{"title":"Evolutionary Transitions in Individuality and Life Cycle Closure","authors":"Guilhem Doulcier, Peter Takacs, Pierrick Bourrat","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.162","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.162","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 We propose a novel account of evolutionary transitions in individuality as life cycle closure: that is, the emergence of a new embedding life cycle. To characterize this process, we show how the life trajectory of lower-level entities (e.g., cells) can be coarse-grained into classes of a higher-level entity. We argue that only higher-level entities displaying two necessary conditions for the existence of a life cycle (e.g., multicellular organisms) have achieved life cycle closure. Throughout, we illustrate our point with stage-structured demographic models that yield a rigorous characterization of the conditions for life cycle closure.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":"11 S9","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138623015","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"PSA volume 90 issue 5 Cover and Back matter","authors":"","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.172","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.172","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":"87 ","pages":"b1 - b2"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139025309","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Minority Reports: Registering Dissent in Science","authors":"Haixin Dang","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.164","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.164","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Consensus reporting is valuable for presenting unified scientific evidence to the public. When a consensus does not exist, I argue that scientists ought not to default to majority reporting in its place. Majority reporting has several epistemic drawbacks because it can obscure underlying justifications and lines of evidence, which may be in conflict or contested. I argue that minority reporting, in conjunction with majority reporting, is an epistemically superior mechanism for scientists to report on the full range of reasons and evidence available within a group. This paper addresses several objections, including worries over group cohesion, fringe reporting, and elite capture.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":" 11","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138612999","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Towards a new phase of Du Châtelet scholarship: from Institutions de Physique (1740) to Institutions Physiques (1742)","authors":"Qiu Lin","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.142","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.142","url":null,"abstract":"There is a mysterious two-fold change in Du Châtelet’s position on Newtonian attraction: from acceptance thereof as an explanatory principle in Essai sur L’Optique (ca. 1938-1939), to rejection in the 1740 Institutions, and returning to acceptance again in her Commentary (1756) to Newton’s Principia. In this paper, I suggest that we turn to the 1742 Institutions for answers. There, Du Châtelet introduces physical explanation and maintains that we can appeal to certain physical qualities (such as attraction) for explanatory force. Using this case study, I argue that the scholarship will benefit greatly from turning to the 1742 edition going forward.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":"40 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139263979","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Deception as Mimicry","authors":"Marc Artiga, Cédric Paternotte","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.156","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.156","url":null,"abstract":"What is the nature of deception? What does it take for an organism to deceive another one? In this paper we address these questions by appealing to the concept of mimicry. More precisely, we argue that a fruitful perspective regards deception as an instance of mimicry rather than the reverse. Conceiving of deception as an instance of mimicry has a number of interesting consequences: it draws connections between different areas of research, it vindicates a functional approach to deception by providing a satisfactory answer to some recent objections, and it suggests some worries for game-theoretic approaches to deception.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":"39 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139273159","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Confidence in Probabilistic Risk Assessment","authors":"Luca Zanetti","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.158","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.158","url":null,"abstract":"Epistemic uncertainties are included in probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) as second-order probabilities that represent the degrees of belief of the scientists that a model is correct. In this paper, I propose an alternative approach that incorporates the scientist’s confidence in a probability set for a given quantity. First, I give some arguments against the use of precise probabilities to estimate scientific uncertainty in risk analysis. I then extend the “confidence approach” developed by Brian Hill and Richard Bradley to PRA. I finally claim that this approach better represents model uncertainty than the standard (Bayesian) one.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139271399","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Growth From Uncertainty","authors":"J. Lavelle","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.157","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.157","url":null,"abstract":"Psychology is a discipline that has a high number of failed replications, which has been characterised as a ‘crisis’ on the assumption that failed replications are indicative of untrustworthy research. This paper uses Chang’s concept of epistemic iteration to show how a research programme can advance epistemic goals despite many failed replications. It illustrates this through analysing an on-going large-scale replication attempt of Southgate’s 2007 work exploring infants’ understanding of false beliefs. It concludes that epistemic iteration offers a way of understanding the value of replications — both failed and successful — that contradicts the narrative centred around distrust.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":"87 6","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139270925","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Theory Choice As Niche Construction: The Feedback Loop Between Scientific Theories and Epistemic Values","authors":"Matteo De Benedetto, Michele Luchetti","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.160","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.160","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we will focus on a neglected aspect of scientific theory choice, i.e., how the selection of theories affects epistemic values. Building on Kuhn, we will provide a general characterization of the feedback-loop dynamic between theories and values in theory choice as analogous to the relationship between organisms and the environment in niche construction. We will argue that understanding theory choice as niche construction can explain how certain values acquire more weight and a specific application over time and how resistance to scientific change can, therefore, arise. We will illustrate our picture by looking at the Mendelian-Biometrician controversy.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":"88 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2023-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139275440","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Against Quantitative Primitivism","authors":"Zee R. Perry","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.140","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.140","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The problem of quantity is the problem of identifying what about the physical world explains why it can be so well represented with mathematical entities. I introduce quantitative primitivism, the dominant position in the literature, which only offers a partial solution to the problem of quantity. I argue that a reductive account of quantitativeness provides a full solution to the problem, and describe two reductive accounts in the literature. Sections 3 and 4 discusses some of the unique metaphysical consequences of reductive accounts of quantity, including a novel dissolution to the longstanding absolutist/comparativist debate.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":" 9","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135813881","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Torsion in the Classical Spacetime Context","authors":"Helen Meskhidze, James Owen Weatherall","doi":"10.1017/psa.2023.136","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/psa.2023.136","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Teleparallel gravity, an empirically equivalent counterpart to General Relativity, represents the influence of gravity using torsional forces. It raises questions about theory interpretation and underdetermination. To better understand the torsional forces of Teleparallel gravity, we consider a context in which forces are better understood: classical spacetimes. We propose a method of incorporating torsion into the classical spacetime context that yields a classical theory of gravity with a closed temporal metric and spacetime torsion. We then prove a result analogous to the Trautman degeometrization theorem, that every model of Newton-Cartan theory gives rise, non-uniquely, to a model of this theory.","PeriodicalId":54620,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of Science","volume":"17 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136261736","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}