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Journal of Moral Philosophy最新文献

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Equality, Democracy, and the Nature of Status: Reply to Motchoulski 平等、民主和地位的本质:对Motchoulski的回答
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Journal of Moral Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-03-27 DOI: 10.1163/17455243-20223942
Jake Zuehl
{"title":"Equality, Democracy, and the Nature of Status: Reply to Motchoulski","authors":"Jake Zuehl","doi":"10.1163/17455243-20223942","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20223942","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Several contemporary philosophers have argued that democracy earns its moral keep in part by rendering political authority compatible with social or relational equality. In a recent article in this journal, Alexander Motchoulski examines these relational egalitarian defenses of democracy, finds the standard approach wanting, and advances an alternative. The standard approach depends on the claim that inequality of political power constitutes status inequality (the ‘constitutive claim’). Motchoulski rejects this claim on the basis of a theory of social status: once you see what social status is, Motchoulski thinks, the constitutive claim is a non-starter. In its place, Motchoulski suggests that relational egalitarians can and should content themselves with a defense of democratic institutions on the basis of a causal-instrumental link between equality of political power and equality of social relations. In this reply, I advance three main claims. First, relational egalitarians have good reason to hope for a defense of the constitutive claim, since that claim is required if relational equality is to vindicate the intrinsic value of democracy. Second, Motchoulski’s argument against the constitutive claim fails, because it depends on conflating one species of social status for the genus as a whole. Finally, I argue that the constitutive claim is trivially true for one kind of status, namely de facto authority, but, since equality of that kind of status is not intrinsically valuable, this does not amount to a defense of the intrinsic value of democracy.","PeriodicalId":51879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Moral Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45156429","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Constraint Against Doing Harm and Long-Term Consequences 对伤害的约束和长期后果
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Journal of Moral Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-02-16 DOI: 10.1163/17455243-20223642
Charlotte Franziska Unruh
{"title":"The Constraint Against Doing Harm and Long-Term Consequences","authors":"Charlotte Franziska Unruh","doi":"10.1163/17455243-20223642","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20223642","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000Many people hold the constraint against doing harm, the view that the reason against doing harm is stronger than the reason against merely allowing harm, everything else being equal. Mogensen and MacAskill (2021) have recently argued that when considering indirect long-term consequences of our everyday behavior, the constraint against doing harm faces a problem: it has the absurd implication that we should do as little as possible in our lives. In this paper, I explore the view that, for behavior that does not increase anyone’s ex ante risk of suffering harm, the reason against doing harm is not stronger than the reason against merely allowing harm, everything else being equal. I argue that this view is plausible, show how it solves the paralysis problem, and defend it against objections.","PeriodicalId":51879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Moral Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48390149","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Fairness, Benefits, and Voluntary Acceptance 公平、利益和自愿接受
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Journal of Moral Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-02-14 DOI: 10.1163/17455243-20223790
Edward Song
{"title":"Fairness, Benefits, and Voluntary Acceptance","authors":"Edward Song","doi":"10.1163/17455243-20223790","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20223790","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000The principle of fairness suggests that it is wrong for free riders to enjoy cooperative benefits without also helping to produce them. Considerations of fairness are a familiar part of moral experience, yet there is a great deal of controversy as to the conditions of their application. The primary debate concerns whether cooperative benefits need to be voluntarily accepted. Many argue that acceptance is unnecessary because such theories are too permissive and acceptance appears to be absent in a variety of cases where considerations of fairness nevertheless seem applicable. In this paper, I defend the claim that acceptance is necessary by suggesting that these worries can be disarmed, and that theories that deny the necessity of acceptance face deep challenges in articulating an understanding of cooperative benefits that does not also appeal to a person’s acceptance of them.","PeriodicalId":51879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Moral Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42969225","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
(When) Are Authors Culpable for Causing Harm? (何时)作者对造成伤害负有责任?
