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Economic Development in Peacekeeping Host Countries 维持和平东道国的经济发展
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Cesifo Economic Studies Pub Date : 2018-12-01 DOI: 10.1093/CESIFO/IFX009
V. Bove, Leandro Elia
{"title":"Economic Development in Peacekeeping Host Countries","authors":"V. Bove, Leandro Elia","doi":"10.1093/CESIFO/IFX009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/CESIFO/IFX009","url":null,"abstract":"To what extent does United Nations peacekeeping assist in laying the foundations for economic development? We conduct the first exploratory analysis of the effect of peace operations on the economic development of the host countries. We highlight the need for new inferential methods to reveal the extent to which robust conclusions about the success of missions can be drawn. We then apply synthetic control methods to 11 peace operations deployed since the end of the Cold War. Our results suggest that, in seven cases, peacekeeping does not seem to significantly affect economic rehabilitation. In two of the remaining four cases, the impact is negative rather than positive, pointing to persistent hurdles to identification.","PeriodicalId":51748,"journal":{"name":"Cesifo Economic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2018-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/CESIFO/IFX009","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47671507","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 20
Defence Commitment and Deterrence in the Theory of War 战争理论中的防御承诺与威慑
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Cesifo Economic Studies Pub Date : 2018-12-01 DOI: 10.1093/CESIFO/IFY001
V. Kanniainen
{"title":"Defence Commitment and Deterrence in the Theory of War","authors":"V. Kanniainen","doi":"10.1093/CESIFO/IFY001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/CESIFO/IFY001","url":null,"abstract":"The article shows that a defending army, particularly a small one, can fight hard when attacked by a predator. The result arises in the commitment equilibrium of a model with intergenerational altruism. By implication, the article offers a novel theory of deterrence and defence policy. It shows that in the absence of informational constraints, there is a unique army size that is sufficient for deterrence. Under informational restrictions, a pooling equilibrium may exist where a victim with strong intergenerational altruism overinvests in its army, while the victim with a more limited altruism free rides on the information gap of the predator and builds a smaller army. Conditions for the existence of a separating equilibrium are established in terms of the cost of war. It turns out that the optimal defence policy need not satisfy the deterrence requirement. The case of separating equilibrium helps to explain why wars exist in equilibrium.","PeriodicalId":51748,"journal":{"name":"Cesifo Economic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2018-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/CESIFO/IFY001","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49127933","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
The Economics of Peace and War: An Overview 和平与战争经济学综述
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Cesifo Economic Studies Pub Date : 2018-12-01 DOI: 10.1093/CESIFO/IFY026
V. Kanniainen, Panu Poutvaara
{"title":"The Economics of Peace and War: An Overview","authors":"V. Kanniainen, Panu Poutvaara","doi":"10.1093/CESIFO/IFY026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/CESIFO/IFY026","url":null,"abstract":"Violence and conflicts have caused suffering throughout history. Moreover, the arrival of nuclear weapons even raised concerns about the survival of humankind. This special issue analyzes the causes and consequences of violence and conflict. It covers wars, civil wars, and terrorism, as well as organization of the military and its effects on the rest of the society.","PeriodicalId":51748,"journal":{"name":"Cesifo Economic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2018-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/CESIFO/IFY026","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49263241","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Budget and Effort Choice in Sequential Colonel Blotto Campaigns 连续布洛托上校战役的预算和努力选择
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Cesifo Economic Studies Pub Date : 2018-12-01 DOI: 10.1093/CESIFO/IFY010
Kai A. Konrad
{"title":"Budget and Effort Choice in Sequential Colonel Blotto Campaigns","authors":"Kai A. Konrad","doi":"10.1093/CESIFO/IFY010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/CESIFO/IFY010","url":null,"abstract":"Military campaigns are studied as dynamic best-of-three contests, where final victory is attributed to the first player who wins a critical number of battles. The article studies how overall budget constraints and different assumptions about the destruction of military resources used in a given battle affect the dynamics and overall equilibrium resources in a best-of-three contest. Discouragement effects for players who lag behind and the showdown effect when the campaign reaches a more decisive state vanish if players have to choose an overall budget and can draw on what is left from this budget in the course of the campaign. This is true both in a context in which the resources allocated to a battle are used up there as well as if player’s battle resources carry over to future battles. If only the winner’s contest resources carryover, this generates precautionary behavior of the leading player and all-in behavior for the player lagging behind.","PeriodicalId":51748,"journal":{"name":"Cesifo Economic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2018-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/CESIFO/IFY010","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46377257","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 12
