PHILOSOPHY最新文献

{"title":"Systemic and Structural Injustice: Is There a Difference?","authors":"S. Haslanger","doi":"10.1017/S0031819122000353","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819122000353","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The terms ‘structural injustice’ and ‘systemic injustice’ are commonly used, but their meanings are elusive. In this paper, I sketch an ontology of social systems that embeds accounts of social structures, relations, and practices. On this view, structures may be intrinsically problematic, or they may be problematic only insofar as they interact with other structures in the system to produce injustice. Because social practices that constitute structures set the backdrop for agency and identity, socially fluent agents reproduce the systems, often unknowingly and unintentionally. The account aims to capture how agents both depend on and enact structures, and do so in ways that, as Ta-Nehisi Coates says, ‘land on the body’.","PeriodicalId":54197,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY","volume":"98 1","pages":"1 - 27"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46704437","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Remorse and the Ledger Theory of Meaning","authors":"Lucas Scripter","doi":"10.1017/S0031819122000304","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819122000304","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract A common idea about assessing meaning in life is that one draws up a list of those various positive values that one has achieved and subtracts from it one's negative deeds in life. The resulting balance is the meaningfulness of one's existence. I call this the ledger theory. Drawing on the work of Raimond Gaita and Julian Barnes's novel The Sense of an Ending, I argue for a phenomenology of remorse that gives us reason to reject the ledger theory. Even those agents whose lives have been exceptionally meaningful in some respects may remain haunted by their past. Certain sorts of misdeeds – those that involve significant, irreparable damage – leave life marred in such a way that the negative remains, even in the face of all the meaningful deeds of life.","PeriodicalId":54197,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY","volume":"98 1","pages":"81 - 102"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49597049","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Reality+: Virtual Worlds and the Problems of Philosophy by David J. Chalmers (W. W. Norton & Company, 2022).","authors":"Yuval Avnur","doi":"10.1017/s003181912200033x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s003181912200033x","url":null,"abstract":"Some philosophers are purists, thinking that the problems of philosophy float above the world of changing empirical circumstances. In Reality+, David Chalmers demonstrates the untenability of this purism by showing that technology raises new philosophical questions and changes old ones. The book is also successful as a relatively accessible, entertaining, and not entirely Eurocentric introduction to the problems of philosophy. It is a sprawlingwork coveringmany different topics, and a kind of manifesto which argues for Chalmers’s sometimes controversial views, some of which are developed more fully in his earlier work, and which together form a general approach to reality in a technological age. Most strikingly, he proposes a ‘structuralist’ account of reality that can solve the traditional problem of global skepticism about the external world. This claim is the central, recurring theme of the book that holds the disparate parts together. Unsurprisingly, since it targets one of philosophy’s enduring problems, it the most philosophically problematic claim in the book. According to Chalmers, you and theworld you seemaywell be part of a simulation – he thinks that there is at least a 25% chance of this (p. 101). His reasoning for this surprising estimate resembles Bostrom (2003)1, but goes beyond it in some details. Throughout the history of the universe, there will probably be many advanced civilizations with the technology to create trillions of detailed simulations containing ‘sims,’ or simulated beings that resemble you. And some of these civilizations are enough like ours in their needs and interests to want to do so (pp. 90, 138-39). Of course, some may not bother. But if even one out of a million such civilizations does so, that one could well create trillions of sims, which would vastly outnumber the non-sims in the universe. Accordingly, you’re probably a sim because most conscious beings in the universe are (Ch. 5). A crucial step is his argument is that simulated beings can be conscious, just like you. His argument for this, though, could have used more discussion, and objections to it considered more fully. Still, one need not agree with all of Chalmers’s arguments (nor his estimate of the chances) to appreciate the main upshot: the simulation scenario is a real possibility. The closer our technology gets to producing a","PeriodicalId":54197,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY","volume":"98 1","pages":"107 - 111"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49024934","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Games: Agency as Art by C Thi Nguyen (Oxford University Press, 2020).","authors":"John M. Gingerich","doi":"10.1017/S0031819122000341","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819122000341","url":null,"abstract":"there are other people, is that one is ignorant about whether there are other people of the sort that are conscious. We never put it that way, of course, because it never occurs to us to think that a non-conscious thing could be a person, as Chalmers is suggesting. It is as if the terms have been changed, and we are meant to take solace in how our old skeptical statements sound under these new meanings. The only way to take solace is to equivocate. Anyone who was ever worried about this:","PeriodicalId":54197,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY","volume":"98 1","pages":"111 - 118"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49005939","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Pragmatic Hypothesis Testing Theory of Self-Deception and the Belief/Acceptance Distinction","authors":"Kevin Lynch","doi":"10.1017/S0031819122000250","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819122000250","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract According to the pragmatic hypothesis testing theory, how much evidence we require before we believe something varies depending on the expected costs of falsely believing and disbelieving it. This theory has been used in the self-deception debate to explain our tendencies towards self-deceptive belief formation. This article argues that the application of this theory in the self-deception debate has overlooked the distinction between belief and acceptance, and that the theory in all likelihood models acceptance rather than belief, in which case it is probably not relevant to the explanation of self-deception. It is suggested, however, that doxastic error costs might be relevant to explaining some types of self-deception, though they feature in an evolutionary explanation of it rather than a psychological one.","PeriodicalId":54197,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY","volume":"98 