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Journal of Moral Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-01-09 DOI: 10.1163/17455243-20223768
Marcus Arvan
{"title":"(When) Are Authors Culpable for Causing Harm?","authors":"Marcus Arvan","doi":"10.1163/17455243-20223768","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20223768","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000To what extent are authors morally culpable for harms caused by their published work? Can authors be culpable even if their ideas are misused, perhaps because they failed to take precautions to prevent harmful misinterpretations? Might authors be culpable even if they do take precautions − if, for example, they publish ideas that others can be reasonably expected to put to harmful uses, precautions notwithstanding? Although complete answers to these questions depend upon controversial views about the right to free speech, this paper argues that five notions from the philosophy of law and legal practice − liability, burden of proof, legal causation, mens rea, and reasoning by precedent − can be adapted to provide an attractive moral framework for determining whether an author’s work causes harm, whether and how culpable the author is for causing such harm, steps authors may take to immunize themselves from culpability, and how to responsibly develop new rules for publishing ethics.","PeriodicalId":51879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Moral Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44609086","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Libertarian Control and Ultimate Responsibility 自由主义控制和终极责任
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Journal of Moral Philosophy Pub Date : 2023-01-09 DOI: 10.1163/17455243-20223805
M. Montminy
{"title":"Libertarian Control and Ultimate Responsibility","authors":"M. Montminy","doi":"10.1163/17455243-20223805","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20223805","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000I raise three new objections against Robert Kane’s account of ultimate responsibility based on what he calls self-forming actions (sfa s). First, the ultimate responsibility that we have for our character is very limited, since, according to Kane’s model of character development, our character is shaped by sfa s for which we are only minimally responsible. Second, it is not desirable to rely on sfa s to shape our character. There are much better alternatives. Third, given what typically motivates our sfa s, we only rarely satisfy the conditions on responsibility for the changes in character that our sfa s give rise to.","PeriodicalId":51879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Moral Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45604225","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Andrew S. Gold, The Right of Redress 安德鲁·s·戈尔德，《补救权》
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Journal of Moral Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-12-06 DOI: 10.1163/17455243-19060001
Erik Encarnacion
{"title":"Andrew S. Gold, The Right of Redress","authors":"Erik Encarnacion","doi":"10.1163/17455243-19060001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-19060001","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Moral Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45239634","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Amy Olberding, The Wrong of Rudeness: Learning Modern Civility from Ancient Chinese Philosophy 奥：“粗鲁的错误：从中国古代哲学中学习现代文明”
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Journal of Moral Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-12-06 DOI: 10.1163/17455243-19060006
J. Hu
{"title":"Amy Olberding, The Wrong of Rudeness: Learning Modern Civility from Ancient Chinese Philosophy","authors":"J. Hu","doi":"10.1163/17455243-19060006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-19060006","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Moral Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46425855","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Kristján Kristjánsson, Flourishing as the Aim of Education: A Neo-Aristotelian View Kristján Kristjánsson，繁荣作为教育的目的:一个新亚里士多德的观点
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Journal of Moral Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-12-06 DOI: 10.1163/17455243-19060005
James E. Murray
{"title":"Kristján Kristjánsson, Flourishing as the Aim of Education: A Neo-Aristotelian View","authors":"James E. Murray","doi":"10.1163/17455243-19060005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-19060005","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Moral Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43025471","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Jason Baehr, Deep in Thought: A Practical Guide to Teaching for Intellectual Virtues Jason Baehr，《深入思考：智慧美德教学的实践指南》
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Journal of Moral Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-12-06 DOI: 10.1163/17455243-19060007
W. Hare
{"title":"Jason Baehr, Deep in Thought: A Practical Guide to Teaching for Intellectual Virtues","authors":"W. Hare","doi":"10.1163/17455243-19060007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-19060007","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Moral Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48271314","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Andrew Forcehimes and Luke Semrau, Thinking Through Utilitarianism: A Guide to Contemporary Arguments Andrew Forcehimes和Luke Semrau，《通过功利主义思考:当代争论指南》
IF 0.9 2区 哲学
Journal of Moral Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-12-06 DOI: 10.1163/17455243-19060004
M. Oliveira
{"title":"Andrew Forcehimes and Luke Semrau, Thinking Through Utilitarianism: A Guide to Contemporary Arguments","authors":"M. Oliveira","doi":"10.1163/17455243-19060004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-19060004","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51879,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Moral Philosophy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47896667","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
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