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Against Purity 对纯度
IF 0.6 3区 哲学
Ergo-An Open Access Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-07-17 DOI: 10.3998/ergo.2919
Jonathan Barker
{"title":"Against Purity","authors":"Jonathan Barker","doi":"10.3998/ergo.2919","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.2919","url":null,"abstract":"A fundamental fact is “pure” just in case it has no grounded entities—ex. Tokyo, President Biden, the River Nile, {Socrates}, etc.—among its constituents. Purity is the thesis that every fundamental fact is pure. I argue that Purity is false. My argument begins with a familiar conditional: if Purity is true, then there are no fundamental “grounding facts” or facts about what grounds what. This conditional is accepted by virtually all of Purity’s defenders. However, I argue that it is also the first step toward Purity’s undoing. For, if every grounding fact has a ground, then some grounded entities have “groundmates” or distinct grounded entities that share their full grounds. But, if there are groundmates, then Purity is false. So Purity leads to a contradiction. Therefore, it is false. I close by noting that my argument against Purity also gives us a powerful reason to think that some grounding facts are fundamental.","PeriodicalId":51882,"journal":{"name":"Ergo-An Open Access Journal of Philosophy","volume":"7 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74662704","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Moral Obligation: Relational or Second-Personal? 道德义务:关系的还是第二人称的?
IF 0.6 3区 哲学
Ergo-An Open Access Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-07-17 DOI: 10.3998/ergo.2917
J. Schaab
{"title":"Moral Obligation: Relational or Second-Personal?","authors":"J. Schaab","doi":"10.3998/ergo.2917","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.2917","url":null,"abstract":"The Problem of Obligation is the problem of how to explain the features of moral obligations that distinguish them from other normative phenomena. Two recent accounts, the Second-Personal Account and the Relational Account, propose superficially similar solutions to this problem. Both regard obligations as based on the legitimate claims or demands that persons as such have on one another. However, unlike the Second-Personal Account, the Relational Account does not regard these claims or demands as based on persons’ authority to address them. Advocates of the Relational Account accuse the Second-Personal Account of falling prey to the Problem of Antecedence. According to this objection, the Second-Personal Account is committed to the implausible claim that we have an obligation to ϕ only if, and because, others demand that we ϕ. Since the Relational Account’s proposed solution to the Problem of Obligation does not face the Problem of Antecedence, its advocates argue that it is dialectically superior to the Second-Personal Account. In this paper, I defend the Second-Personal Account by arguing that, first, the Relational Account does not actually solve the Problem of Obligation and, second, the Second-Personal Account does not fall prey to the Problem of Antecedence.","PeriodicalId":51882,"journal":{"name":"Ergo-An Open Access Journal of Philosophy","volume":"10 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79479363","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
In Defense of the Implicit Commitment Thesis 为内隐承诺命题辩护
IF 0.6 3区 哲学
Ergo-An Open Access Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-07-17 DOI: 10.3998/ergo.3114
Ethan Brauer
{"title":"In Defense of the Implicit Commitment Thesis","authors":"Ethan Brauer","doi":"10.3998/ergo.3114","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.3114","url":null,"abstract":"The implicit commitment thesis is the claim that believing in a mathematical theory S carries an implicit commitment to further sentences not deductively entailed by the theory, such as the consistency sentence Con(S). I provide a new argument for this thesis based on the notion of mathematical certainty. I also reply to a recent argument by Walter Dean against the implicit commitment thesis, showing that my formulation of the thesis avoids the difficulties he raises.","PeriodicalId":51882,"journal":{"name":"Ergo-An Open Access Journal of Philosophy","volume":"65 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87151919","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Norms of Realism and the Case of Non-Traditional Casting 现实主义规范与非传统铸造案例
IF 0.6 3区 哲学
Ergo-An Open Access Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-07-17 DOI: 10.3998/ergo.2910
Catharine Abell
