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Stability in Liberal Epistocracies 自由派的稳定
IF 1.7 2区 哲学
Social Epistemology Pub Date : 2022-10-24 DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2022.2131482
C. Fumagalli
{"title":"Stability in Liberal Epistocracies","authors":"C. Fumagalli","doi":"10.1080/02691728.2022.2131482","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2022.2131482","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In this article, I argue that stability is one of the enabling conditions for epistocratic arrangements to function well and justify their claim right to rule. Against this backdrop, I demonstrate that advocates of strategies to allocate exclusive decision-making power to knowledgeable citizens fail to demonstrate that in a context marked by the fact of pluralism, liberal epistocracies will be stable. They could argue that liberal epistocracies will be stable because epistocratic arrangements are better equipped than democratic decision-making bodies to produce outcomes that approximate the common good. They could argue that liberal epistocracies will be stable because there is a shared meritocratic set of values and ideas. Furthermore, they could opt for two standard liberal strategies, such as overlapping consensus and modus vivendi. Yet, in all cases, the argument for the stability of liberal epistocracies is not persuasive.","PeriodicalId":51614,"journal":{"name":"Social Epistemology","volume":"37 1","pages":"97 - 109"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49661234","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Knowledge, Expertise and Science Advice During COVID-19: In Search of Epistemic Justice for the 'Wicked' Problems of Post-Normal Times. COVID-19 期间的知识、专长和科学建议：为后正常时代的 "邪恶 "问题寻求认识论正义。
IF 1.4 2区 哲学
Social Epistemology Pub Date : 2022-10-10 eCollection Date: 2022-01-01 DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2022.2103750
Maru Mormina
{"title":"Knowledge, Expertise and Science Advice During COVID-19: In Search of Epistemic Justice for the 'Wicked' Problems of Post-Normal Times.","authors":"Maru Mormina","doi":"10.1080/02691728.2022.2103750","DOIUrl":"10.1080/02691728.2022.2103750","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>A consistent claim from governments around the world during the Coronavirus pandemic has been that they were <i>following the science</i>. This raises the question, central to this paper, of what and whose knowledge is or should be sought, which is being side-lined through the choice of particular framings and discourses, and with what consequences for the creation and implementation of evidence-based policy to tackle wicked problems. Through the lens of Fricker's epistemic injustice, I problematise the expertise that has guided the COVID-19 response as epistemically narrow and argue that counteracting a monolithic culture of expertise requires tackling the structural inequalities in the systems of knowledge production to diversify the social and epistemological foundations of science. Drawing on Post-normal Science (PNS) theory, I suggest that the expertise needed to respond to the challenges of a post-COVID world is one that embraces greater pluralism, avoids groupthink, challenges the accepted orthodoxy and helps us revert old models and rigid path dependencies that so often neglect the lived realities and demands of those left behind. This can only be realised by overcoming epistemic injustice and embracing epistemic democracy in the practice of evidence-based policy.</p>","PeriodicalId":51614,"journal":{"name":"Social Epistemology","volume":"36 6","pages":"671-685"},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2022-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9721401/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"10729949","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Epistemic Bunkers 认知掩体
IF 1.7 2区 哲学
Social Epistemology Pub Date : 2022-09-26 DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2022.2122756
Katherine Furman
{"title":"Epistemic Bunkers","authors":"Katherine Furman","doi":"10.1080/02691728.2022.2122756","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2022.2122756","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT One reason that fake news and other objectionable views gain traction is that they often come to us in the form of testimony from those in our immediate social circles – from those we trust. A language around this phenomenon has developed which describes social epistemic structures in terms of ‘epistemic bubbles’ and ‘epistemic echo chambers’. These concepts involve the exclusion of external evidence in various ways. While these concepts help us see the ways that evidence is socially filtered, it doesn’t help us understand the social functions that these structures play, which limits our ability to intervene on them. In this paper, I introduce a new concept – that of the epistemic bunker. This concept helps us better account for a central feature of the phenomenon, which is that exclusionary social epistemic structures are often constructed to offer their members safety, either actual or perceived. Recognising this allows us to develop better strategies to mitigate their negative effects.","PeriodicalId":51614,"journal":{"name":"Social Epistemology","volume":"37 1","pages":"197 - 207"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42335006","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Epistemic Structure in Non-Summative Social Knowledge 非总结性社会知识的认识结构
IF 1.7 2区 哲学
Social Epistemology Pub Date : 2022-09-21 DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2022.2121621
Avram Hiller, R. Randall
