发布求助
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献

Ergo-An Open Access Journal of Philosophy最新文献

筛选
英文 中文
Unity and Application 统一与应用
IF 0.6 3区 哲学
Ergo-An Open Access Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-12-28 DOI: 10.3998/ergo.2245
G. Hall
{"title":"Unity and Application","authors":"G. Hall","doi":"10.3998/ergo.2245","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.2245","url":null,"abstract":"Propositions represent the entities from which they are formed. This fact has puzzled philosophers and some have put forward radical proposals in order to explain it. This paper develops a primitivist account of the representational properties of propositions that centers on the operation of application. As we will see, this theory wins out over its competitors on grounds of strength, systematicity and unifying power.","PeriodicalId":51882,"journal":{"name":"Ergo-An Open Access Journal of Philosophy","volume":"38 2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-12-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72943893","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Public Health, Political Solidarity, and the Ethics of Orientation Ascriptions 公共卫生、政治团结与取向归属的伦理
IF 0.6 3区 哲学
Ergo-An Open Access Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-12-28 DOI: 10.3998/ergo.2228
M. Andler
{"title":"Public Health, Political Solidarity, and the Ethics of Orientation Ascriptions","authors":"M. Andler","doi":"10.3998/ergo.2228","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.2228","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51882,"journal":{"name":"Ergo-An Open Access Journal of Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-12-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88989420","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
God and the Problem of Blameless Moral Ignorance 上帝与无可指责的道德无知问题
IF 0.6 3区 哲学
Ergo-An Open Access Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-12-28 DOI: 10.3998/ergo.2233
F. J. Elbert
{"title":"God and the Problem of Blameless Moral Ignorance","authors":"F. J. Elbert","doi":"10.3998/ergo.2233","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.2233","url":null,"abstract":"A morally perfect God necessarily desires that all rational agents behave morally. An omnipotent and omniscient God has the power and knowledge to ensure that all rational agents have sufficient moral knowledge to do what morality requires. So, if God exists, there are no rational moral agents who lack sufficient moral knowledge to act morally. However, there has been a wide range of moral agents who, without blame, have lacked the moral knowledge to behave morally. Therefore, God does not exist. The preceding argument from non-blameable moral ignorance of our fundamental moral obligations is resistant to some of the standard theistic responses to the problem of evil and divine hiddenness. Moreover, some of the standard theistic responses to the traditional arguments for God’s non-existence lend support to the argument from blameless moral ignorance.","PeriodicalId":51882,"journal":{"name":"Ergo-An Open Access Journal of Philosophy","volume":"240 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-12-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76916720","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Is All Phenomenology Presentational? 所有现象学都是表象的吗?
IF 0.6 3区 哲学
Ergo-An Open Access Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-12-28 DOI: 10.3998/ergo.2242
P. Forrest
{"title":"Is All Phenomenology Presentational?","authors":"P. Forrest","doi":"10.3998/ergo.2242","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.2242","url":null,"abstract":"This paper is about two questions in contemporary philosophy of mind, which I call the Scope Question and the Marks Question. The Scope Question is this: What kinds of mental states (events or processes) have phenomenal character, and how many different kinds of phenomenal character are there? The Marks Question is this: What are the distinguishing “marks” of the phenomenal, in virtue of which a mental state, event, or process counts as being phenomenally conscious? To make progress on these questions and explore the relationship between the two, I narrow my focus to a particular instance of each, viz. the (scope) question of whether thoughts possess their own phenomenal character and the (marks) question of whether all phenomenal character is presentational. First, I argue that a phenomenology of entertaining thought content, if it exists, is non-presentational. I then argue from the fact that every genuine phenomenal property can be thought about using a phenomenal concept, to the conclusion that all phenomenology is presentational. One implication is that a (standard form of) transparent, proprietary phenomenology of thought does not exist.","PeriodicalId":51882,"journal":{"name":"Ergo-An Open Access Journal of Philosophy","volume":"26 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-12-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81151878","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Convergence, Community, and Force in Aesthetic Discourse 美学话语中的聚合、共同体与力量
IF 0.6 3区 哲学