{"title":"The Norms of Realism and the Case of Non-Traditional Casting","authors":"Catharine Abell","doi":"10.3998/ergo.2910","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.2910","url":null,"abstract":"This paper concerns the conditions under which realism is an artistic merit in perceptual narratives, and its consequences for the practice of non-traditional casting. Perceptual narratives are narrative representations that perceptually represent at least some of their contents, and include works of film, television, theatre and opera. On certain construals of the conditions under which realism is an artistic merit in such works, non-traditional casting, however morally merited, is often artistically flawed. I defend an alternative view of the conditions under which realism is an artistic merit in perceptual narratives. I identify the two forms of realism at issue in debates about the artistic merits of non-traditional casting, and identify the artistic norms that determine the conditions under which each constitutes an artistic merit. I argue that, independently of the relation between moral merits and artistic merits, non-traditional casting violates these norms less often than is sometimes assumed. Moreover, in certain circumstances, non-traditional casting affects realism in artistically meritorious ways. I conclude by considering the implications of my view for the practice of whitewashing.","PeriodicalId":51882,"journal":{"name":"Ergo-An Open Access Journal of Philosophy","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88817159","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Telling Gender: The Pragmatics and Ethics of Gender Ascriptions 告诉性别:性别归属的语用学与伦理学
IF 0.6 3区 哲学
Ergo-An Open Access Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-07-17 DOI: 10.3998/ergo.2911
Quill R Kukla, M. Lance
{"title":"Telling Gender: The Pragmatics and Ethics of Gender Ascriptions","authors":"Quill R Kukla, M. Lance","doi":"10.3998/ergo.2911","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.2911","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51882,"journal":{"name":"Ergo-An Open Access Journal of Philosophy","volume":"129 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81000824","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Sometimes It Is Better to Do Nothing: A New Argument for Causal Decision Theory 有时候什么都不做更好:因果决策理论的新论点
IF 0.6 3区 哲学
Ergo-An Open Access Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-07-17 DOI: 10.3998/ergo.3594
O. Vassend
{"title":"Sometimes It Is Better to Do Nothing: A New Argument for Causal Decision Theory","authors":"O. Vassend","doi":"10.3998/ergo.3594","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.3594","url":null,"abstract":"It is often thought that the main significant difference between evidential decision theory and causal decision theory is that they recommend different acts in Newcomb-style examples (broadly construed) where acts and states are correlated in peculiar ways. However, this paper presents a class of non-Newcombian examples that evidential decision theory cannot adequately model whereas causal decision theory can. Briefly, the examples involve situations where it is clearly best to perform an act that will not influence the desired outcome. On evidential decision theory—but not causal decision theory—this situation turns out to be impossible: acts that an agent does not think influence the desired outcome are never optimal. Typically, sophisticated versions of evidential decision theory emulate causal decision theoretic reasoning by (implicitly) conditioning on causal confounders, but in the kind of example considered here, this trick does not work. The upshot is that there is more to causal reasoning than has so far been appreciated.","PeriodicalId":51882,"journal":{"name":"Ergo-An Open Access Journal of Philosophy","volume":"33 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81700520","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Visual Asynchrony & Temporally Extended Contents 视觉异步和时间扩展的内容
IF 0.6 3区 哲学
Ergo-An Open Access Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-07-17 DOI: 10.3998/ergo.2907
P. Chuard
{"title":"Visual Asynchrony & Temporally Extended Contents","authors":"P. Chuard","doi":"10.3998/ergo.2907","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.2907","url":null,"abstract":"Temporal experiences, according to retentionalism, essentially have temporally extended contents: contents which represent distinct events at distinct temporal locations, and some of their temporal relations. This means, retentionalists insist, that temporal experiences themselves needn’t be extended in time: only their contents are. The paper reviews an experiment by Moutoussis and Zeki, which demonstrates a colour-motion visual asynchrony (§2): information about motion seems to be processed more slowly than information about colour, so that the former is delayed relative to the latter. This, the paper argues, raises an important difficulty for retentionalism and its account of the temporal ontology of experiences: it suggests that a central background assumption about neural processing presupposed by retentionalism is false, at least in cases of visual asynchrony. The paper then explores the general significance of this result for retentionalism (§3).","PeriodicalId":51882,"journal":{"name":"Ergo-An Open Access Journal of Philosophy","volume":"22 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90783364","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Intentional Action, Know-how, and Lucky Success 有意的行动，诀窍和幸运的成功