Corrigendum to: Defence Commitment and Deterrence in the Theory of War 《战争理论中的国防承诺和威慑》的勘误表
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Cesifo Economic Studies Pub Date : 2018-11-14 DOI: 10.1093/CESIFO/IFY022
V. Kanniainen
{"title":"Corrigendum to: Defence Commitment and Deterrence in the Theory of War","authors":"V. Kanniainen","doi":"10.1093/CESIFO/IFY022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/CESIFO/IFY022","url":null,"abstract":"The paper shows that a defending army, particularly a small one, can fight hard when attacked by a predator. The result arises in the commitment equilibrium of a model with intergenerational altruism. By implication, the paper offers a novel theory of deterrence and defence policy. It shows that in the absence of informational constraints, there is a unique army size that is sufficient for deterrence. Under informational restrictions, a pooling equilibrium may exist where a victim with strong intergenerational altruism overinvests in its army, while the victim with a more limited altruism free rides on the information gap of the predator and builds a smaller army. Conditions for the existence of a separating equilibrium are established in terms of the cost of war. It turns out that the optimal defence policy need not satisfy the deterrence requirement. The case of separating equilibrium helps to explain why wars exist in equilibrium. JEL Classification: H12, H56","PeriodicalId":51748,"journal":{"name":"Cesifo Economic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2018-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/CESIFO/IFY022","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43538884","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Training Participation and the Role of Reciprocal Attitudes 培训参与与相互态度的作用
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Cesifo Economic Studies Pub Date : 2018-11-13 DOI: 10.26481/UMAGSB.2018024
Arjan Non
{"title":"Training Participation and the Role of Reciprocal Attitudes","authors":"Arjan Non","doi":"10.26481/UMAGSB.2018024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.26481/UMAGSB.2018024","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, I examine the relation between workers’ reciprocal attitudes, as measured in 2005 and 2010, and participation in work-related training courses in 2007 and 2013, respectively. Theory predicts that employers find it more profitable to invest in human capital of workers who have positively reciprocal attitudes, because they are more likely to return their employer’s kindness with higher effort and/or loyalty. The findings are mixed, depending on the survey year. I find that positively reciprocal workers are more likely to participate in employer-financed training in 2007, in particular when training is general. Also, consistent with theoretical expectations, I do not find a relation between workers’ reciprocal attitudes and participation in training that is not financed by the employer. However, workers’ reciprocal attitudes are not related to training participation in 2013. A possible explanation is that employers use training to induce reciprocal feelings in a slack labour market only. (JEL codes: M53 and D91).","PeriodicalId":51748,"journal":{"name":"Cesifo Economic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2018-11-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45477051","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Are Supply-side Reforms Contractionary at the Zero Lower Bound?* 供给侧改革是否在零下限收缩*
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Cesifo Economic Studies Pub Date : 2018-10-26 DOI: 10.1093/CESIFO/IFY021
Yangyang Ji
{"title":"Are Supply-side Reforms Contractionary at the Zero Lower Bound?*","authors":"Yangyang Ji","doi":"10.1093/CESIFO/IFY021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/CESIFO/IFY021","url":null,"abstract":"Research suggests that if supply-side reforms take place as the nominal interest rate hits the so-called ‘zero lower bound’ (ZLB), the benefits of reforms are outweighed by the negatives, and the net effect is contractionary (Eggertsson et al. 2014; Fernandez-Villaverde 2014). In this article, we show that the effectiveness of temporary reforms that reduce price markups is determined by the interaction between two offsetting effects on the real interest rate: one deflationary and one inflationary. If the latter outweighs the former, the reforms can become expansionary. The effectiveness of permanent reforms is determined by the monetary policy outside the ZLB: a wealth effect. If the effect is large enough, the reforms can also become expansionary (JEL codes: E30, E50, E60).","PeriodicalId":51748,"journal":{"name":"Cesifo Economic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2018-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/CESIFO/IFY021","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41569150","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Computation of Equivalent Incomes and Social Welfare for EU and Non-EU Countries 计算欧盟和非欧盟国家的等效收入和社会福利
