{"title":"Anti-Exceptionalism about Logic and the Burden of Explanation","authors":"B. Martin","doi":"10.1017/can.2022.14","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2022.14","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Considerable attention recently has been paid to anti-exceptionalism about logic (AEL), the thesis that logic is more similar to the sciences in important respects than traditionally thought. One of AEL’s prominent claims is that logic’s methodology is similar to that of the recognised sciences, with part of this proposal being that logics provide explanations in some sense. However, insufficient attention has been given to what this proposal amounts to, and the challenges that arise in providing an account of explanations in logic. This paper clarifies these challenges, and shows how the practice-based approach is best placed to meet them.","PeriodicalId":51573,"journal":{"name":"CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"51 1","pages":"602 - 618"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47435036","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"In Memoriam: Terence M. Penelhum","authors":"John W. Heintz","doi":"10.1017/can.2022.12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2022.12","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51573,"journal":{"name":"CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"51 1","pages":"554 - 556"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47465258","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Reliabilism Defended","authors":"Jeffrey Tolly","doi":"10.1017/can.2022.13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2022.13","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Reliabilism about knowledge states that a belief-forming process generates knowledge only if its likelihood of generating true belief exceeds 50 percent. Despite the prominence of reliabilism today, there are very few if any explicit arguments for reliabilism in the literature. In this essay, I address this lacuna by formulating a new independent argument for reliabilism. As I explain, reliabilism can be derived from certain key knowledge-closure principles. Furthermore, I show how this argument can withstand John Turri’s two recent objections to reliabilism: the argument from explanatory inference and the argument from achievements.","PeriodicalId":51573,"journal":{"name":"CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"51 1","pages":"619 - 635"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43878787","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Future Is Not What It Used to Be: Longevity and the Curmudgeonly Attitude to Change","authors":"Kathy Behrendt","doi":"10.1017/can.2022.19","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2022.19","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Boredom has dominated discussions about longevity thanks to Bernard Williams’s influential “The Makropulos Case.” I reveal the presence in that paper of a neglected, additional problem for the long-lived person, namely alienation in the face of unwanted change. Williams gestures towards this problem but does not pursue it. I flesh it out on his behalf, connecting it to what I call the ‘curmudgeonly attitude to change.’ This attitude manifests itself in the tendency, amongst those getting on in years, to observe that things are getting worse. Curmudgeonliness is typically met with dismissal because it often concerns changes that don’t radically inhibit the curmudgeon’s well-being or autonomy. I believe that taking the curmudgeonly attitude more seriously will provide insight into the longer-lived self and its relation to the future. Using Williams’s approach to longevity as the framework, I contend that—as with boredom—a sense of alienation born of curmudgeonliness can become terminal for the subject, rendering her unable to envision the future as a site of worthwhile activity. However, I also uncover ways in which this agential stasis is significantly distinct from boredom and constitutes a different worry and a different risk for the long-lived individual.","PeriodicalId":51573,"journal":{"name":"CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"51 1","pages":"557 - 572"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41348055","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"CAN volume 51 issue 8 Cover and Front matter","authors":"K. Nielsen, David Rondel","doi":"10.1017/can.2022.24","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2022.24","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":51573,"journal":{"name":"CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":" ","pages":"f1 - f3"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44603681","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Thinking Reasonably about Indeterministic Choice Beliefs","authors":"A. Kissel","doi":"10.1017/can.2022.18","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2022.18","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Recent research suggests that, regardless of the truth of libertarianism about free will, there appears to be a widespread belief among nonphilosopher laypersons that the choices of free agents are not causally necessitated by prior states of affairs. In this paper, I propose a new class of debunking explanation for this belief which I call ‘reasons-based accounts’ (RBAs). I start the paper by briefly recounting the failures of extant approaches to debunking explanations, and then use this as a jumping off point to articulate several alternatives, highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of each.","PeriodicalId":51573,"journal":{"name":"CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"51 1","pages":"588 - 601"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41709101","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Algorithmic Fairness and the Situated Dynamics of Justice","authors":"S. Fazelpour, Z. Lipton, D. Danks","doi":"10.1017/can.2021.24","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2021.24","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Machine learning algorithms are increasingly used to shape high-stake allocations, sparking research efforts to orient algorithm design towards ideals of justice and fairness. In this research on algorithmic fairness, normative theorizing has primarily focused on identification of “ideally fair” target states. In this paper, we argue that this preoccupation with target states in abstraction from the situated dynamics of deployment is misguided. We propose a framework that takes dynamic trajectories as direct objects of moral appraisal, highlighting three respects in which such trajectories can be subject to evaluation in relation to their (i) temporal dynamics, (ii) robustness, and (iii) representation.","PeriodicalId":51573,"journal":{"name":"CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"52 1","pages":"44 - 60"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-10-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46441972","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Algorithms and the Individual in Criminal Law","authors":"Renée Jorgensen","doi":"10.1017/can.2021.28","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2021.28","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Law-enforcement agencies are increasingly able to leverage crime statistics to make risk predictions for particular individuals, employing a form of inference that some condemn as violating the right to be “treated as an individual.” I suggest that the right encodes agents’ entitlement to a fair distribution of the burdens and benefits of the rule of law. Rather than precluding statistical prediction, it requires that citizens be able to anticipate which variables will be used as predictors and act intentionally to avoid them. Furthermore, it condemns reliance on various indexes of distributive injustice, or unchosen properties, as evidence of law-breaking.","PeriodicalId":51573,"journal":{"name":"CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":"52 1","pages":"61 - 77"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2021-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43156655","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
京公网安备 11010802042870号
