{"title":"Innovation in Decentralized Markets: Technology versus Synthetic Products","authors":"M. Rostek, Ji Hee Yoon","doi":"10.1257/mic.20220138","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20220138","url":null,"abstract":"Advances in market-clearing technology for multiple assets and synthetic products present alternative ways to leverage complementarities and substitutabilites in asset payoffs. This paper compares their equilibrium and welfare effects. In competitive markets, either instrument can mimic the efficient design. When traders have price impact, however, synthetic products and market-clearing technology provide separate instruments for impacting markets’ performance and can generate synergies or trade-offs. Neither instrument can generally reproduce the other’s payoffs state by state. Moreover, innovation in market clearing renders additional synthetic products nonredundant. Our analysis points to the advantages of each type of innovation while also exposing potential risks. (JEL D44, D47, G11, G12, G13, O31)","PeriodicalId":517133,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal: Microeconomics","volume":"9 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139897492","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Social Connectedness and Information Markets","authors":"R. Kranton, David McAdams","doi":"10.1257/mic.20220056","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20220056","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates information quality in a simple model of socially connected information markets. Suppliers’ payoffs derive from the fraction of consumers who see their stories. Consumers prefer to share and act only on high-quality information. Quality is endogenous and highest when social connectedness is neither too high nor too low. In highly connected markets, low-quality stories are widely seen, giving suppliers little incentive to invest in quality. Increasing the volume of misinformation and increasing consumers’ costs of tuning in to suppliers’ broadcasts can each increase equilibrium information quality. (JEL D11, D82, D83, L82, Z13)","PeriodicalId":517133,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal: Microeconomics","volume":"47 7-8","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139897714","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Predicting Cooperation with Learning Models","authors":"D. Fudenberg, Gustav Karreskog Rehbinder","doi":"10.1257/mic.20220148","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20220148","url":null,"abstract":"We use simulations of a simple learning model to predict cooperation rates in the experimental play of the indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma. We suppose that learning and the game parameters only influence play in the initial round of each supergame, and that after these rounds, play depends only on the outcome of the previous round. We find that our model predicts out-of-sample cooperation at least as well as models with more parameters and harder-to-interpret machine learning algorithms. Our results let us predict the effect of session length and help explain past findings on the role of strategic uncertainty. (JEL C57, C72, C73, D83, D91)","PeriodicalId":517133,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal: Microeconomics","volume":"76 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139896786","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Predicting Cooperation with Learning Models","authors":"D. Fudenberg, Gustav Karreskog Rehbinder","doi":"10.1257/mic.20220148","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20220148","url":null,"abstract":"We use simulations of a simple learning model to predict cooperation rates in the experimental play of the indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma. We suppose that learning and the game parameters only influence play in the initial round of each supergame, and that after these rounds, play depends only on the outcome of the previous round. We find that our model predicts out-of-sample cooperation at least as well as models with more parameters and harder-to-interpret machine learning algorithms. Our results let us predict the effect of session length and help explain past findings on the role of strategic uncertainty. (JEL C57, C72, C73, D83, D91)","PeriodicalId":517133,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal: Microeconomics","volume":"88 9","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139893896","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Weighted Utility and Optimism/Pessimism: A Decision-Theoretic Foundation of Various Stochastic Dominance Orders","authors":"Taoli Wang, Ehud Lehrer","doi":"10.1257/mic.20220350","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20220350","url":null,"abstract":"We show that a probability distribution likelihood ratio dominates another distribution if and only if, for every weighted utility function, the former is preferred over the latter. Likewise, a probability distribution hazard rate (or reverse hazard rate) dominates another distribution if and only if, the former is preferred by every optimistic (or pessimistic) decision maker. (JEL D11, D83)","PeriodicalId":517133,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal: Microeconomics","volume":"2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139896785","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Coordination in the Fight against Collusion","authors":"E. Iossa, S. Loertscher, L. Marx, Patrick Rey","doi":"10.1257/mic.20220194","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20220194","url":null,"abstract":"While antitrust authorities strive to detect, prosecute, and thereby deter collusive conduct, entities harmed by that conduct are also advised to pursue their own strategies to deter collusion. The implications of such delegation of deterrence have largely been ignored, however. In a procurement context, we find that buyers may prefer to accommodate rather than deter collusion among their suppliers. We also show that a multimarket buyer, such as a centralized procurement authority, may optimally deter collusion when multiple independent buyers would not, consistent with the view that “large” buyers are less susceptible to collusion. (JEL D21, D43, D44, L12, L14)","PeriodicalId":517133,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal: Microeconomics","volume":"11 9","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139897315","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Social Connectedness and Information Markets","authors":"R. Kranton, David McAdams","doi":"10.1257/mic.20220056","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20220056","url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates information quality in a simple model of socially connected information markets. Suppliers’ payoffs derive from the fraction of consumers who see their stories. Consumers prefer to share and act only on high-quality information. Quality is endogenous and highest when social connectedness is neither too high nor too low. In highly connected markets, low-quality stories are widely seen, giving suppliers little incentive to invest in quality. Increasing the volume of misinformation and increasing consumers’ costs of tuning in to suppliers’ broadcasts can each increase equilibrium information quality. (JEL D11, D82, D83, L82, Z13)","PeriodicalId":517133,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal: Microeconomics","volume":"494 ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2024-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139894017","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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