{"title":"Epistemic Structure in Non-Summative Social Knowledge","authors":"Avram Hiller, R. Randall","doi":"10.1080/02691728.2022.2121621","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2022.2121621","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT How a group G can know that p has been the subject of much investigation in social epistemology in recent years. This paper clarifies and defends a form of non-supervenient, non-summative group knowledge: G can know that p even if none of the members of G knows that p, and whether or not G knows that p does not locally supervene on the mental states of the members of G. Instead, we argue that what is central to G knowing that p is whether G has an epistemic structure that is functioning appropriately in accord with the action-related purposes of the group, and this structure may include non-agential elements such as devices that retain or process information. We argue that recent objections to non-summative group knowledge given by Jennifer Lackey do not in fact succeed in undermining the view, but do help to clarify the nature of non-summative group knowledge. The main upshot of our response to Lackey’s objections is that groups put their knowledge into action in ways that often differ from how individuals do, and social epistemologists should be careful to notice these differences, especially insofar as groups often structure themselves by employing various epistemically-relevant devices.","PeriodicalId":51614,"journal":{"name":"Social Epistemology","volume":"37 1","pages":"30 - 46"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45105483","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Gap Between Science and Society and the Intrinsically Capitalistic Character of Science Communication 科学与社会的差距与科学传播的本质资本主义特征
IF 1.7 2区 哲学
Social Epistemology Pub Date : 2022-09-21 DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2022.2111670
Luis Arboledas-Lérida
{"title":"The Gap Between Science and Society and the Intrinsically Capitalistic Character of Science Communication","authors":"Luis Arboledas-Lérida","doi":"10.1080/02691728.2022.2111670","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2022.2111670","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that Science Communication inheres to the capitalist relations of production. By making use of Marxist dialectics, the enquiry will elucidate the enquiry will elucidate that capital creates the gap between science and society that Science Communication is deemed to bridge, for capitalism deprives workers of the ‘intellectual potencies of the material process of production’ and makes both impossible and meaningless for them to appropriate scientific knowledge in a direct, unmediated manner. Along these lines, the paper will revisit the long-standing ‘deskilling-upskilling debate’ in order to shed light on what specific workers’ productive attributes form the material basis on which Science Communication grounded. I conclude that the existence of Science Communication responds to the fact that workers are devoid of any control over the social qualitative content of their work – the purpose and the mode of the labouring activity. In other words, Science Communication is premised on the limited form taken by the productive consciousness capital equips workers with in order just to reproduce itself.","PeriodicalId":51614,"journal":{"name":"Social Epistemology","volume":"37 1","pages":"698 - 712"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-09-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48306273","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Beyond Deep Disagreement: A Path Towards Achieving Understanding Across a Cultural Divide 超越深刻分歧:跨越文化鸿沟实现理解之路
IF 1.7 2区 哲学
Social Epistemology Pub Date : 2022-09-20 DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2022.2123261
Jay Evans, J. Kingsbury
{"title":"Beyond Deep Disagreement: A Path Towards Achieving Understanding Across a Cultural Divide","authors":"Jay Evans, J. Kingsbury","doi":"10.1080/02691728.2022.2123261","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2022.2123261","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Achieving genuine engagement and understanding between communities with radically divergent worldviews is challenging. If there is no common ground on which to stand and have a discussion, the likely outcomes of an apparent intercultural disagreement are a stalemate, the (sometimes colonialist) imposition of a single worldview, or a kind of relativistic tolerance that falls short of genuine engagement. In this paper, we suggest a way forward that takes as its starting point the philosophical discussion of deep disagreement, using the example of taniwha – in te ao Māori (the Māori world/worldview), powerful water beings that must be treated with respect – to outline a strategy for building intercultural understanding and enabling constructive intercultural dialogue.","PeriodicalId":51614,"journal":{"name":"Social Epistemology","volume":"37 1","pages":"656 - 665"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43763075","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Bots: Some Less-Considered Epistemic Problems 机器人:一些较少考虑的认知问题
IF 1.7 2区 哲学
Social Epistemology Pub Date : 2022-09-19 DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2022.2122898
Benjamin Winokur
{"title":"Bots: Some Less-Considered Epistemic Problems","authors":"Benjamin Winokur","doi":"10.1080/02691728.2022.2122898","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2022.2122898","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Posts on social media platforms like Twitter are sometimes the products of deceptively designed bots. These bots can cause obvious epistemic problems, such as tricking human users into believing the contents of misleading posts. However, less-considered epistemic problems involve false bot judgements where a human user mistakes another human user’s post for a bot-post, or where a human user mistakenly believes that bots are the primary vehicles for tokening certain content on social media. This paper takes up three questions concerning false bot judgements: what exactly are their associated epistemic harms, just how harmful are they, and what should we do about them?","PeriodicalId":51614,"journal":{"name":"Social Epistemology","volume":"37 1","pages":"713 - 725"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47408088","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
