比特币的未来是否像我们想象的那样安全?通过大额交易发起贿赂攻击的比特币脆弱性分析

IF 4.3 3区 材料科学 Q1 ENGINEERING, ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONIC
Ghader Ebrahimpour, Mohammad Sayad Haghighi
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引用次数: 0

摘要

比特币使用区块链技术维护交易秩序,并提供概率保证以防止重复消费,前提是攻击者的计算能力不超过网络能力的 50%。在本文中,我们设计了一种新颖的贿赂攻击,并证明这种保证会遭到极大破坏。在这种设置中,矿工被假定为理性的,他们获得的奖励是动态计算的。在这种攻击中,对手会滥用比特币协议来贿赂矿工,并最大限度地提高自己的收益。我们将重新表述贿赂攻击,提出一个通用数学基础,并在此基础上构建多种策略。我们将证明,与 "鲸鱼攻击 "不同,这些策略是切实可行的,尤其是在未来半价降低挖矿奖励的情况下。在所谓的 "有承诺的保证可变利率贿赂 "策略中,通过差分进化(DE)的优化,我们展示了在比特币生态系统中,任何价值超过 218.9BTC 的交易都有可能出现双重消费,而且成功率高达 100%。稍微降低成功概率,比如降低 10%,阈值就会降低到 165BTC。如果理性假设成立,这就说明了像比特币这样基于区块链的系统是多么脆弱。我们建议对比特币进行软分叉,最终解决这个问题。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Is Bitcoin Future as Secure as We Think? Analysis of Bitcoin Vulnerability to Bribery Attacks Launched through Large Transactions

Bitcoin uses blockchain technology to maintain transactions order and provides probabilistic guarantees to prevent double-spending, assuming that an attacker’s computational power does not exceed 50% of the network power. In this paper, we design a novel bribery attack and show that this guarantee can be hugely undermined. Miners are assumed to be rational in this setup and they are given incentives that are dynamically calculated. In this attack, the adversary misuses the Bitcoin protocol to bribe miners and maximize their gained advantage. We will reformulate the bribery attack to propose a general mathematical foundation upon which we build multiple strategies. We show that, unlike Whale Attack, these strategies are practical, especially in the future when halvings lower the mining rewards. In the so called ’guaranteed variable-rate bribing with commitment’ strategy, through optimization by Differential Evolution (DE), we show how double spending is possible in the Bitcoin ecosystem for any transaction whose value is above 218.9BTC, and this comes with 100% success rate. A slight reduction in the success probability, e.g. by 10%, brings the threshold down to 165BTC. If the rationality assumption holds, this shows how vulnerable blockchain-based systems like Bitcoin are. We suggest a soft fork on Bitcoin to fix this issue at the end.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
7.20
自引率
4.30%
发文量
567
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