ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security最新文献

{"title":"A Decentralized Private Data Marketplace using Blockchain and Secure Multi-Party Computation","authors":"Julen Bernabé-Rodríguez, Albert Garreta, Oscar Lage","doi":"10.1145/3652162","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3652162","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Big data has proven to be a very useful tool for companies and users, but companies with larger datasets have ended being more competitive than the others thanks to machine learning or artificial inteligence. Secure multi-party computation (SMPC) allows the smaller companies to jointly train arbitrary models on their private data while assuring privacy, and thus gives data owners the ability to perform what are currently known as federated learning algorithms. Besides, with a blockchain it is possible to coordinate and audit those computations in a decentralized way. In this document, we consider a private data marketplace as a space where researchers and data owners meet to agree the use of private data for statistics or more complex model trainings. This document presents a candidate architecure for a private data marketplace by combining SMPC and a public, general-purpose blockchain. Such a marketplace is proposed as a smart contract deployed in the blockchain, while the privacy preserving computation is held by SMPC.</p>","PeriodicalId":56050,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-03-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140152001","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"CySecBERT: A Domain-Adapted Language Model for the Cybersecurity Domain","authors":"Markus Bayer, Philipp Kuehn, Ramin Shanehsaz, Christian Reuter","doi":"10.1145/3652594","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3652594","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The field of cybersecurity is evolving fast. Security professionals are in need of intelligence on past, current and - ideally - on upcoming threats, because attacks are becoming more advanced and are increasingly targeting larger and more complex systems. Since the processing and analysis of such large amounts of information cannot be addressed manually, cybersecurity experts rely on machine learning techniques. In the textual domain, pre-trained language models like BERT have proven to be helpful as they provide a good baseline for further fine-tuning. However, due to the domain-knowledge and the many technical terms in cybersecurity, general language models might miss the gist of textual information. For this reason, we create a high-quality dataset and present a language model specifically tailored to the cybersecurity domain which can serve as a basic building block for cybersecurity systems. The model is compared on 15 tasks: Domain-dependent extrinsic tasks for measuring the performance on specific problems, intrinsic tasks for measuring the performance of the internal representations of the model as well as general tasks from the SuperGLUE benchmark. The results of the intrinsic tasks show that our model improves the internal representation space of domain words compared to the other models. The extrinsic, domain-dependent tasks, consisting of sequence tagging and classification, show that the model performs best in cybersecurity scenarios. In addition, we pay special attention to the choice of hyperparameters against catastrophic forgetting, as pre-trained models tend to forget the original knowledge during further training.</p>","PeriodicalId":56050,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140151767","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"MRAAC: A Multi-Stage Risk-Aware Adaptive Authentication and Access Control Framework for Android","authors":"Jiayi Chen, Urs Hengartner, Hassan Khan","doi":"10.1145/3648372","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3648372","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Adaptive authentication enables smartphones and enterprise apps to decide when and how to authenticate users based on contextual and behavioral factors. In practice, a system may employ multiple policies to adapt its authentication mechanisms and access controls to various scenarios. However, existing approaches suffer from contradictory or insecure adaptations, which may enable attackers to bypass the authentication system. Besides, most existing approaches are inflexible and do not provide desirable access controls. We design and build a multi-stage risk-aware adaptive authentication and access control framework (MRAAC), which provides the following novel contributions: <b>Multi-stage:</b>\u0000MRAAC organizes adaptation policies in multiple stages to handle different risk types and progressively adapts authentication mechanisms based on context, resource sensitivity, and user authenticity. <b>Appropriate access control:</b>\u0000MRAAC provides libraries to enable sensitive apps to manage the availability of their in-app resources based on MRAAC’s risk awareness. <b>Extensible:</b>\u0000While existing proposals are tailored to cater to a single use case, MRAAC supports a variety of use cases with custom risk models. We exemplify these advantages of MRAAC by deploying it for three use cases: an enhanced version of Android Smart Lock, guest-aware continuous authentication, and corporate app for BYOD. We conduct experiments to quantify the CPU, memory, latency, and battery performance of MRAAC. Our evaluation shows that MRAAC enables various stakeholders (device manufacturers, enterprise and secure app developers) to provide complex adaptive authentication workflows on COTS Android with low processing and battery overhead.