Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies最新文献_第3页

The European Court of Justice's Transformation of its Approach towards Preliminary References from Member State Administrative Bodies 欧洲法院对成员国行政机构初步参考的转变

Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies Pub Date : 2022-11-09 DOI: 10.1017/cel.2022.4

Morten Broberg, N. Fenger

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引用次数: 0

Saving Football from Itself: Why and How to Re-make EU Sports Law 拯救足球：为什么以及如何重新制定欧盟体育法

Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies Pub Date : 2022-10-10 DOI: 10.1017/cel.2022.3

S. Weatherill

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Block Exemption Regulations and Public Policy: in The Defence of BERS 块豁免法规与公共政策:为ber辩护

Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies Pub Date : 2022-09-06 DOI: 10.1017/cel.2022.1

O. Brook

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CEL volume 23 Cover and Back matter CEL第23卷封面和封底

Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies Pub Date : 2021-12-01 DOI: 10.1017/cel.2021.15

引用次数: 0

Sincere Cooperation between EU and Member States in the Field of Readmission: The More the Merrier? 欧盟与成员国在外交领域的真诚合作：越愉快？

Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies Pub Date : 2021-12-01 DOI: 10.1017/cel.2021.10

Caterina Molinari

引用次数: 2

Promoting Fair Private Governance in the Platform Economy: EU Competition and Contract Law Applied to Standard Terms 平台经济中促进公平私人治理:适用于标准条款的欧盟竞争法和合同法

Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies Pub Date : 2021-12-01 DOI: 10.1017/cel.2021.11

J. Rutgers, W. Sauter

引用次数: 3

CEL volume 23 Cover and Front matter CEL第23卷封面和封面

Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies Pub Date : 2021-12-01 DOI: 10.1017/cel.2021.14

引用次数: 0

EU Competition Law as Responsive Law 欧盟竞争法作为应诉法

Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies Pub Date : 2021-12-01 DOI: 10.1017/cel.2021.9

Stavros Makris

{"title":"EU Competition Law as Responsive Law","authors":"Stavros Makris","doi":"10.1017/cel.2021.9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/cel.2021.9","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article proposes two broad ways to conceptualise EU competition law. EU competition law could be viewed as ‘autonomous law’ (‘AL’), namely as a closed normative system a technocratic tool consisting in a set of rules that prohibit undue restraints of trade. Or, EU competition law could be viewed as ‘responsive law’ (‘RL’), namely as a relatively open normative system and an interpretive practice that oscillates between openness and integrity. The responsiveness approach offers a compelling conceptualisation as it explains certain endogenous features of EU competition law: its fuzzy mandate, conceptually elastic vocabulary, and use of rules and standards. In addition, the responsiveness approach can clarify the role economics plays in EU competition law. It views economics as an ‘ideological science’, which, even though it cannot insulate this legal field from value disagreements and make it ‘autonomous’, it can provide a source for positive and normative interpretive statements. On this basis the responsiveness approach maintains that EU competition law is by design open—ie conceptually elastic and factually sensitive—and that its openness can enhance, but also undermine its integrity—ie its capacity to realise its objective in a rule of law compatible manner. These conflicts between openness and integrity are the cause of EU competition law's relative indeterminacy. To deal with the problem of indeterminacy, the RL approach proposes a tripartite legal-institutional modus operandi consisting in constructive interpretation, responsive enforcement, and catalytic adjudication. Hence, considering EU competition law as a form of responsive law has three major implications: first, it offers a new way for understanding how this legal field works and changes; second, it suggests a strategy for dealing with EU competition law's indeterminacy, and third it proposes a new framing for the discursive practices of EU competition law's epistemic community.","PeriodicalId":52109,"journal":{"name":"Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies","volume":"23 1","pages":"228 - 268"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48451574","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

EU Competition Law Devours Its Children: The Proliferation of Anti-Competitive Object and the Problem of False Positives 欧盟竞争法吞噬它的孩子:反竞争对象的扩散和假阳性问题

Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies Pub Date : 2021-12-01 DOI: 10.1017/cel.2021.2

C. Nagy

引用次数: 0

So Long Solange? The PSPP Judgment of the German Constitutional Court and the Conflict between the German and the European ‘Popular Spirit’ 如此漫长的孤独?德国宪法法院的PSPP判决与德国与欧洲“大众精神”的冲突

Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies Pub Date : 2021-11-23 DOI: 10.1017/cel.2021.3

P. Hilpold

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引用次数: 0