The Influence of Disciplinary Origins on Peer Review Normativities in a New Discipline 学科渊源对新学科同行评审规范性的影响
IF 1.7 2区 哲学
Social Epistemology Pub Date : 2022-09-15 DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2022.2111669
K. Beddoes, Yu Xia, Stephanie Cutler
{"title":"The Influence of Disciplinary Origins on Peer Review Normativities in a New Discipline","authors":"K. Beddoes, Yu Xia, Stephanie Cutler","doi":"10.1080/02691728.2022.2111669","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2022.2111669","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT STS scholarship has produced important insights about relationships between the roles of peer review and the social construction of knowledge. Yet, barriers related to access have been a continual challenge for such work. This article overcomes some past access challenges and explores peer review normativities operating in the new discipline of Engineering Education. In doing so, it contributes new insights about disciplinary development, interdisciplinarity, and peer review as a site of knowledge construction. In particular, it draws attention to an aspect of peer review not previously discussed – how peer review normativities are shaped by disciplinary origins. A content analysis of peer review documentation revealed that a hyperfocus on methods, which can be traced back to disciplinary origins, continues to be a guiding normativity. However, interviews with editors revealed that they do not acknowledge that normativity. Implications of those findings and their misalignment are discussed, as are contrasts with the history of other disciplines.","PeriodicalId":51614,"journal":{"name":"Social Epistemology","volume":"37 1","pages":"390 - 404"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49418350","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
The Social Indicators of the Reputation of an Expert 专家声誉的社会指标
IF 1.7 2区 哲学
Social Epistemology Pub Date : 2022-09-03 DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2022.2116962
G. Origgi
{"title":"The Social Indicators of the Reputation of an Expert","authors":"G. Origgi","doi":"10.1080/02691728.2022.2116962","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2022.2116962","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT A notion that comes from the toolbox of social sciences, trust has become a mainstream epistemological concept in the last 15 years. The notion of epistemic trust has been distinguished from the notion of moral and social trust, the former involves kinds of inferences about the others that are rationally justifiable. If I trust a scientist about the efficacy of a vaccine against COVID-19, I must have an epistemic justification. I am therefore rationally justified in trusting her because I have an epistemic reason to justify my belief. I will challenge the distinction between epistemic and moral and social trust by pointing to several social indicators that contribute to our trustful attitudes in a reasonable way. Social indicators of reputation, values and moral commitments to values are indispensable strategies to come to trust in a rational way, an attitude that is different from merely believing the truth. I also point out the fragility of trusting experts’ reputations and stress the importance of avoiding biases in trusting other people’s reputations to make our deference to experts more robust.","PeriodicalId":51614,"journal":{"name":"Social Epistemology","volume":"36 1","pages":"541 - 549"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42665504","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Trust, Vaccine Hesitancy, and the COVID-19 Pandemic: A Phenomenological Perspective 信任、疫苗犹豫和COVID-19大流行:现象学视角
IF 1.7 2区 哲学
Social Epistemology Pub Date : 2022-09-03 DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2022.2115325
Tarun Kattumana
{"title":"Trust, Vaccine Hesitancy, and the COVID-19 Pandemic: A Phenomenological Perspective","authors":"Tarun Kattumana","doi":"10.1080/02691728.2022.2115325","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2022.2115325","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Vaccine hesitancy has been a major cause for concern throughout the COVID-19 pandemic. The World Health Organization have previously addressed vaccine hesitancy via the ‘3C model’ (Convenience, Complacency, and Confidence). Recent scholarship has added two more ‘Cs’ (Context and Communication) to formulate a ‘5C model’ that is more equipped to adapt to the uncertainties of the pandemic. This paper focuses on the four ‘Cs’ that explicitly concerns trust (Complacency, Confidence, Context, and Communication) and phenomenologically distinguishes confidence from trust. Experts view vaccines in terms of confidence, where the prospect of an undesirable outcome is extremely rare. Hence, not vaccinating and compromising herd immunity is seen to be unreasonable. Hesitant individuals contest the expert perspective and view vaccines in terms of trust, where the prospect of disappointment is likely. From this perspective, to vaccinate is to take a risk, and it is within reason to have the freedom to choose otherwise. This paper focuses on the hesitant perspective to identify the two social indicators of trust in vaccines most prominently shown during the COVID-19 pandemic in the Global North: (i) the expert reaction to hesitant concerns and (ii) the loss of freedom in relation to vaccine requirements.","PeriodicalId":51614,"journal":{"name":"Social Epistemology","volume":"36 1","pages":"641 - 655"},"PeriodicalIF":1.7,"publicationDate":"2022-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45929525","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
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