IF 0.6 3区 哲学
Ergo-An Open Access Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-07-17 DOI: 10.3998/ergo.3590
M. Kirley
{"title":"Intentional Action, Know-how, and Lucky Success","authors":"M. Kirley","doi":"10.3998/ergo.3590","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.3590","url":null,"abstract":"Elizabeth Anscombe held that acting intentionally entails knowing (in a distinctively practical way) what one is doing. The consensus for many years was that this knowledge thesis faces decisive counterexamples, the most famous being Donald Davidson’s carbon copier case, and so should be rejected or at least significantly weakened. Recently, however, a new defense of the knowledge thesis has emerged: provided one understands the knowledge in question as a form of progressive judgement, cases like Davidson’s pose no threat. In this paper, I argue that this neo-Anscombean maneuver fails because it is founded on an untenable conception of the difference between intentional and merely lucky success. More specifically, the neo-Anscombean view conflates merely lucky success with subjectively surprising success. Unlike the former, subjectively surprising success may well be intentional, for it may well be the result of an exercise of knowledge-how. After sketching an alternative view that better captures the intuitive contrast between lucky and intentional success, I argue that the conflation of surprising and merely lucky success owes to a tacit commitment to the thesis that knowing how entails knowing that one knows how. This thesis is not only false, but distortive of the explanatory role of knowledge-how. This result, in turn, tells us something important about what practical knowledge cannot be.","PeriodicalId":51882,"journal":{"name":"Ergo-An Open Access Journal of Philosophy","volume":"25 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84041248","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Thought and Talk in a Generous World 在一个慷慨的世界里思想和谈话
IF 0.6 3区 哲学
Ergo-An Open Access Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-07-17 DOI: 10.3998/ergo.2918
Alexander Sandgren
{"title":"Thought and Talk in a Generous World","authors":"Alexander Sandgren","doi":"10.3998/ergo.2918","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.2918","url":null,"abstract":"The problem of the many seems to problematize the platitude that we can think about particular things in the world. How is it that, given how very many cat-like candidates there are, we often manage to think and talk about a particular cat? I argue that this challenge stems from an under-examined assumption about the relationship between metaphysics and intentionality. I explore and develop a way of characterizing what it is to think and talk about the world, according to which an abundant ontology poses no obstacle to our ability to think and talk about particular things.","PeriodicalId":51882,"journal":{"name":"Ergo-An Open Access Journal of Philosophy","volume":"49 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79079277","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
On Radical Enactivist Accounts of Arithmetical Cognition 论算术认知的激进行为论
IF 0.6 3区 哲学
Ergo-An Open Access Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-07-17 DOI: 10.3998/ergo.3120
M. Pantsar
{"title":"On Radical Enactivist Accounts of Arithmetical Cognition","authors":"M. Pantsar","doi":"10.3998/ergo.3120","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.3120","url":null,"abstract":"Hutto and Myin have proposed an account of radically enactive (or embodied) cognition (REC) as an explanation of cognitive phenomena, one that does not include mental representations or mental content in basic minds. Recently, Zahidi and Myin have presented an account of arithmetical cognition that is consistent with the REC view. In this paper, I first evaluate the feasibility of that account by focusing on the evolutionarily developed proto-arithmetical abilities and whether empirical data on them support the radical enactivist view. I argue that although more research is needed, it is at least possible to develop the REC position consistently with the state-of-the-art empirical research on the development of arithmetical cognition. After this, I move the focus to the question whether the radical enactivist account can explain the objectivity of arithmetical knowledge. Against the realist view suggested by Hutto, I argue that objectivity is best explained through analyzing the way universal proto-arithmetical abilities determine the development of arithmetical cognition.","PeriodicalId":51882,"journal":{"name":"Ergo-An Open Access Journal of Philosophy","volume":"14 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.6,"publicationDate":"2023-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76231712","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
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