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Cesifo Economic Studies Pub Date : 2018-09-01 DOI: 10.1093/CESIFO/IFX024
Ida Petrillo
{"title":"Computation of Equivalent Incomes and Social Welfare for EU and Non-EU Countries","authors":"Ida Petrillo","doi":"10.1093/CESIFO/IFX024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/CESIFO/IFX024","url":null,"abstract":"Individual well-being depends not only on monetary income but is affected by various non-income dimensions of human life. While this is now broadly acknowledged, a unanimous way to measure such multidimensional well-being does not exist. In this article we examine the various approaches that have been proposed in this vein in welfare economics, by highlighting their strengths and weaknesses, and devote particular attention to the equivalent income. We use this indicator to compute individual well-being and social welfare for all the European Union (EU) and some non-EU countries with the data from the 3rd wave of the European Quality of Life Survey referred to the period 2011–2012. Our analysis shows that, whether we adopt a utilitarian or rank-dependent representation of social preferences, the ranking of countries based on their equivalent incomes is substantially different from that based on monetary incomes.","PeriodicalId":51748,"journal":{"name":"Cesifo Economic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2018-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/CESIFO/IFX024","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46693912","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Fiscal decentralisation in times of financial crises 金融危机时期的财政分权
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Cesifo Economic Studies Pub Date : 2018-09-01 DOI: 10.1093/CESIFO/IFX008
D. Bartolini, Agnese Sacchi, S. Salotti, Raffaella Santolini
{"title":"Fiscal decentralisation in times of financial crises","authors":"D. Bartolini, Agnese Sacchi, S. Salotti, Raffaella Santolini","doi":"10.1093/CESIFO/IFX008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/CESIFO/IFX008","url":null,"abstract":"The virtues of fiscal decentralisation are usually assessed against the provision of local public goods, little is said about its impact on public finances. There is, however, a growing concern that central governments losing control over part of the budget could negatively affect public finances, especially in times of adverse financial conditions. The present work shows that these concerns are misplaced. The empirical investigation on 19 OECD countries, over the period 1980-2010, shows that expenditure decentralisation improves the central budget balance without prejudice for local budgets, thus improving the overall country’s fiscal position. This effect is reinforced when combined with tax autonomy. During periods of financial crises, the disciplinary role of fiscal decentralisation appears to be even stronger, raising concerns about the recentralisation trend recently pursued by some advanced economies precisely to face fiscal distress and economic stagnation.","PeriodicalId":51748,"journal":{"name":"Cesifo Economic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2018-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/CESIFO/IFX008","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45826153","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 24
Estimates of the causal effects of education on earnings over the lifecycle with cohort effects and endogenous education 基于队列效应和内生教育的生命周期中教育对收入的因果影响的估计
IF 1.3 4区 经济学
Cesifo Economic Studies Pub Date : 2018-09-01 DOI: 10.1093/CESIFO/IFX020
Giuseppe Migali, I. Walker
{"title":"Estimates of the causal effects of education on earnings over the lifecycle with cohort effects and endogenous education","authors":"Giuseppe Migali, I. Walker","doi":"10.1093/CESIFO/IFX020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/CESIFO/IFX020","url":null,"abstract":"This paper acknowledges that the relationship between log wages and schooling is considerably more complex than the simple human capital earnings function suggests and that schooling is endogenous. We estimate a model where educational attainment is discrete and ordered and log wages are determined by a simple function of work experience for each level of attainment. We distinguish between lifecycle and cohort effects by exploiting the fact that we have a short panel. We strongly reject both the usual separability assumption and exogeneity of educational attainment.","PeriodicalId":51748,"journal":{"name":"Cesifo Economic Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2018-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/CESIFO/IFX020","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42097006","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
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