EJournal of Tax Research最新文献

{"title":"The SECURE Act: Retirement Plan Distributions after the Death of a Beneficiary","authors":"Vorris J. Blankenship","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3739180","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3739180","url":null,"abstract":"The Setting Every Community Up for Retirement Enhancement Act (SECURE Act) of 2019 made very significant changes to required minimum distributions (RMDs) paid to beneficiaries of defined contribution retirement plans, including IRAs. The Act generally applies to beneficiaries of a defined contribution plans if the plan participant dies after 2019. The most significant provisions of the Act limit RMDs that are life or life expectancy distributions. Life-expectancy RMDs are now available only for eligible designated beneficiaries (EDBs). EDBs are defined as (1) the surviving spouse of a plan participant, (2) a minor child of the participant, (3) a disabled individual, (4) a chronically ill individual, or (5) an individual who is not more than ten years younger than the participant. The Act also replaced the alternative five-year distribution rule with a comparable ten-year rule. Under the new ten-year rule, a plan is required to distribute the participant’s entire benefit before the end of the tenth calendar year after the participant’s death. The Act also generally requires a plan to distribute all the plan’s remaining benefit before the end of the tenth calendar year following the death of an EDB who was receiving distributions over his or her life expectancy. The Act imposes a similar rule on the post-2019 death of a designated beneficiary in a plan that otherwise would not be subject to the Act because the participant died before 2020. These distributions required after the death of an EDB (or a designated beneficiary in a pre-2020 plan) are referred to in this Article as successor ten-year distributions. They are the focus of the Article. A major problem may occur on the death of an EDB in a plan with multiple EDBs. In addition to applying the successor ten-year rule to the benefit of the deceased EDB, the SECURE Act will also generally apply the rule to the interests of the other living EDBs. The underlying theory is that a plan is allowed only one method for payment of RMDs, and the SECURE Act imposes that method upon the death of an EDB. Solutions to the problem of multi-beneficiary plans lie in the ability of a participant or trustee to divide a plan into separate accounts for each beneficiary. If such a separation is timely, the death of an EDB in one separate account should not affect the method or period under which RMDs are being made from the separate accounts of other EDBs. Unfortunately, the separate account solution generally does not work for multiple EDBs who are beneficiaries in a “see-through” trust. The interest of a see-through trust in a plan cannot be divided into separate accounts for trust beneficiaries. Instead, the solution lies in the proper creation of separate subtrusts for each beneficiary that insulate the plan interests of living EDBs from the successor ten-year rule applicable to the interest of a deceased EDB. Note though that, in some unique circumstances, a special type of trust allowed by the SECURE Act, an “","PeriodicalId":54058,"journal":{"name":"EJournal of Tax Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-11-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78228593","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Blockchain Initiatives for Tax Administration","authors":"Young Ran (Christine) Kim","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3798136","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3798136","url":null,"abstract":"A thriving body of literature discusses various legal issues related to blockchain, but often it mixes the discussion about blockchain with cryptocurrency. However, blockchain is not the same as cryptocurrency. Defined as a decentralized, immutable, peer-to-leer ledger technology, blockchain is a newly emerging data management system. The private sector—including the financial industry and supply chains—and the public sector—property records, public health, voting, and compliance, have all begun to utilize blockchain. Since more data is processed remotely, and thus digitally, the evolution of blockchain is gaining stronger momentum. \u0000 \u0000While scholarship on blockchain is growing, none of the scholarship has considered the impact of blockchain on the tax sector. This Article extends the study of blockchain to tax administration, evaluates the feasibility of incorporating blockchain within existing tax administrations, and provides policymakers with criteria to consider and some recommended designs for blockchain. Blockchain can enhance the efficiency and transparency of tax administration through its ability to deliver reliable, real-time information from many sources to a large audience. Further, a well-designed private consortium blockchain, evolved from the classic public blockchain, may effectively protect taxpayers' information. Potential areas that blockchain could enhance are payroll taxes, withholding taxes, value added taxes, transfer pricing, the sharing of information between federal, state, and local governments as well as countries. \u0000 \u0000This Article offers normative considerations for policymakers deliberating blockchain initiatives for tax administration, such as timeline, standardization, its integration with other systems, its limitations, and the accompanying legislation to regulate the government and the taxpayer’s rights and privacy. Those implications may resonate with a broader audience beyond tax policymakers.","PeriodicalId":54058,"journal":{"name":"EJournal of Tax Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82078783","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"What May We Expect of a Theory of International Tax Justice?","authors":"D. Broekhuijsen, H. Vording","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3725661","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3725661","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, we discuss what may be expected of a theory of international tax justice. After looking at the most important distributive as well as procedural theories of tax justice, we conclude that none of the existing theories can provide a coherent account of international tax justice. We therefore propose an alternative, more pragmatic approach drawing on Amartya Sen. Even if we do not agree on any particular notion of tax justice, it is still obvious that developing countries’ interests will be served by much simpler rules of international tax law.","PeriodicalId":54058,"journal":{"name":"EJournal of