{"title":"Organized crime as a link between inequality and corruption","authors":"Soeren C. Schwuchow","doi":"10.1007/s10657-023-09764-x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-023-09764-x","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We study a model that establishes a novel theoretical rationale for the empirically well-documented relation between inequality and corruption. According to our model, inequality can nurture corruption by empowering organized crime because collusion between local police forces and criminal organizations is more likely in societies characterized by high inequality or weak security forces. Law enforcement and organized crime have a strong incentive to collude due to efficiency gains from specialization. However, their agreement breaks down when the mobsters can no longer credibly commit to joint rent maximization and thus start to compete with law enforcement for citizens’ wealth. The mobsters then non-violently monopolize the market for extortion by undercutting the police forces, similar to a strategy of predatory pricing. Criminal collusion is thus not very different from its corporate equivalent; hence, similar policy measures should be promising. In addition, our model also suggests that the criminal organization’s higher efficiency in extracting rents has a greater impact when the relative power between law enforcement and organized crime is rather balanced. Accordingly, when violent conflict becomes less predictable, non-violent elements of relative power become more relevant. Our model also allows for the interpretation that in the absence of strong social norms against corruption, organized crime is more difficult to challenge.","PeriodicalId":51664,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Law and Economics","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136151802","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Financial market enforcement in France","authors":"Laure de Batz","doi":"10.1007/s10657-023-09761-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-023-09761-0","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51664,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Law and Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47551547","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Capitation taxes and the regulation of professional services","authors":"B. Deffains, D. Demougin","doi":"10.1007/s10657-023-09762-z","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-023-09762-z","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51664,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Law and Economics","volume":"55 1","pages":"167-193"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-02-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42323585","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Do antitrust laws erode shareholder returns? Evidence from the Chinese market","authors":"S. Cho, C. Chung, D. Kim","doi":"10.1007/s10657-023-09763-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-023-09763-y","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51664,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Law and Economics","volume":"55 1","pages":"349-376"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48000206","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Georges Siotis, Carmine Ornaghi, Micael Castanheira
{"title":"Evolving market boundaries and competition policy enforcement in the pharmaceutical industry","authors":"Georges Siotis, Carmine Ornaghi, Micael Castanheira","doi":"10.1007/s10657-022-09760-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-022-09760-7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51664,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Law and Economics","volume":"55 1","pages":"313-348"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-02-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48216449","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Does legal freedom satisfy?","authors":"Niclas Berggren, Christian Bjørnskov","doi":"10.1007/s10657-022-09753-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-022-09753-6","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Much political conflict in the world revolves around the issue of how much freedom to accord people. Liberal democracies are characterized by, e.g., the rule of law and a strong protection of civil rights, giving individuals a great deal of legally guaranteed freedom to lead their lives as they see fit. However, it is not known whether legal freedom suffices to make people satisfied with freedom. Our study explores that issue by relating seven indicators of legal freedom to the satisfaction people express with their freedom of choice. Using a sample of 133 countries over the period 2008-2018, and taking a panel-data approach, we find no robust baseline relationship. However, when exploring conditional associations by interacting the indicators with social trust, the rule of law is positively and increasingly related to satisfaction with freedom above and below a threshold level. Freedom of assembly is more positive for satisfaction with freedom the higher the GDP per capita and in democracies. Thus, for some types of legal freedom, formal legal institutions are complementary with culture, income and the political system in generating satisfaction with freedom.</p>","PeriodicalId":51664,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Law and Economics","volume":"55 1","pages":"1-28"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9511442/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10867302","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Motor Vehicle Registration Taxes (MVRT) across EU countries: MNEs' profitability and the role of market concentration.","authors":"Pranvera Shehaj, Martin Zagler","doi":"10.1007/s10657-023-09775-8","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s10657-023-09775-8","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>This paper discusses the effects of one-off Motor Vehicle Registration Taxes (MVRT) and market concentration level on the profitability of multinational enterprises (MNEs) operating in the European Union motor vehicle industry. Our simple theoretical framework shows that firm profits depend on the demand function and therefore on taxes applied to prices. We overcome empirically the challenges of making informative theoretical predictions on the pass-through rate under imperfect competition. We find that MVRT,-both as ad valorem taxes and as specific taxes,-have a significant negative effect on MNEs' profitability. Our findings show a statistically significant positive effect of market concentration on profitability. Finally, our results suggest that the degree of competitiveness in the motor vehicle market moderates the effect of MVRT on firm profitability only in EU countries where the MVRT is an ad valorem tax, with the negative effect of the ad valorem MVRT becoming higher as the motor vehicle market becomes less competitive.</p>","PeriodicalId":51664,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Law and Economics","volume":"56 1","pages":"155-198"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10447272/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10084477","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Francesco Angelini, Massimiliano Castellani, Pierpaolo Pattitoni
{"title":"You can’t export that! Export ban for modern and contemporary Italian art","authors":"Francesco Angelini, Massimiliano Castellani, Pierpaolo Pattitoni","doi":"10.1007/s10657-022-09759-0","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-022-09759-0","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51664,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Law and Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48230321","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"You go first!: coordination problems and the burden of proof in inquisitorial prosecution","authors":"Robin Christmann, Roland Kirstein","doi":"10.1007/s10657-022-09757-2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-022-09757-2","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Prosecution of criminals is costly and subject to errors. In contrast to adversarial court procedures, in inquisitorial systems the prosecutor is regarded as an impartial investigator and an aide to the judge. We show in a sequential prosecution game of a Bayesian court that a strategic interaction between these two impartial agents exists where each player may hope to free ride on the other one´s investigative effort. This gives rise to inefficient equilibria. The model demonstrates that the effectiveness of some policy measures that intend to curb the free-riding problem critically depends on the assumed benevolence of the prosecutor. We find that, if policy makers are unable to infer the true preferences of the prosecutorial body, the high burden of proof in criminal law may reduce the probability of court errors. Our analysis, therefore, substantiates claims made in the literature that inquisitorial procedures are introduced to avoid wrongful acquittals.</p>","PeriodicalId":51664,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Law and Economics","volume":"30 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-12-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138513864","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Regulatory objectives vs fiscal interests: Are German casino locations motivated by beggar-thy-neighbor policy? An empirical analysis","authors":"Justus Haucap, Radivoje Nedic, Talha Şimşek","doi":"10.1007/s10657-022-09758-1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-022-09758-1","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51664,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Law and Economics","volume":"55 1","pages":"291-311"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45437939","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}