History and Philosophy of Logic最新文献

{"title":"An Axiomatic System Based on Ladd-Franklin's Antilogism","authors":"Fangzhou Xu","doi":"10.1080/01445340.2023.2207245","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2023.2207245","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":55053,"journal":{"name":"History and Philosophy of Logic","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-07-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41871628","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Brouwer's Intuition of Twoity and Constructions in Separable Mathematics","authors":"Bruno Bentzen","doi":"10.1080/01445340.2023.2210908","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2023.2210908","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":55053,"journal":{"name":"History and Philosophy of Logic","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-06-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45473304","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Dashtakī's Solution to the Liar Paradox: A Synthesis of the Earlier Solutions Proposed by Ṭūsī and Samarqandī","authors":"Mohammad Saleh Zarepour","doi":"10.1080/01445340.2023.2210918","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2023.2210918","url":null,"abstract":"AbstractṢadr al-Dīn al-Dashtakī (d. 1498) has proposed a solution to the liar paradox according to which the liar sentence is a self-referential sentence in which the predicate ‘false’ is iterated. Discussing the conditions for the truth-aptness of the sentences with nested and iterated instances of the predicates ‘true’ and/or ‘false’, Dashtakī argued that the liar sentence is not truth-apt at all. In the tradition of Arabic logic, the central elements of Dashtakī's solution—the self-referentiality of the liar sentence and the implicit iteration of the predicate ‘false’—were initially highlighted in two earlier solutions proposed by Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 1274) and Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī (d. 1322), respectively. Here I investigate all three solutions and show that Dashtakī's solution can be taken as a synthesis of the other two. None of these solutions seems to be convincing at the end of the day. Nevertheless, all of them include significant logical and philosophical insights. In particular, although Dashtakī's solution is not itself compelling, it is only a few steps away from a promising solution. The appendix to this paper includes translations of the relevant passages.Keywords: The liar paradoxArabic logical-Dashtakīal-Ṭusīal-Samarqandī AcknowledgementsI am thankful to Reza Pourjavady for insightful discussions we had about al-Shīrāzī, Ibn Kammuna, and Dashtakī, and to Stephen Read for his extremely helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 For a classification of different families of solutions to the liar paradox in the tradition of Arabic logic, see Zarepour Citation2021, secs. 1–2.2 To the best of my knowledge, the earliest study of Dashtakī's solution in the secondary literature is provided by Miller Citation1989. A more detailed analysis of this solution has recently been offered by El-Rouayheb Citation2020.3 It is more precise if we talk about ‘the liar sentences’ instead of ‘the liar sentence’. However, for the sake of simplicity I use only the latter. Almost all the solutions that are studied in this paper are concerned, in the first place, with the liar sentence ‘every sentence I say at this moment is false’. The contextual assumption which guarantees that the latter sentence is indeed a liar sentence is that that sentence is said by someone who does not say any other sentence at the moment of saying that sentence.4 Abharī's solution is analysed and reconstructed by Zarepour Citation2021. A discussion of Ṭūsī's commentary on Abharī's solution can be found in Alwishah and Sanson Citation2009, sec. 3.5 A truth-apt sentence is capable of having a truth value. It can be either true or false. Consequently, if a sentence is not truth-apt, it has no truth-value. It can be neither true nor false.6 al-Ṭūsī Citation1974, 236, ll. 3–4.7 al-Ṭūsī Citation1974, 237, l. 4.8 In contemporary versions of the correspondence theory of truth, corr","PeriodicalId":55053,"journal":{"name":"History and Philosophy of Logic","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135791982","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Arthur N. Prior on the Labours of Ł3 Conjunctions","authors":"J. J. Joaquin, Peter Eldridge-Smith","doi":"10.1080/01445340.2023.2211311","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2023.2211311","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":55053,"journal":{"name":"History and Philosophy of Logic","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43004948","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"John Eliot's Logick Primer: A Bilingual English-Massachusett Logic Textbook","authors":"S. Uckelman","doi":"10.1080/01445340.2023.2207244","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2023.2207244","url":null,"abstract":",","PeriodicalId":55053,"journal":{"name":"History