Ergo-An Open Access Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-12-28 DOI: 10.3998/ergo.2248
Nick Riggle
{"title":"Convergence, Community, and Force in Aesthetic Discourse","authors":"Nick Riggle","doi":"10.3998/ergo.2248","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.2248","url":null,"abstract":"Philosophers often characterize discourse in general as aiming at some sort of convergence (in beliefs, plans, dispositions, feelings, etc.), and many views about aesthetic discourse in particular affirm this thought. I argue that a convergence norm does not govern aesthetic discourse. The conversational dynamics of aesthetic discourse suggest that typical aesthetic claims have directive force. I distinguish between dynamic and illocutionary force and develop related theories of each for aesthetic discourse. I argue that the illocutionary force of aesthetic utterances is typically invitational because its dynamic force is influenced by a ‘communal’ discourse norm. I draw on dynamic pragmatics to develop a formal account of this dynamic force that explains why invitation has pride of place in aesthetic conversation. It turns out that the end of aesthetic discourse is not convergence but a distinctive form of community, a kind of harmony of individuality, that is compatible with aesthetic disagreement. If this is right, then convergence theories of aesthetic and normative discourse, and of conversation in general, need to be revised.","PeriodicalId":51882,"journal":{"name":"Ergo-An Open Access Journal of Philosophy","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-12-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86293756","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Subjunctive Hypocrisy 虚拟语气的虚伪
IF 0.6 3区 哲学
Ergo-An Open Access Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-12-28 DOI: 10.3998/ergo.2263
Jessica Isserow
{"title":"Subjunctive Hypocrisy","authors":"Jessica Isserow","doi":"10.3998/ergo.2263","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.2263","url":null,"abstract":"It is commonly thought that agents lack the standing to blame in cases where their blame would be hypocritical. Jack for instance, would seem to lack the standing to blame Gerald for being rude to their local barista if he has himself been rude to baristas in the past. Recently, it has been suggested that Jack need not even have displayed any such rudeness in order for his blame to qualify as hypocritical; it would suffice if he too would have been rude to the barista, were he in Gerald’s situation. The latter is an instance of subjunctive hypocritical blame; Jack’s blame is hypocritical not because he has committed the wrong in question, but because he would do so under particular circumstances. Many philosophers endorse a kind of symmetry between ordinary and subjunctive hypocritical blame; they maintain that Jack lacks the standing to blame Gerald if his blame would be hypocritical in either the ordinary or the subjunctive sense. However, I believe that they are mistaken to do so. I argue for an asymmetry between ordinary and subjunctive hypocritical blame: only the former should be taken to compromise an agent’s standing.","PeriodicalId":51882,"journal":{"name":"Ergo-An Open Access Journal of Philosophy","volume":"50 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-12-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78201422","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Fallibility without Facts 没有事实的错误
IF 0.6 3区 哲学
Ergo-An Open Access Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-12-28 DOI: 10.3998/ergo.2241
Will Gamester
{"title":"Fallibility without Facts","authors":"Will Gamester","doi":"10.3998/ergo.2241","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.2241","url":null,"abstract":"If, as expressivists maintain, the function of normative thought and talk is not to represent or describe the world, then how can normative judgements be correct or incorrect? In particular, how can I make sense of my own normative fallibility, the possibility that my own normative judgements might be mistaken? In this paper, I construct and defend a substantive but non-representational theory of normative (in)correctness for expressivists. Inspired by Blackburn’s (1998: 318) proposal that I make sense of my fallibility in terms of the possibility that my judgements might be unstable through improvement, my account is designed in the first instance to vindicate the expressivist’s conception of the nature of normative inquiry. I then defend the proposal from the charge that it leaves insufficient room for my own fallibility, and in particular from Egan’s (2007) argument that it implies a “smug” asymmetry between myself and others. Critical to the response is the appeal to indeterminacy in cases of fundamental normative disagreement between reasonable normative outlooks.","PeriodicalId":51882,"journal":{"name":"Ergo-An Open Access Journal of Philosophy","volume":"30 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-12-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81697469","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Why Do Women Philosophy Students Drop Out of Philosophy? Some Evidence from the Classroom at the Bachelor’s Level 为什么女哲学系学生会退出哲学系?来自本科阶段课堂的一些证据
