{"title":"Rational Aversion to Information","authors":"Sven Neth","doi":"10.1086/727772","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1086/727772","url":null,"abstract":"Is more information always better? Or are there some situations in which more information can make us worse off? Good (1967) argues that expected utility maximizers should always accept more information if the information is cost-free and relevant. But Good's argument presupposes that you are certain you will update by conditionalization. If we relax this assumption and allow agents to be uncertain about updating, these agents can be rationally required to reject free and relevant information. Since there are good reasons to be uncertain about updating, rationality can require you to prefer ignorance.","PeriodicalId":55327,"journal":{"name":"British Journal for the Philosophy of Science","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134910676","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Scientific Explanation","authors":"Denis Bonnay","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190690649.003.0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190690649.003.0001","url":null,"abstract":"One of the major aims of science, it is commonly held, is to provide explanations. Philosophers of science have tried to understand what it is to provide a scientific explanation, what distinguishes good from bad explanations, and why explanations are valuable. This chapter goes through the main answers that have been elaborated in the last decades. It starts with a detailed discussion of the famous deductive-nomological (DN) model of explanation proposed by Hempel and Oppenheim. Then, the two main rivals to the DN model, the causal theory and the unificationist theory, are introduced and discussed. Some other contemporary approaches are sketched out in the closing section.","PeriodicalId":55327,"journal":{"name":"British Journal for the Philosophy of Science","volume":"85 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2018-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80360881","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Philosophy of Biology","authors":"T. Pradeu","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190690649.003.0012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190690649.003.0012","url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this chapter is to address the conceptual, theoretical, and methodological questions bearing on the foundations of today’s life sciences. It discusses the main themes of the philosophy of evolutionary biology, asking what is meant by the idea of adaptation and reviewing the various answers to the units of selection problem. The latter considers on which biological entities—genes, genomes, cells, organisms, groups, species, and so forth—natural selection operates and is a nice illustration of how philosophy of biology situates itself at the frontier between philosophy and the most theoretical parts of biology. The chapter also presents recent debates over the notions of genetic programming and organismal development and the reduction of macromolecular biology to molecular biology.","PeriodicalId":55327,"journal":{"name":"British Journal for the Philosophy of Science","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2018-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75843820","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Theories and Models","authors":"M. Vorms","doi":"10.1093/OSO/9780190690649.003.0005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/OSO/9780190690649.003.0005","url":null,"abstract":"Theories are among the main achievements of scientific inquiry and appear as the repositories of scientific knowledge. This chapter is devoted to an examination of the notion of theory as a unit of analysis for the study of scientific knowledge. Most of the analysis consists in presenting and criticizing two major proposals made by philosophers of science, the “received view,” commonly attributed to logical empiricism, and the “semantic view of theories,” which became the new orthodoxy in the 1960s. Both proposals aim at formal reconstructions of theories. The shared assumptions underlying this common project will be questioned. Alternative ways of construing scientific theorizing will be sketched, notably those which are more “agent-centered” and put forward the way scientists use and understand their theories in practice.","PeriodicalId":55327,"journal":{"name":"British Journal for the Philosophy of Science","volume":"141 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":3.4,"publicationDate":"2018-07-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76426806","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}