{"title":"Jenseits von Affektivismus und Intellektualismus","authors":"Jörg U. Noller","doi":"10.1515/dzph-2022-0024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2022-0024","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In recent times, Kant’s theory of the moral feeling of respect has increasingly come to the centre of Kant research. His diverse and seemingly contradictory characterisations of this feeling in particular have led to continued controversial discussion. While a number of scholars try to understand the special role of respect in Kant by isolating this feeling from its conceptual context or solely referring to its role as moral motivation, I will concentrate on the systemic position of respect within the framework of Kant’s theory of the autonomy of reason. Furthermore, I will try to elucidate the different characterisations of respect given by Kant, referring not only to his ethics, but also to his general theory of transcendental idealism. Examining the special place of respect within Kant’s transcendental idealism, I will plead for a compatibilist reading of respect, according to which the “intellectualist” as well as the “affectivist” view both hold true. This is motivated by interpreting respect as a volitional structure featuring rational as well as emotional dimensions.","PeriodicalId":54099,"journal":{"name":"DEUTSCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHIE","volume":"70 1","pages":"400 - 424"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45997337","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Wer muss draußen bleiben?","authors":"R. Jaster, G. Keil","doi":"10.1515/dzph-2022-0029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2022-0029","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The Special Focus on invitation policy at universities contains a target article by Romy Jaster and Geert Keil, five commentaries, and a response. The question under discussion is what disqualifies a person from being invited to speak at a university. On liberal, Millian approaches, the epistemic benefits of free speech preclude no-platforming policies. More restrictive approaches demand the exclusion of speakers who are considered racist or otherwise hostile against marginalized groups. Jaster and Keil take a virtue-based approach to invitation policy: A person is ineligible as a speaker if she exhibits specific intellectual vices that are detrimental to the pursuit of truth, the university’s raison d’être. The five critics raise various concerns. Birgit Recki deems the virtue-based approach too restrictive: It is prone to exclude some speakers who make intellectually stimulating contributions. Eva von Redecker and Daniel Loick deem the criterion too permissive: It allows for contributions that should have no place on campus. Dieter Schönecker and Maria-Sibylla Lotter object that the approach is silent on all recent actual cases of ‘cancelling’ at universities. In their response, Jaster and Keil address these concerns and clarify their position.","PeriodicalId":54099,"journal":{"name":"DEUTSCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHIE","volume":"70 1","pages":"474 - 491"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43911530","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Angstverfassungen","authors":"J. Bung","doi":"10.1515/dzph-2022-0026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2022-0026","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The connection between fear, law and the state is a topic that is given particular attention in times of social insecurity. Some approximations are explored here under the notion of fear constitutions. We are equal in fear of one another, which is why fear can be understood as a condition of modern constitutions. However, the social contract does not lead to freedom from fear, but rather fear shifts; the legal subjects remain subjects of fear, in relation to one another, but in particular towards that multiple artificial person which the state comes to embody as it takes on a life of its own. The degree of fear varies with the degree of unpredictability and indeterminacy of executive action. State measures against terrorism or against the pandemic are often an unpredictable response to an unknown danger and are therefore at the same time both an expression of fear and its trigger. It would be helpful if there was a clear distinction between sensible and unreasonable, functional and dysfunctional forms of fear. Freud tried to provide criteria with his concept of neurotic fear, a concept that has been taken up in political and legal philosophy. However, the concept is obscure and cannot be used without normative specifications.","PeriodicalId":54099,"journal":{"name":"DEUTSCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHIE","volume":"70 1","pages":"430 - 444"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44756539","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Nachruf auf Friedrich Kambartel","authors":"","doi":"10.1515/dzph-2022-0039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2022-0039","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":54099,"journal":{"name":"DEUTSCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHIE","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42227347","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Gattungswesen","authors":"T. Khurana","doi":"10.1515/dzph-2022-0023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2022-0023","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In which sense can human beings be conceived as social animals? To elucidate this question, the present paper (I) distinguishes the logical sociality of all living beings from the material sociality of social animals and the political sociality of self-conscious social animals. (II) The self-conscious political sociality that characterises the human genus-being requires a complex interplay of first and second person through which alone we can participate in our form of life and determine its content. (III) The human form of life thus constituted is characterised by a particularly open, and at the same time precarious, membership which involves specific forms of vulnerability and power. (IV) Against this background, forms of objective spirit are necessary which grant us a generalized recognition and relieve us from the contingency of each particular second-personal recognition, without abandoning the openness of the sociality of the human form of life. This double requirement has led to paradoxical institutions in modern society which strive to protect and ensure the sociality of the human form of life precisely by naturalising and individualising our access to it.","PeriodicalId":54099,"journal":{"name":"DEUTSCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHIE","volume":"70 1","pages":"373 - 399"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48744660","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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