</p>","PeriodicalId":56050,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139765963","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Combining Cyber Security Intelligence to Refine Automotive Cyber Threats","authors":"Florian Sommer, Mona Gierl, Reiner Kriesten, Frank Kargl, Eric Sax","doi":"10.1145/3644075","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3644075","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Modern vehicles increasingly rely on electronics, software, and communication technologies (cyber space) to perform their driving task. Over-The-Air (OTA) connectivity further extends the cyber space by creating remote access entry points. Accordingly, the vehicle is exposed to security attacks that are able to impact road safety. A profound understanding of security attacks, vulnerabilities, and mitigations is necessary to protect vehicles against cyber threats. While automotive threat descriptions, such as in UN R155, are still abstract, this creates a risk that potential vulnerabilities are overlooked and the vehicle is not secured against them. So far, there is no common understanding of the relationship of automotive attacks, the concrete vulnerabilities they exploit, and security mechanisms that would protect the system against these attacks. In this paper, we aim at closing this gap by creating a mapping between UN R155, Microsoft STRIDE classification, Common Attack Pattern Enumerations and Classifications (CAPEC™), and Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE™). In this way, already existing detailed knowledge of attacks, vulnerabilities, and mitigations is combined and linked to the automotive domain. In practice, this refines the list of UN R155 threats and therefore supports vehicle manufacturers, suppliers, and approval authorities to meet and assess the requirements for vehicle development in terms of cybersecurity. Overall, 204 mappings between UN threats, STRIDE, CAPEC attack patterns, and CWE weaknesses were created. We validated these mappings by applying our Automotive Attack Database (AAD) that consists of 361 real-world attacks on vehicles. Furthermore, 25 additional attack patterns were defined based on automotive-related attacks.</p>","PeriodicalId":56050,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-02-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139689872","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"AdverSPAM: Adversarial SPam Account Manipulation in Online Social Networks","authors":"Federico Concone, Salvatore Gaglio, Andrea Giammanco, Giuseppe Lo Re, Marco Morana","doi":"10.1145/3643563","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3643563","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In recent years, the widespread adoption of Machine Learning (ML) at the core of complex IT systems has driven researchers to investigate the security and reliability of ML techniques. A very specific kind of threats concerns the <i>adversary</i> mechanisms through which an attacker could induce a classification algorithm to provide the desired output. Such strategies, known as Adversarial Machine Learning (AML), have a twofold purpose: to calculate a perturbation to be applied to the classifier’s input such that the outcome is subverted, while maintaining the underlying intent of the original data. Although any manipulation that accomplishes these goals is theoretically acceptable, in real scenarios perturbations must correspond to a set of permissible manipulations of the input, which is rarely considered in the literature. In this paper, we present <i>AdverSPAM</i>, an AML technique designed to fool the spam account detection system of an Online Social Network (OSN). The proposed black-box evasion attack is formulated as an optimization problem that computes the adversarial sample while maintaining two important properties of the feature space, namely <i>statistical correlation</i> and <i>semantic dependency</i>. Although being demonstrated in an OSN security scenario, such an approach might be applied in other context where the aim is to perturb data described by mutually related features. Experiments conducted on a public dataset show the effectiveness of <i>AdverSPAM</i> compared to five state-of-the-art competitors, even in the presence of adversarial defense mechanisms.</p>","PeriodicalId":56050,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139579471","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Uncovering CWE-CVE-CPE Relations with Threat Knowledge Graphs","authors":"Zhenpeng Shi, Nikolay Matyunin, Kalman Graffi, David Starobinski","doi":"10.1145/3641819","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3641819","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Security assessment relies on public information about products, vulnerabilities, and weaknesses. So far, databases in these categories have rarely been analyzed in combination. Yet, doing so could help predict unreported vulnerabilities and identify common threat patterns. In this paper, we propose a methodology for producing and optimizing a knowledge graph that aggregates knowledge from common threat databases (CVE, CWE, and CPE). We apply the threat knowledge graph to predict associations between threat databases, specifically between products, vulnerabilities, and weaknesses. We evaluate the prediction performance both in closed world with associations from the knowledge graph, and in open world with associations revealed afterward. Using rank-based metrics (i.e., Mean Rank, Mean Reciprocal Rank, and Hits@N scores), we demonstrate the ability of the threat knowledge graph to uncover many associations that are currently unknown but will be revealed in the future, which remains useful over different time periods. We propose approaches to optimize the knowledge graph, and show that they indeed help in further uncovering associations. We have made the artifacts of our work publicly available.</p>","PeriodicalId":56050,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139501391","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Is Bitcoin Future as Secure as We Think? Analysis of Bitcoin Vulnerability to Bribery Attacks Launched through Large Transactions","authors":"Ghader Ebrahimpour, Mohammad Sayad Haghighi","doi":"10.1145/3641546","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3641546","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Bitcoin uses blockchain technology to maintain transactions order and provides probabilistic guarantees to prevent double-spending, assuming that an attacker’s computational power does not exceed 50% of the network power. In this paper, we design a novel bribery attack and show that this guarantee can be hugely undermined. Miners are assumed to be rational in this setup and they are given incentives that are dynamically calculated. In this attack, the adversary misuses the Bitcoin protocol to bribe miners and maximize their gained advantage. We will reformulate the bribery attack to propose a general mathematical foundation upon which we build multiple strategies. We show that, unlike Whale Attack, these strategies are practical, especially in the future when halvings lower the mining rewards. In the so called ’guaranteed variable-rate bribing with commitment’ strategy, through optimization by Differential Evolution (DE), we show how double spending is possible in the Bitcoin ecosystem for any transaction whose value is above 218.9BTC, and this comes with 100% success rate. A slight reduction in the success probability, e.g. by 10%, brings the threshold down to 165BTC. If the rationality assumption holds, this shows how vulnerable blockchain-based systems like Bitcoin are. We suggest a soft fork on Bitcoin to fix this issue at the end.