{"title":"Hope as a Source of Grit","authors":"Catherine Rioux","doi":"10.3998/ergo.2234","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.2234","url":null,"abstract":"Psychologists and philosophers have argued that the capacity for perseverance or “grit” depends both on willpower and on a kind of epistemic resilience. But can a form of hopefulness in one’s future success also constitute a source of grit? I argue that substantial practical hopefulness, as a hope to bring about a desired outcome through exercises of one’s agency, can serve as a distinctive ground for the capacity for perseverance. Gritty agents’ “practical hope” centrally involves an attention-fueled, risk-inclined weighting of two competing concerns over action: when facing the decision of whether to persevere, hopeful gritty agents prioritize the aim of choosing a course of action which might go very well over that of choosing a course of action which is very likely to go fairly well. By relying on the notion of a “risk-inclined attentional pattern” as a dimension of gritty agents’ practical hope, we can explain that form of hope’s contribution to their motivation and practical rationality, especially on a risk-weighted expected utility framework. The upshot is a more pluralistic view of the sources of grit.","PeriodicalId":51882,"journal":{"name":"Ergo-An Open Access Journal of Philosophy","volume":"661 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-12-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85372280","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Nietzsche's Concept of Health","authors":"Ian D. Dunkle","doi":"10.3998/ergo.2235","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.2235","url":null,"abstract":"Nietzsche assesses values, moralities, religions, cultures, and persons in terms of health. He argues that we should reject those that are unhealthy and develop healthier alternatives. But what is Nietzsche’s conception of health, and why should it carry such normative force? In this paper I argue for reading Nietzsche’s concept of health as the overall ability to meet the demands of one’s motivational landscape. I show that, unlike other interpretations, this reading accounts for his rejection of particular features of a prevailing, then as now, model of health; for his association of health with strength and with psychic unity; and for his claim that health is compatible with, and can even be enhanced by, functional impairments such as those from which he personally suffered. Throughout I draw connections to recent literature on health and disability.","PeriodicalId":51882,"journal":{"name":"Ergo-An Open Access Journal of Philosophy","volume":"41 4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-12-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89987414","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Anne Conway’s Atemporal Account of Agency","authors":"H. Sample","doi":"10.3998/ergo.2259","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.2259","url":null,"abstract":"This paper aims to resolve an unremarked-upon tension between Anne Conway’s commitment to the moral responsibility of created beings, or creatures, and her commitment to emanative, constant creation. Emanation causation has an atemporal aspect according to which God’s act of will coexists with its effect. There is no before or after, or past or future, in God’s causal contribution. Additionally, Conway’s constant creation picture has it that all times are determined via divine emanation. Creaturely agency, by contrast, is fundamentally temporal, occurring successively over time. It is unclear how creatures can count as emanative causes, which coexists with its effect, given that their agency is limited by time, proceeding from before to after, or past to future. Conway’s account of divine justice in the progress of time, however, requires that creatures are causally responsible. That is, moral responsibility requires causal responsibility. I propose that Conway’s distinction between vital motion and local motion enables a resolution of the tension. Vital motion contributes an atemporal aspect to creaturely agency so that creatures can count as secondary emanative causes.","PeriodicalId":51882,"journal":{"name":"Ergo-An Open Access Journal of Philosophy","volume":"20 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-12-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90681993","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How Do We Differ When We Differ In Taste?","authors":"Daniel Pallies","doi":"10.3998/ergo.2225","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.2225","url":null,"abstract":"My partner loves the experiences she gets from eating olives. I, on the other hand, hate the experiences I get from eating olives. We differ in tastes. But how exactly do we differ? In particular: do our taste experiences differ phenomenologically—do my olive-experiences feel different than my partner’s olive-experiences? Some philosophers have assumed that the answer is “no,” and have advanced important arguments which turn on this assumption. I argue that, contrary to what these philosophers assume, ordinary taste differences do involve differences in phenomenology. My olive-experiences feel different than my partner’s olive-experiences. I argue for this phenomenal thesis in stages. First, I argue that there is a link between our attitudes and our pleasures; second, I argue that there is a link between our pleasures and our phenomenology. Together, my conclusions link our attitudes and phenomenology in a way that vindicates the phenomenal thesis. Along the way, I fend off various worries about what the phenomenal thesis might entail. I show that it does not entail any form of radical subjectivism, nor does it entail that there is a “distinctive feeling of pleasure.” I close by considering how opponents of the phenomenal thesis might retreat to a weaker thesis: one which concerns extraordinary taste differences, as opposed to ordinary taste differences. I argue that there are no obviously sound arguments for even this weaker thesis, which should make us all the more confident in the phenomenal thesis.","PeriodicalId":51882,"journal":{"name":"Ergo-An Open Access Journal of Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-12-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81132497","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Trusting on Another's Say-So","authors":"Grace Paterson","doi":"10.3998/ergo.2244","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.2244","url":null,"abstract":"We frequently trust others—even strangers—based on little more than the good word of a third party. The purpose of this paper is to explain how such trust is possible by way of certain speech acts. I argue that the speech act of vouching is the primary mechanism at work in many of these cases and provide an account of vouching in comparison to the speech act of guaranteeing. On this account, guaranteeing and vouching both commit the speaker to certain actions conditional on undesirable events. However, while guaranteeing may generate reliance in someone or something by providing insurance against bad outcomes, vouching may generate trust in another agent by way of the vouching party manifesting their own trust in the party vouched for and enjoining the addressee to trust likewise.","PeriodicalId":51882,"journal":{"name":"Ergo-An Open Access Journal of Philosophy","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-12-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74405338","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Mental