Tax Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-11-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76543050","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Tax Treaty Negotiations: Myth and Reality","authors":"Y. Brauner","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3722607","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3722607","url":null,"abstract":"Tax treaties are the building blocks of the international tax regime. There are currently over 3000 tax treaties that regulate the lion’s share of cross-border investment. They are largely fashioned after a single model reflecting an increasing convergence of international tax norms. Despite this convergence, and despite the passing of nearly a century from when the first modern tax treaties were formalized into a model, there remains a great many unanswered fundamental questions about their application, interpretation, and effectiveness. \u0000 \u0000The importance of these questions was clearly exposed in the recent global displeasure with the norms of the international tax regime, displeasure which has eventually led to perhaps the single most extensive reform initiative for that regime, known as the BEPS project. Much effort and energy were spent on the study of tax treaties before, during, and in the aftermath of this project. Yet surprisingly, almost no effort has ever been made to study the actual making of tax treaties and their negotiation. This Article aims to begin filling this void with a pioneering survey of tax treaty negotiators that documents the process and launches a discourse over its implications for the interpretation and reform of international tax law around the world.","PeriodicalId":54058,"journal":{"name":"EJournal of Tax Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81000100","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"FAQ: Anti-Avoidance Law & Estate Planning with Captives","authors":"Beckett G. Cantley, Geoffrey C. Dietrich","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3707585","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3707585","url":null,"abstract":"This article seeks to address how general judicial anti-avoidance law may be applied to estate planning with IRC 831(b) captive insurance companies.","PeriodicalId":54058,"journal":{"name":"EJournal of Tax Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74061935","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Changing Lanes: Tax Relief for Commuters","authors":"H. Holderness","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3705646","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3705646","url":null,"abstract":"Tax law reaches all parts of life, and societal expectations about life’s activities often affect how the law is applied. As those expectations change, application of the law should be expected to change in turn. This Essay highlights changing societal views about commuting, particularly as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, to demonstrate how even long-standing positions under the tax law can be quickly uprooted. Specifically, as working from home becomes standard, taxpayers should be afforded tax relief when required to commute into the workplace, despite the fact that the tax law traditionally has rejected such relief.","PeriodicalId":54058,"journal":{"name":"EJournal of Tax Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74116216","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Taxpayer Non-Compliance with Input Tax Credit Rules: Data and Policy Options for Canada","authors":"C. Kessler","doi":"10.32721/ctj.2020.68.3.kessler","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.32721/ctj.2020.68.3.kessler","url":null,"abstract":"Input tax credits (ITCs) are a mechanism for businesses to recover the goods and services tax (GST)/harmonized sales tax (HST) paid on expenses related to their commercial activities. While many businesses claim ITCs in accordance with the rules, instances of non-compliance are apparent. Canada uses an invoice credit system that relies on the claimant's retention of documentation that can be checked to detect any overstatement of ITC entitlement. Absent an audit, businesses are generally not required to provide tax authorities with details of their transactions.<br><br>This article draws on a study of case law relating to section 169 of the Excise Tax Act over the five-year period 2014-2019. Section 169 contains the general principles and rules for claiming ITCs. The study highlights various reasons for non-compliance with the ITC system in Canada, both intentional and unintentional. There are several recurring themes: the prevalence of fraudulent practices in certain industries, burdensome documentation and verification requirements, and taxpayers' misunderstanding of the rules for claiming ITCs, owing to ambiguous or otherwise complicated legal tests. In particular, the substantive rules concerning what constitutes a \"commercial activity\" for the purposes of claiming ITCs are often misapplied or misunderstood by claimants. Undisclosed agency relationships also cause problems where they result in the wrong name appearing on the documentation supporting an ITC claim. These issues point to certain flaws in the implementation of the rules under the GST/HST regime in Canada.<br><br>In response to instances of suspected fraud, Canadian tax authorities have been results-driven in implementing increasingly onerous supplier verification requirements that must be met before an ITC is claimed, particularly where the supplier did not remit the applicable tax. This contributes to a high compliance burden for taxpayers. Some proposals have been made for changes that would mitigate the issues associated with undisclosed agency relationships, but there are still problems with the documentation requirements and other substantive rules for claiming ITCs that need to be addressed.