1","pages":"29 - 53"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"56753751","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Is Practical Deliberation Bound by a Coherency Requirement? Foundational Normative States, Volitional Conflict, and Autonomy","authors":"Henk Jasper van Gils-Schmidt","doi":"10.1017/S0031819122000262","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819122000262","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Harry G. Frankfurt has put the problem of volitional conflict at the center of philosophical attention. If you care fundamentally about your career and your family, but these cares conflict, this conflict undermines the coherency of your decision standard and thereby your ability to choose and act autonomously. The standard response to this problem is to argue that you can overcome volitional conflict by unifying your foundational motivational states. As Frankfurt puts it, the ‘totality of things that an agent cares about’ plus his ‘ordering of how important to him they are effectively specifies his answer to the question of how to live’ (The Reasons of Love (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), p. 23). In this paper, I critically assess the three main reasons given for such a coherency requirement: 1) we can do only one action at a time; 2) our motivational states come with normative pressure towards coherency; and 3) conflicting motivational states provide us with an incoherent decision-making framework. I conclude that these reasons do not ground a coherency requirement for practical deliberation and argue that we can autonomously express ourselves as volitionally conflicted by acting on our conflicting motivational states over the course of multiple actions.","PeriodicalId":54197,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY","volume":"98 1","pages":"55 - 79"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43408059","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Hegel on spirited animals","authors":"Christoph Schuringa","doi":"10.1017/S0031819122000274","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819122000274","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Hegel conceives of human beings as both natural and spirited. On Robert Pippin's influential reading, we are natural by being ‘ontologically’ like other animals, but spirited through a ‘social-historical achievement’. I contest both the coherence of this reading and its fidelity to Hegel's texts. For Hegel the human being is the truth of the animal. This means that spirit's self-production is not, as Pippin claims, an achievement that an animal confers on itself, but the realization of what the human being is. I end by specifying Aristotelian features of Hegel's account whose neglect by Pippin can help explain what goes wrong in his reading, and provide the outlines of a reading that is both coherent and faithful to Hegel's texts.","PeriodicalId":54197,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY","volume":"97 1","pages":"485 - 508"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46100903","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Philosophical Retreat to the Here and Now: Notes on Living in Time","authors":"R. Moran","doi":"10.1017/S0031819122000195","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819122000195","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The ordinary human concerns with the past and the future can be seen both as forms of suffering (anxiety toward the future, regret toward the past, etc.) and as illusory because they involve the failure to appreciate the primary reality of the present. In this lecture I argue that while there are certainly ways of being occupied with past or future times that we have reason to criticize, such criticism cannot base itself on any metaphysical claim to the singular or exclusive reality of the present. The task of developing useful forms of describing and assessing the different ways we can go wrong in temporalizing our lives is hindered rather than helped by the suggestion that our concerns with the past and with the future are as such forms of attachment to the Unreal.","PeriodicalId":54197,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY","volume":"97 1","pages":"413 - 433"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48185786","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Needs, Values, Truth: Essays in the philosophy of value by David Wiggins (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987).1","authors":"S. Chappell","doi":"10.1017/S0031819122000213","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819122000213","url":null,"abstract":"David Wiggins was Fellow and Praelector in Philosophy at University College, Oxford, from 1981 to 1989. Needs, Values, Truth (NVT) was his third book. It collects three previously unpublished essays on broadly ethical and metaethical matters, with revised versions of six essays on the same kind of topics published over the years since 1973. (Though some go back a good deal further than 1973: a footnote on the first page of Essay VI reveals, slightly coyly, that at least its first three sections originated in the early 1960s.) Essay I is the longest, at 58 pages; it explores what is logically and ethically distinctive about claims of need. Essays II-V are all in different ways about truth in ethics, as contrasted with truth in other areas: how much there can be, and why, in ethics unlike some other domains, there is some determinacy but not complete determinacy. Essays VI-VII consider and refine an Aristotelian understanding of practical reason (and un-reason). Essay VIII is about free will. Essay IX addresses personal identity, the value of survival, and so in a way the meaning of life, which is also a central theme of Essay III. A tenth chapter, 37 pages long and divided into 4 main sections, does not deserve the relative neglect that is risked by its being titled ‘Postscript’. This characteristically self-critical closing chapter adds reflections and qualifications to Essays I-IX: its section 1 draws some threads together about ‘intuitionism’ in ethics, section 2 adds some further thoughts about needs, and sections 3–4 have more to say about truth, both as to its philosophical logic and as to its applicability (or otherwise) in ethics. Between Professor Wiggins’ first two books, Identity and SpatioTemporal Continuity (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967) and Sameness and Substance (Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 1980) there was (if I may) a certain continuity, to the extent that the second is almost an","PeriodicalId":54197,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY","volume":"97 1","pages":"397 - 402"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47349162","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"PHI volume 97 issue 3 Cover and Back matter","authors":"","doi":"10.1017/s0031819122000298","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0031819122000298","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":54197,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY","volume":"97 1","pages":"b1 - b6"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47635422","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}