effect on the relationship between CG and ES of selected DMBs in Nigeria (R2 = 0.3795, ΔR2 = 0.0119, ΔF (3.5781)3u, p &gt; 0.05). Social capital had significant moderating effect on the relationship between CG and ES (R2 = 0.6519, ΔR2 = 0.0187, ΔF = 6.0708, p &lt; 0.05). Self-regulation and social capital had significant combined moderating effect on the relationship between CG and ES (ΔR2 = 0.0341, ΔF = 6.4669, p &lt; 0.05).<br><br>The study concluded that CG affects ES of DMBs. The study recommended that management of DMBs should ensure transparency, accountability, board diversity, director independence and adequate board size to ensure enterprise success. The management of DMBs should encourage self-regulation and social capital.","PeriodicalId":57292,"journal":{"name":"公司治理评论","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82033062","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"It Ain’t Just What Funds Disclose (It's The Way That They Do It)","authors":"A. Tucker, Yusen Xia, S. Smelcer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3674572","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3674572","url":null,"abstract":"The finance and accounting literature document how operating company disclosure tone and textual attributes affect firm performance, earnings persistence, stock volatility, capital costs, and retail investor behavior. In this Article, we explore the applicability of these theories to mutual fund disclosure, examining the extent to which disclosure tone influences fund risk and performance. Following (Loughran and McDonald 2011), we first develop customized dictionaries (word lists) specific to mutual fund disclosure language. We also introduce a novel sentiment scoring framework that generates a transparent sentence and disclosure-level score for our sample of 132,000 mutual fund summary prospectuses (497k) from 2010-2018. Our results demonstrate that investment strategy (IS) sections differ in tone and function from principal risk (PR) sections, results that we explore in conjunction with Tucker and Xia (2020) examination of disclosure readability. In particular, we find IS sections are more negative than PR sections—a trend that only increases over time. We also note differences in sentiment scores among CRSP categories, suggesting that asset class drives disclosure tone. A fixed effect regression analysis explores the effect of disclosure tone on fund performance and risk.","PeriodicalId":57292,"journal":{"name":"公司治理评论","volume":"41 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88457759","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Mutual Fund Advisory Misconduct: Investor Flows and Company Reactions","authors":"Bing Liang, Yuying Sun, Kai Wu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3061419","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3061419","url":null,"abstract":"We evaluate the economic consequences of mutual fund advisory misconduct from 2000 to 2015. An average of 31.25% reduction in monthly fund flows occurs in one year after the misconduct. The effect is more pronounced in funds facing strong investor monitoring. Although all types of misconduct have negative effects on sentiment-driven flows, only disclosure-related misconduct has negative effects on fundamental-driven flows. To respond, mutual funds raise marketing expenditures, reduce contractual incentives, impose stricter investment restrictions, hold more liquid assets, and replace malfeasant advisory firms subsequently. These measures alleviate the adverse effects of misconduct on investor flows. Overall, our study highlights the significant impact of misconduct on mutual fund flows and responsive policies in the mutual fund industry.","PeriodicalId":57292,"journal":{"name":"公司治理评论","volume":"63 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83850627","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Role of Hedge Funds in the 2020 Treasury Market Turmoil","authors":"Marco Di Maggio","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3698415","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3698415","url":null,"abstract":"This paper provides new evidence about the behavior of hedge funds during the disruptions that occurred in the Treasury market in March 2020. In contrast to some recent policy papers arguing that hedge funds were a major amplifier of those disruptions, we show that aggregate Treasury positions held by hedge funds were far too small to be the main disruptive factor. Moreover, we find that a range of parties, especially non-US official institutions, sold Treasuries as they sought to lock in US dollars in cash. The hedge funds implementing the Fixed Income Relative Value strategy behaved in a way that was consistent with market expectations as they faced challenging financing conditions when banks abruptly withdrew from funding their positions in the repo market. Overall, this evidence also highlights important vulnerabilities of the Treasury market. Since the last financial crisis, exploding federal deficits led to a significant increase in the stock of marketable Treasuries which outstripped the capacity of dealers to safely intermediate the market on their own balance sheets.","PeriodicalId":57292,"journal":{"name":"公司治理评论","volume":"47 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"91162138","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Firm Complexity and Limits to Arbitrage","authors":"A. Barinov","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3613528","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3613528","url":null,"abstract":"Several important anomalies are stronger for more complex firms. Despite conglomerates being on average larger and more liquid than single-segment firms, anomalies are stronger for conglomerates. In the conglomerates-only sub-sample, anomalies are stronger for conglomerates with more between-segments difference in market-to-book and operating leverage.","PeriodicalId":57292,"journal":{"name":"公司治理评论","volume":"18 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2020-07-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85465044","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}