<br><br>The article concludes with a review of reform options proposed or adopted in other jurisdictions with a value-added tax. It also discusses a compliance measure implemented in Quebec (the attestation de Revenu Québec), which could be applied in other provinces. Specific recommendations are made for the adoption of e-invoicing and increased reporting requirements to address some of the reasons for non-compliance in Canada. A number of countries have moved toward implementing periodic or near-real-time reporting requirements. These measures show promise and suggest that Canada could move in that direction as well.","PeriodicalId":54058,"journal":{"name":"EJournal of Tax Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81579861","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"The Trade-Off Between Tax Administration and Tax Compliance","authors":"D. Weisbach","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3680827","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3680827","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract \u0000This paper revisits optimal tax enforcement policy, focusing on two elements of that policy: (1) the optimal mix of government-level tax administration and individual-level tax compliance; and (2) the optimal mix of this combination (together, tax enforcement) and tax rates. The standard view is that we should weight tax administration but not tax compliance by the government’s cost of funds because we must pay for tax administration, but not compliance, through dis-torting taxes. As a result, we might want to rely on tax compliance measures even when using tax administration would otherwise be less expensive. Using a flexible model that allows the costs of tax ad-ministration and compliance to be imposed in arbitrary ways, I find instead that we should choose between administration and compliance costs purely on effectiveness grounds, without weighting. The reason is that tax administration and tax compliance impose equivalent types of costs and distortions. Both required forced exactions. Using this result, I derive a formula for the optimal mix of tax rates and the overall level of enforcement. Finally, I briefly comment on how the analysis may change in a redistributive income tax context.","PeriodicalId":54058,"journal":{"name":"EJournal of Tax Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-08-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73021551","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Amicus Brief of Tax Scholars in Support of Appellants","authors":"E. Scharff, Lily L. Batchelder, Jeremy Bearer-Friend, J. Brooks, P. L. Caron, A. Chodorow, Steven A. Dean, D. Gamage, Jacob Goldin, H. Holderness, Ariel Jurow Kleiman, R. Pomp, Darien Shanske, Daniel N. Shaviro, Jay A. Soled, K. Thomas, Vanessa S. Williamson","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3674110","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3674110","url":null,"abstract":"It is hard to describe tax law succinctly. The federal Internal Revenue Code is over 6,000 pages and contains over 4 million words. As scholars who write about taxation, we are well aware of this challenge. Nevertheless, the 100-word summary that appeared on Invest in Education’s petitions accurately describes its proposed change to Arizona tax law. \u0000 \u0000Arizona's Invest in Education initiative would establish a new, separate surcharge of 3.5% on taxable income above certain threshold amounts. This new surcharge shall be imposed “[i]n addition to any other tax imposed by this chapter” and, it will be “collected regardless of whether the income tax rate brackets in this chapter are changed, replaced or eliminated by an act of the legislature.” \u0000 \u0000Invest in Education’s 100-word summary described this provision as “establishing a 3.5% surcharge on taxable income above $250,000 annually for single persons or married persons filing separately, and on taxable income above $500,000 annually for married persons filing jointly or head of household filers.” This description straightforwardly describes the tax law change proposed in the initiative text. \u0000 \u0000The Arizona trial court held there were three tax-related problems with the 100-word summary. The trial court concluded that the use of the term “surcharge” rather than “tax” was misleading, and it held that the description omitted two principal provisions: the relative percentage change in the marginal tax rate and the fact that the definition of taxable income includes income that individuals earn as owners of pass-through entities. The trial court’s conclusions are based in confusion about tax law and a misreading of the Arizona Supreme Court's decision in Molera v. Reagan. As this brief explains, there is nothing misleading about the 100-word summary, and it accurately described the principal tax provision.","PeriodicalId":54058,"journal":{"name":"EJournal of Tax Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75043278","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Calculating Captive Insurance Settlement Initiative Benefits","authors":"Beckett G. Cantley","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3665917","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3665917","url":null,"abstract":"Following several IRS victories against abusive captive insurance companies (“CICs”), the IRS on September 15, 2019 announced a pilot Captive Insurance Company Settlement Initiative (“SI”). The SI set forth a settlement offer to a very limited number of taxpayers. First, the IRS made clear that it will continue to target abusive CIC transactions in the U.S. Tax Court, but that a small group of such taxpayers (only 200 total) with at least one open year under audit have the opportunity to settle their cases on the terms outlined in the SI. This action is understandable given that it is estimated that IRS is dealing with over 500 CIC cases. The SI intends to relieve pressure on the U.S. Tax Court without litigation, conserve IRS resources, and potentially produce finality for those that accept the fixed terms. In a subsequent announcement, the IRS stated that as many as eighty percent (80%) of taxpayers that received offers under the SI accepted the terms. Although the period for accepting this SI has already expired, the IRS may expand this pilot program to make additional settlement offers that are likely to be on terms worse to the taxpayer. \u0000 \u0000The IRS set out SI terms in a document attached to the September 2019 announcement titled “Micro-Captive Insurance Resolution Terms” that contains two sections and an appendix. The first two parts of this article examine the SI offer and consider how a participant who actually closes on the offer is affected. Specifically, part I of this article provides an overview of the SI’s general terms and conditions the IRS required to be met before an offer recipient could participate. Part II examines the applicable SI financial benefits and, also puts into perspective any concessions a participant had to make. This article concludes by calculating the financial results of different sample taxpayers including: (1) a taxpayer who is never audited by the IRS; (2) a taxpayer who accepts and closes on the offer; (3) a taxpayer who declines the offer. Ultimately, the goal of this article is to provide decision making context in preparation for potential future settlement initiatives.","PeriodicalId":54058,"journal":{"name":"EJournal of Tax Research","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87632794","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}