</p>","PeriodicalId":56050,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2024-01-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139499276","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Non-Intrusive Balance Tomography Using Reinforcement Learning in the Lightning Network","authors":"Yan Qiao, Kui Wu, Majid Khabbazian","doi":"10.1145/3639366","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3639366","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The Lightning Network (LN) is a second layer system for solving the scalability problem of Bitcoin transactions. In the current implementation of LN, channel capacity (i.e., the sum of individual balances held in the channel) is public information, while individual balances are kept secret for privacy concerns. Attackers may discover a particular balance of a channel by sending multiple <i>fake</i> payments through the channel. Such an attack, however, can hardly threaten the security of the LN system due to its high cost and noticeable intrusions. In this work, we present a novel <i>non-intrusive balance tomography</i> attack, which infers channel balances silently by performing legal transactions between two pre-created LN nodes. To minimize the cost of the attack, we propose an algorithm to compute the optimal payment amount for each transaction and design a path construction method using reinforcement learning to explore the most informative path to conduct the transactions. Finally, we propose two approaches (NIBT-RL and NIBT-RL-<i>β</i>) to accurately and efficiently infer all individual balances using the results of these transactions. Experiments using simulated account balances over actual LN topology show that our method can accurately infer (90%sim 94% ) of all balances in LN with around 12 USD.</p>","PeriodicalId":56050,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2023-12-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139078799","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Sphinx-in-the-Head: Group Signatures from Symmetric Primitives","authors":"Liqun Chen, Changyu Dong, Christopher J. P. Newton, Yalan Wang","doi":"10.1145/3638763","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3638763","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Group signatures and their variants have been widely used in privacy-sensitive scenarios such as anonymous authentication and attestation. In this paper, we present a new post-quantum group signature scheme from symmetric primitives. Using only symmetric primitives makes the scheme less prone to unknown attacks than basing the design on newly proposed hard problems whose security is less well-understood. However, symmetric primitives do not have rich algebraic properties, and this makes it extremely challenging to design a group signature scheme on top of them. It is even more challenging if we want a group signature scheme suitable for real-world applications, one that can support large groups and require few trust assumptions. Our scheme is based on MPC-in-the-head non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs, and we specifically design a novel hash-based group credential scheme, which is rooted in the SPHINCS+ signature scheme but with various modifications to make it MPC (multi-party computation) friendly. The security of the scheme has been proved under the fully dynamic group signature model. We provide an implementation of the scheme and demonstrate the feasibility of handling a group size as large as 2⁶⁰. This is the first group signature scheme from symmetric primitives that supports such a large group size and meets all the security requirements.</p>","PeriodicalId":56050,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2023-12-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139063268","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"DEEPFAKER: A Unified Evaluation Platform for Facial Deepfake and Detection Models","authors":"Li Wang, Xiangtao Meng, Dan Li, Xuhong Zhang, Shouling Ji, Shanqing Guo","doi":"10.1145/3634914","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3634914","url":null,"abstract":"<p>DeepFake data contains realistically manipulated faces - its abuses pose a huge threat to the security and privacy-critical applications. Intensive research from academia and industry has produced many deepfake/detection models, leading to a constant race of attack and defense. However, due to the lack of a unified evaluation platform, many critical questions on this subject remain largely unexplored. <i>(i)</i> How is the anti-detection ability of the existing deepfake models? <i>(ii)</i> How generalizable are existing detection models against different deepfake samples? <i>(iii)</i> How effective are the detection APIs provided by the cloud-based vendors? <i>(iv)</i> How evasive and transferable are adversarial deepfakes in the lab and real-world environment? <i>(v)</i> How do various factors impact the performance of deepfake and detection models? </p><p>To bridge the gap, we design and implement <monospace>DEEPFAKER</monospace>, a unified and comprehensive deepfake-detection evaluation platform. Specifically, <monospace>DEEPFAKER</monospace> has integrated 10 state-of-the-art deepfake methods and 9 representative detection methods, while providing a user-friendly interface and modular design that allows for easy integration of new methods. Leveraging <monospace>DEEPFAKER</monospace>, we conduct a large-scale empirical study of facial deepfake/detection models and draw a set of key findings: <i>(i)</i> the detection methods have poor generalization on samples generated by different deepfake methods; <i>(ii)</i> there is no significant correlation between anti-detection ability and visual quality of deepfake samples; <i>(iii)</i> the current detection APIs have poor detection performance and adversarial deepfakes can achieve about 70% ASR (attack success rate) on all cloud-based vendors, calling for an urgent need to deploy effective and robust detection APIs; <i>(iv)</i> the detection methods in the lab are more robust against transfer attacks than the detection APIs in the real-world environment; <i>(v)</i> deepfake videos may not always be more difficult to detect after video compression. We envision that <monospace>DEEPFAKER</monospace> will benefit future research on facial deepfake and detection.</p>","PeriodicalId":56050,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.3,"publicationDate":"2023-11-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138540694","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}