and Philosophy of Logic","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59177453","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Logical Writings of Karl Popper","authors":"Constantin C. Brîncuş","doi":"10.1080/01445340.2023.2199100","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2023.2199100","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":55053,"journal":{"name":"History and Philosophy of Logic","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-04-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43279262","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Arithmetical dictum","authors":"P. Maffezioli, Riccardo Zanichelli","doi":"10.1080/01445340.2023.2190309","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2023.2190309","url":null,"abstract":"Building on previous scholarly work on the mathematical roots of assertoric syllogistic we submit that for Aristotle, the semantic value of the copula in universal affirmative propositions is the relation of divisibility on positive integers. The adequacy of this interpretation, labeled here ‘arithmetical dictum’, is assessed both theoretically and textually with respect to the existing interpretations, especially the so-called ‘mereological dictum’.","PeriodicalId":55053,"journal":{"name":"History and Philosophy of Logic","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41854023","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Form, Formality, Formalism in Hegel’s Dialectic-Speculative Logic","authors":"A. Nuzzo","doi":"10.1080/01445340.2023.2181581","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2023.2181581","url":null,"abstract":"This essay addresses the general systematic question underlying any project of ‘formalization’ of Hegel’s dialectic-speculative logic, namely, the question concerning the peculiar concept of logical ‘form’ and the connected type of ‘formalism’ at stake in a logic that is, programmatically and innovatively within the historical tradition, a ‘dialectic-speculative’ logic.","PeriodicalId":55053,"journal":{"name":"History and Philosophy of Logic","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59177443","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Introduction: The Formalization of Dialectics","authors":"E. Ficara, G. Priest","doi":"10.1080/01445340.2023.2182598","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2023.2182598","url":null,"abstract":"The idea at the basis of this special issue is that reopening the old debate about the logical status of Hegel's dialectics is extremely interesting, for various reasons. The first reason is that a new Hegel is circulating, nowadays, in the philosophical literature, with specific reference to Hegel's dialectical logic and its relation to the history and philosophy of logic. This development deserves to be accounted for. Secondly, new research about the connection between contradictory logical systems and Hegel's dialectics is also being developed, and this too deserves to be acknowledged. Finally there are, recently, confirmations that the concept of dialectics is of general interest, and that the usual perplexities about the Hegelian triadic and fairly mechanic device of ‘yes, not, and not not’ are in remission.","PeriodicalId":55053,"journal":{"name":"History and Philosophy of Logic","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48849266","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Intuitionist and Classical Dimensions of Hegel’s Hybrid Logic","authors":"P. Redding","doi":"10.1080/01445340.2023.2180727","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2023.2180727","url":null,"abstract":"Hegel interpreters commonly reject attempts to situate Hegel’s logic in relation to modern movements. Appealing to his criticisms of the logic of Verstand or mere understanding with its fixed logical structure, Hegel’s logic, it is pointed out, was a logic of Vernunft or reason—a logic more at home in the thought of Plato and Aristotle than in modern mathematical forms. Contesting this implied dichotomy, it is here argued that the ancient roots of Hegel’s logic, especially as transmitted by late Neopythagorean/Neoplatonic thinkers such as Proclus, gave it many features similar to ones later found in the type of algebraic transformation of Aristotle, started first by Leibniz, reanimated by Boole in the mid-nineteenth century and then developed by others such as C. S. Peirce and Arend Heyting. In particular, the ancient mathematics upon which Hegel had drawn allowed him to anticipate an answer to the criticism that Frege would later aim at Boole, concerning his inability to unite opposed class and propositional calculi. Hegel’s logic would be a hybrid, incorporating features found later in intuitionist and classical logic, but it could be so because of the way he had called upon the mathematics of the ancient Platonist tradition.","PeriodicalId":55053,"journal":{"name":"History and Philosophy of Logic","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47087842","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}