IF 0.6 3区 哲学
Ergo-An Open Access Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-12-28 DOI: 10.3998/ergo.2252
Catherine Herfeld, Jan Müller, Kathrin von Allmen
{"title":"Why Do Women Philosophy Students Drop Out of Philosophy? Some Evidence from the Classroom at the Bachelor’s Level","authors":"Catherine Herfeld, Jan Müller, Kathrin von Allmen","doi":"10.3998/ergo.2252","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.2252","url":null,"abstract":"It is well known that there has been a steady and significant underrepresentation of women in philosophy on different professional levels. Numerous hypotheses explaining this underrepresentation have been suggested, but empirical analyses are not yet extensive. In particular, studies of the phenomenon in different countries are nonexistent. In this paper, we present findings from an exploratory study in which we analyze the interests, abilities, beliefs, attitudes, perceptions, and goals of bachelor’s students in a semester-long philosophy of science course at a major German university. We furthermore make the first attempt to compare women-only learning environments with mixed-gender learning environments. Our results suggest that while there are generally some gender differences regarding interests, abilities, beliefs, attitudes, perceptions, and goals of students in the classroom, most of the hypotheses we explore to explain dropout rates by gender differences cannot be supported. We conclude that possible factors leading to the underrepresentation of women in philosophy in Germany might be found in the social and institutional environment within which philosophy is taught.","PeriodicalId":51882,"journal":{"name":"Ergo-An Open Access Journal of Philosophy","volume":"3 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-12-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74444590","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
What Immigrants Owe 移民欠什么
IF 0.6 3区 哲学
Ergo-An Open Access Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-12-28 DOI: 10.3998/ergo.2237
A. Lovett, Daniel Sharp
{"title":"What Immigrants Owe","authors":"A. Lovett, Daniel Sharp","doi":"10.3998/ergo.2237","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.2237","url":null,"abstract":"Unlike natural-born citizens, many immigrants have agreed to undertake political obligations. Many have sworn oaths of allegiance. Many, when they entered their adopted country, promised to obey the law. This paper is about these agreements. First, it’s about their validity. Do they actually confer political obligations? Second, it’s about their justifiability. Is it permissible to get immigrants to undertake such political obligations? Our answers are ‘usually yes’ and ‘probably not’ respectively. We first argue that these agreements give immigrants political obligations. We then argue that getting immigrants to undertake such obligations is morally wrong. This is because it makes immigrants’ political obligations more burdensome than those of natural-born citizens. We conclude that the practice of getting immigrants to undertake such obligations should be abolished.","PeriodicalId":51882,"journal":{"name":"Ergo-An Open Access Journal of Philosophy","volume":"50 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-12-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76116014","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Imprecise Credences and Acceptance 不精确的凭证和接受
IF 0.6 3区 哲学
Ergo-An Open Access Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-12-28 DOI: 10.3998/ergo.2264
Benjamin Lennertz
{"title":"Imprecise Credences and Acceptance","authors":"Benjamin Lennertz","doi":"10.3998/ergo.2264","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.2264","url":null,"abstract":"Elga (2010) argues that no plausible decision rule governs action with imprecise credences. I follow Moss (2015a) in claiming that the solution to Elga’s challenge is found in the philosophy of mind, not in devising a special new decision rule. Moss suggests that in decision situations that involve imprecise credences, we must identify with a precise credence, but she says little about identification. By reflecting on the common conception of identification and on what is necessary for Moss’s solution to succeed, I argue that identifying with a precise credence is fundamentally accepting (in the sense of Bratman 1992; Cohen 1989) a proposition about probabilities. The norm on action with imprecise credences is then a special case of the general norm on action and acceptance. I delineate a number of attractive features of this position.","PeriodicalId":51882,"journal":{"name":"Ergo-An Open Access Journal of Philosophy","volume":"86 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-12-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83689414","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
首页 上一页 下一页 尾页
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整，为了账户安全，请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
相关产品
×
本文献相关产品
联系我们：info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务，方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号：604180095
Book学术官方微信