Filing Systems: A User's Guide","authors":"H. Clarke","doi":"10.3998/ergo.2249","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.2249","url":null,"abstract":"How seriously should we take the idea that the mind employs mental files? Goodman and Gray (2022) argue that mental filing—a thinker rationally treating her cognitive states as being about the same thing—can be explained without files. Instead, they argue that the standard commitments of mental file theory, as represented by Recanati’s indexical model, are better seen in terms of a relational representational feature of object representations, which in turn is based on the epistemic links a thinker bears to objects. This paper argues that this revision is misguided. Neither the representational property nor any basic role for epistemic links are needed for an adequate explanatory theory that makes use of the image of a mental filing system. A better alternative to the indexical model does posit files, albeit as causal-functional entities. This makes additional representational features redundant, and shows that epistemic links play a secondary role.","PeriodicalId":51882,"journal":{"name":"Ergo-An Open Access Journal of Philosophy","volume":"4 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-12-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81832602","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"First Steps in an Epistemology of Collective Intellectual Self-Trust","authors":"Nadja El Kassar","doi":"10.3998/ergo.2262","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.2262","url":null,"abstract":"When one looks at the extensive literature on collectivity in philosophy, it may seem that every item in the family of collective states, traits and entities has been examined, but one crucial state has largely been left out of focus: collective intellectual self-trust. In this article I propose a novel conception of collective intellectual self-trust and explain the role of collective intellectual self-trust in groups. I start with a short overview of individual intellectual self-trust, then I introduce what kinds of groups are capable of having collective intellectual self-trust. Against this background I develop the constituents of collective intellectual self-trust. Then I turn to the differences between warranted and unwarranted collective intellectual self-trust and their function in different groups. I close by discussing an objection about the acquisition of collective intellectual self-trust. These are first steps in an epistemology of collective intellectual self-trust that aim to provide the ground for further work in this field.","PeriodicalId":51882,"journal":{"name":"Ergo-An Open Access Journal of Philosophy","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2022-12-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83304687","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Why Critical Social Ontologists Shouldn’t Be Univocalists","authors":"Joshua Harris","doi":"10.3998/ergo.1138","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.1138","url":null,"abstract":"C social ontology is a burgeoning enterprise in the philosophy of social science that amounts to something like a synthesis of two seemingly disparate traditions of inquiry: namely, “critical theory,” broadly construed, and “ontology” or “metaphysics.” Like critical theorists, critical social ontologists understand their theoretical work to be formally conditioned by the fundamental project of human emancipation and social transformation.1 And, like metaphysicians, critical social ontologists concern themselves with questions about the being of the things they investigate.2 Following Michael J. Thompson, we might stipulatively define critical social ontology as a theoretical enterprise founded upon the conviction that “normative claims [e.g., claims about social injustice, oppression, etc.] are critical only to the extent that they carry descriptive claims about the essential structures of sociality within them” (2017: 18). In other words, the basic idea is that we need to attend to the distinctive being, essences and powers of social phenomena if we are to account adequately for their effects, especially those bearing on matters of social justice. Simply put, as Emmanuel Renault has noted, “different ontological assumptions can lead to distinct conceptions of social transformation” (2016: 29). This being the case, I take it as obvious that, among other things, critical social ontologists should affirm what Katherine Ritchie (2015) calls “group realism,”","PeriodicalId":51882,"journal":{"name":"Ergo-An Open Access Journal of Philosophy","volume":"40 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90866273","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Aesthetic Engagement Theory of Art","authors":"Patrick Grafton-Cardwell","doi":"10.3998/ergo.1146","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.1146","url":null,"abstract":"I introduce and explicate a new functionalist account of art, namely that something is an artwork iff the fulfillment of its function by a subject requires that the subject aesthetically engage it. This is the Aesthetic Engagement Theory of art. I show how the Aesthetic Engagement Theory outperforms salient rival theories in terms of extensional adequacy, non-arbitrariness, and ability to account for the distinctive value of art. I also give an account of what it is to aesthetically engage a work that relies on our agential capacity to treat an object as having non-instrumental value, even while the ultimate purpose for our engaging the object is to get something from it.","PeriodicalId":51882,"journal":{"name":"Ergo-An Open Access Journal of Philosophy","volume":"205 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77750848","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Eliminativism and Evolutionary Debunking","authors":"Jeffrey N. Bagwell","doi":"10.3998/ergo.1154","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.1154","url":null,"abstract":"Eliminativists sometimes invoke evolutionary debunking arguments against ordinary object beliefs, either to help them establish object skepticism or to soften the appeal of commonsense ontology. I argue that object debunkers face a self-defeat problem: their conclusion undermines the scientific support for one of their premises, because evolutionary biology depends on our object beliefs. Using work on reductionism and multiple realizability from the philosophy of science, I argue that it will not suffice for an eliminativist debunker to simply appeal to some object-free surrogate theory of evolution that results from converting any scientific proposition about some object K into a proposition about simples arranged K-wise. In the process, I examine some hazards peculiar to eliminative reductions of scientific theories, and propose a trilemma for eliminativists who attempt to recoup generality for ontologically sparse reducing theories by appealing to pluralities of simples arranged K-wise. The paper is intended to define and develop the object debunker’s self-defeat problem for further study, and to clarify some of the ways sparse and abundant ontologies interact with scientific theory.","PeriodicalId":51882,"journal":{"name":"Ergo-An Open Access Journal of Philosophy","volume":"476 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2021-12-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76362606","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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